A WTO Agreement on Investment: A Solution in Search of a Problem? by Kennedy, Kevin C.
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Faculty Publications
1-1-2003
A WTO Agreement on Investment: A Solution in
Search of a Problem?
Kevin C. Kennedy
Michigan State University College of Law, kenne111@law.msu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/facpubs
Part of the International Law Commons, and the International Trade Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For more
information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kevin C. Kennedy, A WTO Agreement on Investment: A Solution in Search of a Problem?, 24 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 77 (2003).
HeinOnline -- 24 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 77 2003
A WTO AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT: A SOLUTION IN 
SEARCH OF A PROBLEM? 
KEVIN C. KENNEDY* 
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKDROP 
As global competition for foreign direct investment intensifies, 
the question pending before the World Trade Organization 
("WTO") is whether to negotiate an agreement on investment that 
would address, inter alia, national laws that restrict market access 
of foreign capital.1 In the intervening years between the Singapore 
Ministerial Conference in 1996 and the latest Ministerial Confer-
ence held in Doha, Qatar in 2001, several WTO members (including 
the European Union, Japan, and Korea) and commentators urged 
the WTO to include on its agenda negotiations leading to multilat-
eral rules on investment.2 Demands by the European Union 
(liEU") for a comprehensive trade negotiation round that includes 
negotiations on investment could very well be a red herring in-
tended to draw attention away from negotiations on agricultural 
trade reform and the EU's common agricultural policy ("CAP"), 
.. Professor of Law, Michigan State University-Detroit College of Law. J.D. 
1977, Wayne State University Law School; LL.M. 1982, Harvard Law School. 
1 At least one WTO member has characterized the question as one of under-
standing "what is missing in the current WTO framework." WTO Working 
Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Submission from Can-
ada, at 2, WT/WGTI/W /19 (Dec. 11, 1997). 
2 See, e.g., Daniel Pruzin, EU Advocates GATS Approach to wro Talks on In-
vestment, Offers Nondiscrimination View, 19 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1218, 1219 Guly 
11, 2002); Daniel Pruzin, EU Official Says Support Growing Jor Comprehensive Trade 
Round, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1284 (Aug. 4, 1999) [hereinafter Pruzin, EU Offi-
cial]; Daniel Pruzin, Japan Discussion Paper Highlights Likely Issues for wro Talks on 
Investment Rules, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 881 Gune 7, 2001) (describing Japan's 
call for WTO negotiation on investment rules); Daniel Pruzin, Prospects Diminish-
ing Jor Talks on Rules Covering Investment, Competition, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 
1598 (Oct. 6, 1999); Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Offers Olive Branch on Talks at wro on In-
vestment, But Not Inside Seattle Round, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1779 (Nov. 3, 
1999); Co-operate on Competition, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1998, at 16 (calling upon the 
WTO to issue multilateral competition policy); The Borders of Competition, 
ECONOMIST, July 4, 1998, at 69 (suggesting WTO including minimum competition 
policies). 
77 
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the proverbial 1/ third rail" of EU politics - that is, if any EU politi-
cian touches it, their political life is finished.3 Before the start of the 
aborted Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999, the United States 
took the position that negotiations on a WTO investment agree-
ment should not be part of any new multilateral round of trade ne-
gotiations.4 
3 See RAJ BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW: THE GATT-WTO 
SYSTEM, REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, AND U.S. LAW 1188 (1998) (noting that" the CAP 
is a highly charged subject"); Daniel Pruzin, EU Official, supra note 2, at 1284. 
Without question the most politically charged of all the EU common policies, both 
within and outside the EU, is the common agricultural policy. Article 32 of the 
Treaty of Establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty") directs the EU 
member states to develop a common agricultural policy. See Treaty Establishing 
the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997) [hereinafter EC 
Treaty]. Article 33 of the EC Treaty identifies the CAP's five objectives: (1) to in-
crease agricultural productivity, (2) to ensure a fair standard of living for farmers, 
(3) to stabilize markets, (4) to assure availability of supplies, and (5) to ensure that 
consumers pay reasonable prices. ld. art. 33. The EC Treaty offers no details on 
how these five objectives are to be accomplished, but instead leaves it to the 
Commission and Council to work out proposals and directives. ld. arts. 34-37. 
The Commission has adopted three principles to guide it in developing the CAP: 
(1) with the single market concept as the polestar, agricultural products must 
move freely within the EU and be sold at stable prices set by the EU; (2) priority 
should be given to EU-origin agricultural products to protect them from cheaper 
imports; and (3) the costs of the CAP must be shared. See European Commission, 
Activities of the European Union, Agriculture: Introduction, at 
http://europa.eu.intjscadplus/leg/en/lvb/504000.htm (defining instruments 
used for EC agricultural policy); BHALA & KENNEDY, supra, at 1185-86 (stating that 
the CAP's main objective is "food self-sufficiency"). Some of the thorniest issues 
that the EU has had to grapple with in framing the CAP have included the ques-
tion of food self-sufficiency, stable prices for farmers and consumers, and adjust-
ment to international trade competition. See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra, at 1178-80 
(providing an introduction to GATT-WTO agricultural concerns). Under the 
CAP, huge food surpluses have been created that are sold in world markets at 
prices that severely undercut the prices of those same products offered by other 
agricultural exporting countries, including the United States, Argentina, and Aus-
tralia. See Amy Kaslow, Farm Subsidies Create Bounty, Boondoggles, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Nov. 4, 1992, at 12 (discussing the negative effects of farm subsidies). 
Agricultural trade wars have been the result, with one country undercutting an-
other country's exporter's price by subsidizing exports to third countries. See 
BHALA & KENNEDY, supra, at 1186 (noting further the problem of agricultural over-
production resulting in bidding wars); Will These Modest Proposals Provoke Mayhem 
Down on the Farm? ECONOMIST, July 13, 2002, at 42 (analyzing the EC's agricultural 
aid policies). 
4 See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Outlines Priorities for WTO's Seattle Ministerial, 16 
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1285 (Aug. 4, 1999). The United States was joined by the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (" ASEAN"), India, Mexico, and Pakistan. 
See Daniel Pruzin, Seattle Ministerial and Beyond: A Long, Winding Road for WTO, 16 
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1975, 1977 (Dec. 1, 1999). 
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The arguments for a binding, multilateral legal instrument on 
foreign direct investment ("FDI")5 can be briefly summarized as 
follows: 
(1) A multilateral investment agreement is an important devel-
opment tool because it will attract FDI that will in tum improve 
5 Investment can be divided into two broad categories: portfolio investment 
and direct investment. The former involves acquiring shares of corporations 
without exercising any direct control over management of the organization. Di-
rect investment, in contrast, involves acquiring a significant controlling interest of 
an existing foreign firm or establishing a new firm (the latter is sometimes re-
ferred to as a "greenfield" investment). One measure of a controlling interest is 
that an investor must hold at least ten percent of a firm's equity in order for that 
investment to be classified as a direct investment. See Approaching the Next Fron-
tier for Trade in Seruices: Liberalization of International Investment, Industry, Trade, & 
Tech. Rev., April 1996, USITC Pub. 2962 at 2 (distinguishing between portfolio 
and direct investment). It is management control that distinguishes direct in-
vestment from portfolio investment. As used in this Article, the term "foreign di-
rect investment" refers to direct investment, including the purchase or sale of 
business enterprises (mergers and acquisitions) and the establishment of a fresh or 
"greenfield" investment. 
Foreign direct investment can be further divided into three types: horizontal, 
vertical, and distribution. WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between 
Trade and Investment, The Relationship Between Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, 
Note by the Secretariat, at 3-4, WT /WGTI/W /7 (Sept. 18, 1997). Horizontal FDI re-
fers to investment in facilities producing the same line of products in different 
countries. This type of investment occurs when a product has a high weight to 
value ratio and is thus expensive to transport (e.g., cement). Horizontal FDI can 
also occur in order to jump a high tariff wall. Horizontal FDI tends to occur in 
host countries with a large domestic market for the product in order to achieve 
economies of scale, or in smaller countries which can serve as an export platform 
to the adjacent region. Horizontal FDI displaces some exports of final goods from 
the home country, but tends to generate offsetting trade in intermediate goods. 
See id. at 13-15 (describing in detail horizontal FDI). 
Vertical FDI refers to investment in production facilities that manufacture dif-
ferent stages of a product in different countries. The location of each stage is cho-
sen to minimize total production costs. For example, extractive industries are 
found where the raw material is plentiful. Similarly, energy-intensive and Iabor-
intensive industries are located where energy and labor costs are low. By its very 
nature vertical FDI is trade-creating, because it subdivides the production process 
of a single product between or among countries. Trade barriers in both the host 
and home country discourage vertical FDI. Tariffs imposed by the host country 
on intermediate goods sold to an affiliate will raise the cost of the product. If the 
final product produced abroad is later exported to the home country, and tariffs 
are also assessed on the imported final product, then in combination the tariffs of 
the host and home country may make a vertical FDI uneconomic. However, such 
tariff barriers may encourage horizontal FDI. See id. at 16-17 (detailing the mod-
em view of vertical FDI). 
Distribution FDI refers to investment in local sales offices, distribution net-
works, and services facilities. See id. at 17-18 (stating, "[Blut also in marketing, 
distribution and service-related activities ... "). 
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competitiveness and promote the transfer of technology and 
managerial know-how from home country to host country. 
(2) A multilateral investment agreement will introduce greater 
transparency, predictability, and legal security in the FDI process. 
(3) National legislation provides inadequate legal protection for 
FDI and is, thus, not an alternative to a multilateral agreement. 
Stated slightly differently, a multilateral agreement on investment 
has insurance value in that it gives a foreign investor greater confi-
dence that a host country's national investment laws and policies 
will not be changed at the whim or caprice of national leaders to 
the detriment of the investor. To a lesser extent, a multilateral in-
vestment agreement might be some insurance against corruption 
by local officials in the host country. 
(4) A multilateral investment agreement will bring policy co-
herence to the "spaghetti bowl" of bilateral and regional invest-
ment treaties.6 
(5) Countries that are not parties to bilateral or regional in-
vestment agreements are marginalized or cut out as beneficiaries of 
FDI inflows. As parties to a multilateral investment agreement, 
they will be part of the mainstream. 
(6) A multilateral investment agreement will eliminate resort to 
wasteful investment incentives to attract FDF 
(7) A country that is a party to a multilateral agreement on in-
vestment will enhance its credibility as a place that is hospitable to 
FDI.8 
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development ("OECD"),9 the greatest value of a multilateral 
6 Zdenek Drabek, A Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Convincing the Scep-
tics 4-5 WTO Econ. Res. and Analysis Div., Working Paper ERAD-98-05, Feb. 
1998) (providing "powerful arguments in favor of MAl"). 
7 Id. at 5-6. 
8 See Bernard Hoekman & Kamal Saggi, Multilateral Disciplines for Investment-
Related Policies? 15 (unpublished paper presented at conference on Global Region-
alism, Feb. 8-9, 1999) (on file with author) (arguing that PDI is a "credibility en-
hancing institution"); James R. Markusen, Multilateral Rules on Foreign Direct In-
vestment: The Developing Countries' Stake 51 (World Bank Study Paper, Oct. 1998) 
(discussing the insurance value of such a treaty). 
9 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") 
was founded in 1961. The OECD is the primary organization for highly-
industrialized and industrializing nations to discuss trade, investment, and other 
economic matters of mutual interest. Its objectives are to achieve economic 
growth and employment in member countries while maintaining financial stabil-
ity. Its twenty-nine members include the fifteen EU member countries, Australia, 
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agreement on investment is the stability, predictability, and trans-
parency it brings to the legal environment: 
International rules have much to contribute to the stability 
of the multilateral system by helping avoid distortions to 
production and trade and in promoting more stable in-
vestment flows, higher quality investments and a better dis-
tribution of their benefits. Adherence to rules may be espe-
cially valuable to countries whose share of international 
investment falls short of their needs, as well as to small and 
medium-sized enterprises that might otherwise hesitate to 
invest outside familiar territory. Rules offer transparency 
and predictability for investors, and a vehicle for interna-
tional co-operation and dispute resolution.10 
Canada, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zea-
land, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States. 
Along with the WTO and the United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment, the OECD has actively studied the subject of foreign direct investment 
and the role it plays in promoting trade and development. The most important of 
its work products in the field of foreign investment is the 1976 Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, revised in 2000. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC 
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE OECD DECLARATION AND DECISIONS ON 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: BASIC TEXTS, 
DAFFE/IME(2000)20 (2000). See also WTO Working Group on the Relationship 
Between Trade and Investment, Communication from the DECD, The DECD Guide-
lines for Multinational Enterprises, WT /WGTI/W /40 Oune 11, 1998) (providing 
guidelines to OECD member nations); WTO Working Group on the Relationship 
Between Trade and Investment, Communication from the DECD, Revised DECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, WT /WGTI/W /93 (Oct. 31, 2000) (stating 
the same); WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Invest-
ment, Communication from the DECD, Summary of DECD Work on Issues Related to 
Investment Policy Analysis, WT/WGTI/W /100 (Apr. 2, 2001) (addressing the con-
cerns of FOI); ARGHYRIOS A. FATOUROS, THE OECD GUIDELINES IN A GLOBALISATION 
WORLD, DAFFE/IME/RD(99)3 (1999) (reconsidering past guidelines); 
DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL, FISCAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS, SURVEY OF OECO 
WORK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT (Working Paper Series 1998) (summarizing 
findings on the role of international investment in globalization and economic de-
velopment). 
10 OECD, Open Markets Matter: The Benefits of Trade and Investment Liber-
alisation 7 (policy Brief, Oct. 1999). This view is cautiously shared by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCT AD), which has served as 
the focal point in the United Nations system for all matters relating to FOI and 
multinational corporations. In its World Investment Report 1998, UNCTAD con-
cluded that on balance a multilateral agreement on investment "would improve 
the enabling environment for FOI, to the extent that it would contribute to greater 
security for investors and greater stability, predictability and transparency in in-
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The WTO Secretariat has added its support for a multilateral 
agreement on investment. In a 1996 report, Trade and Foreign Direct 
Investment,l1 the Secretariat noted: 
At an institutional level, the growing importance of FDI, 
coupled with the absence of binding multilateral rules on 
national policies toward FDI, has created what in many 
quarters is viewed as an obstacle that could slowdown the 
pace of further integration of the world economy. The per-
ceived need for multilateral rules on investment is not 
new - indeed, the Havana Charter for the stillborn Interna-
tional Trade Organization ... contained provisions on for-
eign investment - but attempts to reach a comprehensive 
multilateral agreement with binding rules have thus far not 
been successful.12 
By favoring domestic investors vis-a.-vis foreign investors, or 
by discriminating against foreign investment regardless of country 
of origin, producers of goods or suppliers of services may be pre-
vented from building or acquiring a facility within a foreign coun-
vestment policies and rules." UNCf AD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998: TRENDS 
AND DETERMINANTS 129 (1998) [hereinafter WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998]. Ac-
cord WIO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, 
Communication from Korea, A Benefit of Multilateral Investment Rules: Enhanced 
Transparency, at. 1, WI /WGTI/W /70 (Mar. 30, 1999) (stating that" a high level of 
transparency is crucial"); WIO Working Group on the Relationship Between 
Trade and Investment, Communication from Japan, Improving Transparency, para. 1, 
WI /WGTI/W /87 Ouly 5, 2000} ("Transparency is one of the most important ele-
ments."); WIO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Invest-
ment, Communication from Hong Kong, China, Transparency of Investment Environ-
ment, WI/WGTI/W /90 (Oct. 9, 2000); WIO Working Group on the Relationship 
Between Trade and Investment, Communication from the European Community and 
Its Member States, Some Ideas on Flexibility and Non-Discrimination, para. 8, 
WT/WGTI/W /89 (Oct. 9, 2000) ("[B]e prepared to accept basic rules to increase 
predictability."). But see UNCfAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996: INVESTMENT, 
TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY ARRANGEMENTS 161-63 (1996) (concluding that 
current bilateral and regional arrangements regulating FDI flows are working 
well, so that a multilateral agreement on investment may be unnecessary). See 
generally Hoekman & Saggi, supra note 8 (concluding that the case for initiating 
negotiations on investment policies is weak). 
11 Press Release, WTO, Report by the WTO Secretariat: Trade and Foreign 
Direct Investment (Oct. 9, 1996) [hereinafter Trade and Foreign Direct Invest-
ment], at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres96_e/pr057_e.htm. 
12 Id. 
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try due to government barriers to entry of foreign investment capi-
tal. As a consequence, local manufacturers or service providers, 
who may be less efficient than their foreign competitors, will be 
shielded from foreign competition in the domestic market, reduc-
ing total wealth in the target host country. Thus, contend the ad-
vocates of an international investment agreement, national laws 
and regulations that discriminate against foreign direct investment 
can distort international capital movements in much the same way 
as tariffs, quotas, and other non-tariff barriers can distort the flow 
of international trade in goods and services. 
Despite the policy arguments for a multilateral agreement on 
investment, opinion on the issue is divided even among the illumi-
nati. At a special meeting sponsored by the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Investment ("UNCTAD") in 1997, some ex-
perts on FDI questioned the need for a multilateral agreement on 
investment, while others supported the idea.13 The contentions 
and assertions in favor of a multilateral agreement on investment 
beg a host of questions. 
First, does the international business community really need a 
multilateral agreement on investment? Are private investors com-
plaining about a lack of access to foreign markets for their capital 
because of restrictive foreign investment laws? The answer gener-
ally is "no," although anecdotal reports have circulated about per-
formance requirements that an investor has been required to fulfill 
as a condition to making an investment.14 The point is that the 
13 See UNCTAD, REPORT OF THE EXPERT MEETING ON EXISTING AGREEMENTS ON 
INVESTMENT AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT DIMENSIONS (1997), circulated by the Working 
Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Communication from 
UNCTAD, WT/WGTI/W /21 Oan. 6, 1998) (discussing the advantages and disad-
vantages to a multilateral agreement). 
14 But see Canadian Chamber of Commerce, Foreign Investment Barriers 16 
(2000) (reporting the results of a questionnaire to seventy-one Canadian compa-
nies that identified 106 specific restrictions faced by these companies when mak-
ing a foreign investment, which in twenty-one percent of the cases led to a cancel-
lation of the investment), at http://strategis-ic.gc.ca/pics/bi/ barriers.pdf. 
In its annual National Trade Estimate Report, the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative reports on foreign barriers to trade in goods and services as well as 
investment. See, e.g., U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2002 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE 
REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS (2002). In the main, these annual Reports dis-
cuss trading partners' national barriers to investment but do not indicate that any 
U.S. investor has specifically complained about the investment barrier, nor do 
they identify specific complaints by U.S. investors who have been frustrated in 
their attempt to make a foreign investment as a result of the spotlighted barrier. 
HeinOnline -- 24 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 84 2003
84 U. Fa. J. Int'l Eeon. L. [24:1 
level and type of barriers to investment apparently have not been 
sufficiently serious that foreign investors have felt motivated to 
collectively urge their governments to negotiate an international 
agreement on investment. Why hasn't there been a groundswell of 
support for a multilateral agreement on investment within the 
business community? One possible explanation for the apparent 
lack of interest among the business community is that the demand 
for foreign capital exceeds its supply, leaving foreign investors 
with alternative locations for investment.15 The general absence of 
complaints from the investment community might well suggest 
that the current legal regime governing FDI is not broken. It 
would also help to explain why the private sector has not led the 
charge for a multilateral agreement to liberalize FDI because, 
namely, it has no economic incentive to do so because market ac-
cess for foreign capital is generally goOd.16 As is explained more 
fully below, the pace of FDI has only quickened in the past decade, 
not slowed, despite the absence of a multilateral agreement on in-
In addition, a survey of the petitions filed with the U.S. Trade Representative 
("USTR") under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.s.c. § 2411 (2002), 
shows that only one petitioner has complained about barriers to foreign invest-
ment. On June 16, 1989, the USTR initiated an investigation of trade-restricting 
measures imposed by the government of India on foreign investors. In two other 
instances, the USTR self-initiated investigations in cases that were investment-
related. On October 11, 1996, the USTR self-initiated an investigation under Sec-
tion 301 with respect to certain acts, policies, and practices of the government of 
Brazil concerning the grant of tariff-reduction benefits contingent on satisfying 
certain export performance and domestic content requirements. On October 8, 
1996, the USTR self-initiated an investigation under Section 301 with respect to 
certain acts, policies and practices of the government of Indonesia concerning the 
grant of conditional tax and tariff benefits intended to develop a motor vehicle 
sector in Indonesia. 
A table of the 121 Section 301 cases initiated by the U.S. Trade Representative, 
summarizing each of the cases, is available at http://www.ustr.gov 
/htmlfact301.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2003). A table of the twenty-nine with-
drawn or rejected Section 301 petitions is available at http://www.ustr.gov 
/html/in301.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2003). For an extensive analysis of Section 
301, see BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 1009-68. 
15 See Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 11, at 21 (noting the 
occurrence of competition for foreign direct investment). 
16 See Pierre Sauve & Christopher Wilkie, Exploring Approaches to Invest-
ment Liberalization in the GATS 6 (unpublished paper presented at the confer-
ence, Services 2000-New Directions in Services Trade Liberalization, co-
sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution, the 
Center for Business and Government at Harvard UniverSity, and the Coalition of 
Service Industries Education and Research Foundation, Washington, D.C., June 1-
2,1999) (on file with author) (contending there has been no major "market or pol-
icy failure" to incentivize a push for FDI liberalization). 
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vestment. From 1992 to 2001, the only year in which FDI declined 
was 2001, which made sense following the global recession and the 
aftershock of the September 11 terrorist attack. Moreover, despite 
the WTO Secretariat's characterization that there was a /I perceived 
need for multilateral rules on investment" dating as far back as the 
late 1940s,17 the Havana Charter provisions on FDI were so weak as 
to amount to a mere exhortation (a point that is discussed more 
fully below).18 In fact, all negotiations on a multilateral agreement 
on investment since the Havana Charter have met with failure,19 
Second, while the rule of law does provide transparency, stabil-
ity, and predictability, that fact does not necessarily mean that the 
proper legal instrument for encouraging and promoting such 
transparency, stability, and predictability in the context of foreign 
investment has to be international in scope.20 What about the vast 
network of bilateral and regional investment treaties and the role 
they play in liberalizing the global market for foreign capital? 
What benefits would be realized from the multilateralization of bi-
lateral investment treaties ("BITs") that don't already exist? Is the 
push in some circles for a multilateral agreement on investment a 
solution in search of a problem? In other words, do existing na-
tional, bilateral, and regional rules on investment provide adequate 
access for foreign capital flowing to host countries? A WTO 
agreement on investment might increase FDI flows by consolidat-
ing changes at the national, bilateral, and regional level that have 
created a more liberal climate for FDI. The numbers substantiate 
the success of national policies and bilateral and regional agree-
ments on investment. On the other hand, expanding those bilat-
eral and regional efforts to the multilateral level takes negotiators 
into uncharted waters. As noted by UNCTAD, "the existence of a 
network of BITs [bilateral investment treaties] cannot be assumed 
17 Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 11 and accompanying 
text. 
18 See infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text (detailing the Havana Char-
ter's lack of thorough treatment of foreign direct investment). 
19 See Mina Mashayekhi, Trade-Related Investment Measures, in UNCTAD, A 
POSmVE AGENDA FOR DEVELOPING COUNIRIFS: ISSUES FOR FUTURE TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS 235 (2000) (discussing how none of the negotiations since the Ha-
vana Charter have succeeded). 
20 But see WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Communication from Canada, at 3, WT /WGTI/W /36 (Apr. 8, 1998) (" A 
comprehensive set of consistent rules among all WTO Members would allow for a 
stable, transparent and consistent environment for firms operating in the global 
market, whatever their ownership structure or place of incorporation."). 
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to signal the preparedness of countries to move to another level, in 
spite of a convergence of perspectives in certain substantive areas 
as signified by existing BITs."21 As UNCTAO notes, there has al-
ready been significant liberalization for FOI in many countries, 
such that any multilateral agreement that prohibits the introduc-
tion of new barriers to FOI would essentially maintain the status 
quo.22 An agreement on investment could thus conceivably have 
little or no impact on FOI flows because it would not materially 
change the policy and legal framework for FOI that presently exists 
at the national level. H the economic benefits of foreign investment 
for a host country are so strong and compelling (a point explored 
more fully below),23 then host countries will have a strong incen-
tive to enact national laws to attract such investment. The evidence 
shows that this is exactly what has happened with few, if any, re-
versals in national policies liberalizing market access for FOI in the 
past ten to fifteen years. In such a legal environment, an interna-
tional instrument would in effect be mere surplus. The absence of 
a multilateral agreement on investment has not hobbled FOI flows. 
In addition, as the paramount international institution for liberaliz-
ing cross-border trade in goods and services, some have ques-
tioned whether the WTO could successfully address investment is-
sues in an institutional framework that is focused on the 
movement of goods and services, rather than capita1.24 Indeed, if a 
country pursues a policy of open trade in goods and services, then 
an investment agreement will have marginal impact for those for-
eign firms that can then access the foreign market through trade 
rather than investment.25 
21 UNCTAD, LESSONS FROM THE MAl 28 (1999) [hereinafter LESSONS FROM THE 
MAl]. 
22 See WORLD INVESfMENT REPORT 1998, supra note 10, at 129 (explaining that 
the maintenance of the status quo is one of several possible impacts of a multilat-
eral framework on investment). 
23 See infra notes 259-73 and accompanying text (explaining why the host 
country's benefits are significant). 
24 See, e.g., Anyuan Yuan, China's Entry into the WTO: Impact on China's Regu-
lating Regime a/Foreign Direct Investment, 35 INT'L LAw. 195, 201 (2001) (discussing 
whether the WTO can successfully address investment issues). 
2S See Hoekman & Saggi, supra note 8, at 9 (explaining that this is the result 
because "the realization of profit-shifting objectives requires trade policy instru-
ments"). However, in the case of certain services that are not tradeable across 
borders, FDI takes on added importance. This additional importance of FDI high-
lights the significance of pursuing negotiations under the GATS to expand market 
liberalization, especially under the commercial presence model of supply. 
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Third, what about national sovereignty concerns voiced by de-
veloping countries insofar as their ability to regulate the activities 
of foreign investors? What challenges to national labor standards 
are posed by a multilateral agreement on investment? H the WTO 
members did negotiate an agreement on investment, what would 
be the interface between such an agreement and national competi-
tion (antitrust) laws? Can there be a WTO agreement on invest-
ment without a parallel WTO agreement on competition law and 
policy? Developing countries, fearing the power of multinational 
enterprises ("MNE") to crush local competition, have answered 
"no" in response to this last question. As between developed 
countries, if a proposed acquisition of a firm by a foreign MNE is 
rejected by national-competition law enforcement authorities in the 
EU, for example, on the ground that the acquisition or merger 
would be anti-competitive, would such action be grounds for a 
challenge under a WTO investment agreement? 
Fourth, what are the lessons to be learned from the failure of 
the OECD to conclude a multilateral agreement on investment in 
1998? Efforts to liberalize international investment have a long his-
tory within the OECD, reflected primarily in its non-binding Code 
of Liberalization of Capital Movements. These efforts were the 
source of investment principles in subsequent trade agreements, 
including the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")26 
and the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures 
(the "TRIMs Agreement"). Given the lack of direction at the time 
within the WTO regarding a multilateral agreement on investment, 
OECD ministers voted in 1995 to sponsor negotiations and to con-
clude a multilateral agreement on investment within two years. 
Firmly convinced that a multilateral agreement on investment 
would reduce business uncertainty and improve the flow of in-
vestment capital around the world, negotiations within the OECD 
on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment ("MAl") were 
launched with a completion date set of May 1997.27 Despite the le-
26 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 15, 1993, reprinted in 1 NORTH 
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, TExTs OF AGREEMENT, IMPLEMENTING BILL, 
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, AND REQUIRED SUPPORTING STATEMENTS, 
H.R. Doc. No. 159, 103d Congo (1st Sess. 1993) [hereinafter NAFTA STATEMENT OF 
ADMINISTRATIVEACTIONj (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994). 
27 See OECD, REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MOVEMENTS AND 
INVISIBLE TRANSACTIONS, A MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT, 
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gal and economic arguments for liberalizing national barriers to 
FDI, the failure of the OECD to conclude the MAl by 1998 should 
be a sobering reminder that successfully negotiating a comprehen-
sive multilateral agreement on investment is a supremely difficult 
task. 
The draft MAl's main features included provisions extending 
most-favored-nation ("MFN") and national treatment to both the 
establishment and the subsequent treatment of an investment; a 
broad, asset-based definition of investment; standstill and rollback 
provisions; provisions on country-specific reservations; standards 
on expropriation, compensation in the event of a taking, and repa-
triation of profits; and binding arbitration in country-to-country 
and investor-to-host country disputes.28 The final product would 
have been a comprehensive set of investment rules that would 
have overlapped with the multilateral trade agreements concluded 
during the Uruguay Round-in particular, the TRIMs Agree-
ment-and that would have mirrored many of the features of the 
U.S. prototype bilateral investment treaty.29 The MAl would have 
DAFFE/CMIT/CIME (95) 13/FINAL (May 5, 1995), available at http://www1 
.oecd.org/ daf/ maifhtm/ cmitcime95.htm. 
28 See OECO, THE MAl NEGOTIATING TEXT (as of Apr. 24, 1998) [hereinafter 
MAl NEGOTIATING TEXT] (elaborating on these main features), available at 
http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/mai/mai.pdf; ORGANIZATION 
FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COMMENTARY TO THE MAl 
NEGOTIATING TEXT (as of Apr. 24, 1998) (explaining OECD's positions on these fea-
tures of the MAl). For a brief account of the highlights of the main provisions of 
the MAl and the MAl negotiating process, see LESSONS FROM THE MAl, supra note 
21; WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998, supra note 10, at 65-69. See also Michael P. 
Avramovich, The Protection of International Investment at the Start of the Twenty-First 
Century: Will Anachronistic Notions of Business Render Irrelevant the GECD's Multi-
lateral Agreement on Investment?, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1201, 1277 (1998) (arguing 
in support of concluding negotiations on an MAl); Stephen J. Canner, The Multi-
lateral Agreement on Investment, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 657, 666 (1998) (concluding 
that an MAl must include provisions on binding dispute settlement, adequate 
compensation, and compensation that includes the full value of the investor's in-
tangible assets). 
29 A U.S. BIT provides U.S. investors with six basic benefits. The new proto-
type BIT contains the major features of its predecessor. Beginning with a compre-
hensive definition of direct investment that includes tangible as well as intangible 
property, a U.s. BIT contains five core elements: (1) national treatment and MFN 
treatment for investments; (2) standards for expropriation and compensation in 
the event of a taking; (3) the right to transfer funds; (4) limits on performance re-
quirements consistent with the provisions of NAFT A and the TRIMs Agreement; 
and (5) a binding dispute settlement mechanism. 
The United States launched its BIT program in 1982 in order to secure for U.S. 
direct investors certain rights and protections overseas. U.S. BITs originally were 
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been a free-standing international treaty, open to accession by all 
countries regardless of whether they were OECD members.30 
The negotiations ultimately floundered because several highly 
contentious issues could not be satisfactorily resolved. These is-
sues were the definition of investment, exceptions to national and 
MFN treatment, intellectual property, a cultural exception proposal 
by France and Canada, exceptions for regional trade arrangements, 
exceptions under national treatment, performance requirements, 
labor and environmental issues, regulatory takings, the extraterri-
torial application of U.s. laws (in particular, the Helms-Burton 
Act), and dispute settlement.31 In May 1998, the date set for com-
negotiated with developing countries exclusively. See generally Jeswald W. Sa-
lacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on 
Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 INT'L LAw. 655 (1990) (detailing the 
emergence and evolution of U.S. BITs). However, more recently the BITs program 
has shifted focus to Eastern Europe, the republics of the former Soviet Union, and 
Latin America. 
The U.S. prototype BIT does not differ in its material respects from other 
countries' standard models for BITs. See WTO Working Group on the Relation-
ship Between Trade and Investment, Communication from Japan, WT /WGTI/W /34 
(Apr. 8, 1998) (illustrating standard BIT models); WTO Working Group on the Re-
lationship Between Trade and Investment, Communication from Korea, Korea's Bilat-
erallnvestment Treaties, WT /WGTI/W / 42 Ouly 6, 1998) (illustrating standard BIT 
models); WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Invest-
ment, Communication from Turkey, Turkey's Experience with Bilateral Investment Trea-
ties, WT /WGTI/W /51 (Sept. 18, 1998) (illustrating standard BIT models). 
30 Sovereignty concerns led U.S. state governors to express reservations 
about the MAl. See WESTERN GoVERNORS' AssoCIATION, MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT 
ON INVESTMENT: POTENTIAL EFFECfS ON STATE & LOCAL GoVERNMENT 19-21 (1997) 
(presenting a range of concerns involving how MAl might infringe upon sover-
eignty), available at http://www.westgov.org/wga/publicatfmaiweb.htm. The 
'MAl was at one time considered a possible framework for a WTO agreement on 
trade and investment by the Clinton Administration. See Tarullo Says MAl May 
Provide Framework for International Accord, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2032 (Nov. 26, 
1997). For additional analysis of the MAl, see WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998, 
supra note 10, at 65-69. 
31 See LESSONS FROM THE MAl, supra note 21, at 1; Mashayekhi, supra note 19, 
at 235 (presenting a failure to resolve these issues). On March 12, 1996, President 
Clinton signed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERT AD) Act of 
1996, popularly known as the Helms-Burton Act. Cuban Liberty and Democratic 
Solidarity (LIBERT AD) Act of 1996,22 U.S.c. §§ 6021-6091 (1996). For articles cri-
tiquing the Helms-Burton Act, see Brice M. Clagett, Title III of the Helms-Burton Act 
Is Consistent with International Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 434 (1996); Andreas F. 
Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 419 (1996); 
Jonathan R. Ratchik, Cuban Liberty and the Democratic Solidarity Act of 1995, 11 AM. 
U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 343 (1996). The Act broadens the U.S. embargo against Cuba: 
(1) barring U.S. foreign aid to countries that provide assistance to Cuba; (2) au-
thorizing U.S. nationals who had property confiscated by the Cuban government 
since 1959 to sue foreign companies if they are "trafficking" in the property that 
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pletion of negotiations, the MAl negotiations officially entered a 
"pause" phase.32 This action was taken following strong criticism 
of the proposed text by labor and environmental groups. Some 
countries participating in the negotiations also expressed concerns 
about "free riders" who would receive the benefits of other coun-
tries' market openings on FDI, but who would not themselves 
open their markets to FDI.33 France's withdrawal from the MAl 
negotiations in October 1998, on the ground of inadequate protec-
tion of cultural industries, sounded the death knell of the MAI.34 
Although the OECD MAl would have been open to acceptance 
by all countries regardless of OECD membership, many develop-
ing countries were hostile to the idea in the absence of a comple-
mentary set of rules involving restrictive business practices. Some 
developing countries feared that investment by multinational cor-
porations would result in local monopolies, which in tum can en-
gage in predatory pricing that would drive local competitors out of 
business. On the other hand, other developing countries welcome 
so-called II greenfield" investment that brings fresh capital, man-
was expropriated by the Cuban government after the Cuban revolution; and (3) 
barring the issuance of visas to aliens who, after the effective date of the Act, con-
fiscate, convert, or traffic in property expropriated from a U.S. citizen. The Presi-
dent has the power to suspend for up to six months at a time the implementation 
of provisions in Title III of the Act that authorize U.S. nationals to bring lawsuits 
to recover confiscated property if doing so would be in the national interest. Both 
Presidents Clinton and Bush have suspended the operation of Title III. 
For information about the possible impact on BITs between Cuba and several 
EU member states because of the EU's apparent capitulation to the Helms-Burton 
Act, see WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Invest-
ment, Communication from Cuba, WT /WGTI/W / 45 Ouly 20, 1998). 
32 Daniel Schwanen, Chilling Out: The MAl Is on Ice but Globallnvestment Re-
mains Hot, C.O. Howe Institute Commentary 109, at 2 Oune 18, 1998), available at 
http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/Sch-03.pdf ("The negotiations toward a Multilat-
eral Agreement on Investment ... have officially entered a 'pause' that some ob-
servers say could be permanent."). 
33 See The Sinking of the MAl, ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 1998, at 81-82 (discussing 
the potential free-rider problem). 
34 See Peter T. Muchlinski, The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on In-
vestment: Where Now?, 34 INT'L LAW. 1033 (2000) (tracing the history of failed at-
tempts to negotiate an international investment agreement); Lawrence J. Speer, 
Mulling Failed MAl Process, DECO Debates Future of Investment Liberalization Proc-
ess, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1570 (Sept. 29, 1999); Lawrence J. Speer & Gary G. 
Yerkey, France Pulls Out of DECO Talks on Multilateral Investment Treaty, 15 Int'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1750 (Oct. 21, 1998) (discussing France's withdrawal from the 
negotiations when guarantees on labor and environment standards and a cultural 
exception were not forthcoming). 
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agement know-how, and export markets to the host country.35 In 
the end, of course, it was the OECD members themselves who 
spiked the draft Agreement. At the risk of placing too much blame 
on anyone country, France had strong reservations about the 
negative impact a MAl would have on its cultural industries, a 
misapprehension undoubtedly shared by Canada.36 Other OECD 
members were pressured by domestic environmental groups that 
pressed their case against the MAl as being a threat to the global 
environment. In addition, labor advocacy groups wondered how a 
MAl might negatively affect developing-country labor markets by 
developed-country multinational investors. The upshot was that 
by late 1998 the OECD MAl was a dead letter, notwithstanding the 
great expectations shared by most participants in the negotiations 
that a successful conclusion was barely weeks away. 
Fifth, and finally, what are the lessons to be learned from the 
pace of liberalization efforts achieved to date under two existing 
WTO agreements that address key dimensions of FDI: the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS"), including the two sub-
sidiary agreements on financial services and basic telecommunica-
tions, and the TRIMs Agreement? 
Against this backdrop, the overarching issue addressed in this 
Article is whether international trade in goods and services should 
be integrated with foreign direct investment through a WTO 
agreement on investment. The arguments advanced for such an 
agreement have an undeniable appeal as a theoretical matter. Pro-
ponents of a multilateral agreement on investment-the "global-
ization school"37 - submit that national laws and regulations that 
discriminate against foreign direct investment distort international 
trade in much the same way as do tariffs, quotas, and other non-
tariff barriers to trade. By eliminating such laws that either dis-
35 See, e.g., James Lim, South Korea Installs Ombudsman to Resolve Problems of 
Foreign Investors, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1792 (Nov. 3, 1999); James Lim, South 
Korea Says It Will Continue Promotion of Foreign Direct Investment, 16 Int'I Trade 
Rep. (BNA) 1468 (Sept. 15,1999); James Lim, South Korea Sets Long-Term Target to 
Increase Foreign Direct Investment, 17 Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA) 390 (Mar. 9, 2000); 
Shai Oster, China Looking to Private Investment for Economic Stimulus, Analysts Say, 
17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 45 Oan. 13, 2000). 
36 See Daniel Pruzin, Canada Seeks Support of Trade Partners for Multilateral Ac-
cord to Protect Culture, 16 Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA) 1736 (Oct. 27, 1999) (noting Can-
ada's concern for cultural protection). 
37 WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, 
Communication from Korea, Multilateral Framework on Investment: A Realistic Ap-
proach, para. 1, WT/WGTI/W /79 Oune 2,1999). 
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criminate in favor of domestic investors or that discriminate 
against foreign investors, the most efficient producers of goods and 
suppliers of services with capital to invest, regardless of country of 
origin, will be able to penetrate a market unhindered by govern-
ment interference. 
But just how prevalent are national laws that impede or block 
the flow of foreign capital? Empirical research on the subject is 
scant. One study in the mid-1990s of the investment policies of the 
twenty-nine members of the OECD-whose investment policies 
might be expected to be the most liberal in the world - revealed 
that they collectively maintain over 400 investment restrictions,38 
The fifteen member-states of the EU as a group were reported to 
have the greatest number of investment restrictions, accounting for 
54 % of all restrictions identified for OECD members. The United 
States was reported to have the second largest number of restric-
tions, accounting for 17% of the OECD total, followed by Canada, 
Mexico, and Australia with 14%,7%, and 6%, respectively,39 How-
ever, as is discussed below, the decided trend in the latter half of 
the 1990s and into the 21st century has been to enact regulatory 
38 See Liberalization of International Investment, supra note 5, at 8. 
39 Id. A proposed purchase in 1988 of an eighty percent interest in an Ameri-
can firm, Fairchild Semiconductor Corp., by a Japanese firm, Fujitsu, Ltd., was the 
catalyst for a provision added to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
1988 to amend the Defense Production Act of 1950. The new provision, com-
monly known as the Exon-Florio amendment, authorizes the President to review 
and prohibit the acquisition, merger, or takeover of a business in the United States 
by a foreign person if such commercial activity could result in foreign control of a 
U.S. firm that would threaten to impair national security. See Defense Production 
Act § 721 (1950), as amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
1988, codified at 50 U.S.c. § 2170. 
In exercising his authority under Exon-Florio, the President is directed to 
consider such factors as domestic production needed for projected national de-
fense requirements and the capacity of domestic industries to meet national de-
fense requirements. The 1992 Byrd-Exon amendment required an investigation 
whenever an attempted purchase is made by an entity owned or controlled by a 
foreign government. See 50 U.S.c. § 2170(c). The Byrd-Exon amendment was in 
direct response to an unsuccessful bid by Thomson-CSF, a French company par-
tially owned by the French government, to purchase the missile division of LTV 
Corp., a U.S. aerospace company. See generally Patrick L. Schmidt, The Exon-Florio 
Statute: How It Affects Foreign Investors and Lenders in the United States, 27 INT'L 
LAW. 795 (1993). 
Pursuant to Executive Order, the Exon-Florio amendment is enforced by the 
interagency Committee on Foreign Investment. See Exec. Order No. 12,661, 54 
Fed. Reg. 779 (Dec. 27, 1988). It has been the target of heavy criticism from the 
EU. See More U.S. Barriers to Trade with EU Arose in Past Year, EU Report Says, 13 
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1244 Ouly 31, 1996). 
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measures that are hospitable to FDI. Moreover, despite these re-
strictions and the absence of a multilateral agreement on invest-
ment, investors' appetite for making investments abroad has only 
grown.40 Oddly enough, there appears to be an inverse correlation 
between the number of restrictions on FDI and FDI flows. During 
the ten-year period from 1992 to 2001, the top sixteen recipients of 
FDI were OECD members. Of all OECD member countries, the 
United States had the largest number of restrictions on FDI in the 
1990s, as reported by the OECD, yet the United States received 
more FDI inflows in the period 1992-2001 than any other country, 
$1.27 trillion,' more than double the numbers of second-place Brit-
ain.41 Similarly, even though China places numerous restrictions 
on investment, it remains one of the world's top destinations for 
foreign direct investment.42 
A counterpoint to the globalization school of FDI is the 1/ inter-
nalization school." The internalization school believes in minimiz-
ing the amount of outside intervention in a country's ability to es-
tablish national laws and regulations governing FDI, thus 
reserving the maximum flexibility of host countries to deal with 
FDI.43 
Before examining in-depth the pros and cons of a WTO agree-
ment on investment, a survey of the history of investment rules 
within the GATT-WTO legal regime, including the Uruguay 
Round and post-Uruguay Round results, will provide important 
background and perspective. The following survey will show that 
WTO addresses the subject of foreign direct investment in several 
40 See Patrick Tracey, Foreign Direct Investors See Increase; China, Others Gain 
Investment Appeal, 181nt'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 306 (Feb. 22, 2001). 
41 Economic and Financial Indicators, ECONOMIST, Aug. 17, 2002, at 77. 
42 Yuan, supra note 24, at 201. The four leading host countries for FDI in-
flows during the decade 1985-95 were the United States ($478 billion), the United 
Kingdom ($200 billion), France ($138 billion), and China ($130 billion). Trade and 
Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 11, at 5. In 1997, the United States ($76.5 bil-
lion), China ($40.8 billion), the United Kingdom ($26 billion), and France ($22 bil-
lion) were the top four recipients of FDI inflows. WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998, 
supra note 10, tbl.I.9. In 1999, the United Kingdom surpassed the United States as 
the largest outbound investor for the first time since 1988, although the United 
States remained the leading recipient of FDI (over $250 billion) by a factor of 
nearly three over second-place Sweden (approximately $75 billion). Economic and 
Financial Indicators, ECONOMIST, Feb. 12, 2000, at 105. 
43 WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, 
Communication from Korea, Multilateral Framework on Investment: A Realistic Ap-
proach, para. 2, WT /WGTI/W /79 Oune 2, 1999). More will be said about the 
views and arguments of the internalization school as this Article unfolds. 
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important respects. When it comes to investment, the WTO is not 
operating in a complete vacuum. 
2. INVESTMENT RULES IN THE GATT -WTO SYSTEM 
Over its fifty-five year history, the GATT-WTO international 
trading system has had as its core goal the elimination of govern-
ment barriers to international trade in goods and now, under the 
GATS, the creation of market access for services as well. Although 
nowhere explicitly stated in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade ("GATT") or any WTO agreement, the guiding economic 
premise that underlies the entire GATT-WTO system is open trade. 
One commentator has explained open trade (sometimes referred to 
as liberal trade) in the following terms: 
In a liberal economic system, government does not thwart 
private parties in their attempts to enter voluntary transac-
tions, and taxes are stable, predictable, and nonprohibitive. 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is lib-
eral in this sense. . .. Interventions [by governments] in lib-
eral exchange across frontiers to make trade fair may be the 
political price of liberalism, but such interventions are 
themselves its antithesis.44 
Why did open trade become GATT's desideratum? The an-
swer is short but compelling: by exploiting the law of comparative 
advantage, liberal trade policies permit the unrestricted flow of the 
best goods and services across national borders at the lowest 
prices, thereby increasing total world wealth. Under the law of 
comparative advantage, resources are allocated efficiently across 
and within industries in response to competitive pressures from 
imports. Both of these phenomena lead to product specialization 
and increased firm size that in turn lowers the unit cost of goods 
and services. The role that multilateral trade rules play in fostering 
liberal trade manifests itself in two important ways. First, speciali-
zation and economies of scale become possible because of secure 
access to a barrier-free international market. Second, increased in-
44 Martin Wolf, Why Trade Liberalization Is a Good Idea, in THE URUGUAY 
ROUND: A HANDBOOK ON THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 14 a. Michael 
Finger & Andrzej Olechowski eds., 1987}. 
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ternational competition leads to product and process innovation, 
further reducing costs and expanding consumer choices.45 
The kinds of government conduct restricting market access that 
have been of greatest interest to the GAIT contracting parties, and 
today, to the WTO members, include reducing and eliminating tar-
iffs on imported goods, limiting the use of import and export quo-
tas, imposing discipline on the imposition of safeguard measures 
(i.e., escape clause relief), ensuring that state-trading enterprises 
that have a monopoly on the purchase and/ or sale of goods con-
duct their operations on the basis of market disciplines, circum-
scribing the use of antidumping duties, discouraging subsidies to 
sunset and sunrise domestic industries, and limiting the extent to 
which governments can restrict imported goods on the basis of 
product standards. All of these trade liberalization measures can 
have the salutary effect of indirectly combating certain restrictive 
business practices engaged in by domestic firms, e.g., price fixing, 
by allowing greater import competition that will in turn break up 
such illegal arrangements through price competition. The GAIT-
WTO system has had little or nothing to say about private restric-
tive business practices, government-sponsored commodity cartels 
(e.g., the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries "OPEC"), 
government-sponsored boycotts, and government procurement 
laws that discriminate in favor of domestic suppliers.46 Until the 
Uruguay Round, the same was true for national laws that dis-
criminate against, restrict, or otherwise distort the global market 
for foreign direct investment. 
45 For classical and contemporary arguments in support of free trade and the 
arguments for protectionism, see RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 1-123 (2001); Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and Environment: 
Lessons from the Federal Experience, 49 WASH. & LEE 1. REV. 1329, 1330 (1992); The 
Miracle of Trade, ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 1996, at 61-62. 
46 The plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement opens govern-
ment procurement of goods, services, and construction contracts to enterprises 
from the other signatories to the Agreement. See Agreement on Government Pro-
curement, Apr. 15, 1994, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e 
/gproce/agrmnt_e.htm. (last visited on Jan. 31, 2003). To date, twenty-seven 
countries and the European Communities are parties to the Government Pro-
curement Agreement, with seven countries involved in accession negotiations. 
An updated list of countries that are party to the Agreement on Government Pro-
curement is available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproce 
/memobs_e.htm. (last visited Jan. 31, 2003). 
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2.1. The Havana Charter and GATT 1947 
The World Trade Organization traces its origins to 1944. In 
that year, a comprehensive economic and financial plan for post-
World War II reconstruction and development was proposed by 
the United States and the United Kingdom at Bretton Woods, New 
Hampshire. A triad of international economic and financial insti-
tutions was envisioned. Two of the institutions, the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), were created to ad-
dress development and monetary issues. Rounding out the institu-
tional triad was the International Trade Organization ("ITO"). The 
General Agreement was to serve as an interim agreement until the 
ITO and its founding document, the Havana Charter, could be ap-
proved by nationallegislatures.47 
In September 1946, the United States drafted a proposed Char-
ter that became the basis for discussions at the First Session of the 
Preparatory Committee on the Havana Charter.48 During the pe-
riod 1946-1947, the Preparatory Committee began drafting the ITO 
Charter. Independent of this project, the Committee members also 
conducted tariff-reduction negotiations in anticipation of the com-
pletion of the ITO Charter. They negotiated approximately 45,000 
tariff concessions affecting about $10 billion of world trade in 
goods.49 In order to protect the value of these concessions, the 
Committee members further agreed to the early acceptance of 
47 For a complete history of GATT and the Bretton Woods system, see 
KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 
(1970); ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 
(2d ed. 1990); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969); G.J. 
LANJOUW, INTERNATIONAL TRADE INSTITUTIONS (ACE Translations trans., 1995); 
OLIVIER loNG, LAW AND Irs LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 
4-6 (1985); ARMAND V AN DORMAEL, BRETTON WOODS: BIRTH OF A MONETARY SYSTEM 
(1978); Gerald A. Bunting, GAIT and the Evolution of the Global Trade System: A His-
torical Perspective, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 505 (1996). 
48 The members of the Preparatory Committee were Australia, Belgium, Lux-
embourg, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, 
Lebanon, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the U.s.s.R., the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. With the exception of the former Soviet 
Union, all of these countries became GATT contracting parties under Protocols of 
Provisional Application. See WTO, 1 ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND 
PRACTICE, at 1-9 (1995). 
For additional background on the preparatory work on GATT, see DAM, su-
pra note 47, at 10-16; JACKSON, supra note 47, at 35-57; loNG, supra note 47, at 4-6; 
Armin von Bogdandy, The International Trade Law, in U.S. TRADE BARRIERS: A 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 73, 74-76 (Eberhard Grabitz & Armin von Bogdandy eds., 1991). 
49 BHALA, supra note 45, at 127-28, 133. 
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some of the obligations in the draft ITO Charter. The combination 
of the tariff concessions and interim trade rules was formalized in 
the GAIT. In short, in order to expedite the start of international 
negotiations on tariff reductions and their implementation pending 
approval of the Havana Charter by national legislatures, GAIT 
was approved provisionally by national representatives, effective 
January 1, 1948.50 President Truman approved it on behalf of the 
United States pursuant to authority granted under the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements Act of 1934.51 
GAIT Article XXIX makes it plain that GAIT was not intended 
by its drafters to function on a permanent basis. lt was contem-
plated that once the Havana Charter entered into force, and with it 
the ITO, Part II of GAIT that contains the bulk of the international 
legal commitments (other than the MFN obligation and tariff 
commitments) would be suspended.52 
In the end, the Havana Charter never entered into force. In 
fact, no acceptances of the Charter were ever received by the 
United Nations, the depositary for Charter accessions.53 The Ha-
vana Charter was a far more comprehensive document than GAIT. 
lt contained provisions relating to employment, economic devel-
opment, restrictive business practices, and dispute resolution un-
der ITO auspices.54 Had it been approved, the Havana Charter for 
50 Id. at 127-28. 
51 Id. at 128. 
52 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXIX, opened for signature 
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter 1947 
GATT]. GATT Article XXIX provides that Part II of the Agreement shall be sus-
pended on the day on which the Havana Charter enters into force. In addition, it 
provides that if by September 30, 1949, the Havana Charter has not entered into 
force, the contracting parties shall meet before December 31, 1949, to agree 
whether the Agreement shall be amended, supplemented or maintained. 
Id. 
53 See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 2. 
Once it became clear that the Havana Charter had no chance of being 
approved by the neo-isolationist U.S. Senate, the State Department is-
sued a statement that the Charter would not be submitted again to Con-
gress. As a consequence, GATT was pressed into service by default to fill 
the institutional vacuum. Despite its left-footed start, GATT became the 
centerpiece of international trade law, doubling as a multilateral trade 
agreement and an international trade forum for its 114 contracting par-
ties for nearly five decades. 
54 Final Act and Related Documents of the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Employment, Havana, Cuba, Mar. 24, 1948, U.N. Doc. IOTO/1/4 
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an International Trade Organization would have covered not only 
tariffs, quotas, and other non-tariff barriers to trade in goods, but 
also restrictive business practices (Articles 46-54),55 commodity 
agreements (Articles 55-70),56 and foreign direct investment (Arti-
cles 11 & 12).57 Although the refusal of national legislatures-in 
particular, the neo-isolationist U.S. Senate-to approve the Havana 
Charter could be viewed quite naturally as a missed opportunity, it 
is debatable whether the Charter would have thrown open the 
gates to FDI. The Havana Charter's coverage of foreign direct in-
vestment is, at best, skeletal. In fact, far from being a comprehen-
sive code analogous to today's typical bilateral investment treaties, 
Articles 11 and 12 merely sketch out in broad brush the role of the 
International Trade Organization in promoting FDI, and minimal 
rights of ITO members which are host countries for FDI. 
First, Article 11.2 of the Havana Charter authorized the ITO to 
enter into collaborative programs with other inter-governmental 
organizations (e.g., the World Bank and the IMF) that would (1) 
lead to the conclusion of a bilateral or multilateral agreement on 
double taxation in order to stimulate foreign investment, and (2) 
II promote the adoption of a general agreement or statement of 
principles regarding the conduct, practices and treatment of for-
eign investment."58 Article 11 clearly saves for another day the de-
tails of a multilateral agreement on investment. 
Second, Article 12 of the Havana Charter, entitled International 
Investment for Economic Development and Reconstruction, is a state-
ment of non-binding principles regarding FDI. Under Article 12.1, 
members recognize that international investment If can be of great 
value in promoting economic development and reconstruction, 
and consequent social progress," and that If the international flow 
of capital will be stimulated to the extent that Members afford na-
tionals of other countries opportunities for investment and security 
for existing and future investments."59 Article 12.1(c) goes on to 
reserve to members the following rights: 
(1948) [hereinafter Havana Charter]. See generally CLAIR WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR 
WORLD TRADE (1949). 
55 Havana Charter, supra note 54, arts. 46-54. 
56 ld. arts. 55-70. 
57 ld. arts. 11-12. 
58 ld. art. 11.2(c). 
59 ld. art. 12.1. 
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(i) to take any appropriate safeguards necessary to ensure 
that foreign investment is not used as a basis for interfer-
ence in its internal affairs or national policies; 
(ii) to determine whether and to what extent and upon 
what terms it will allow future foreign investment; 
(iii) to prescribe and give effect on just terms to require-
ments as to the ownership of existing and future invest-
ments; 
(iv) to prescribe and give effect to other reasonable re-
quirements with respect to existing and future invest-
ments.60 
99 
What clearly emerges from Article 12(c) is the right to restrict 
investment to match national development plans. Article 12.1(d) 
further notes that economic development II may be promoted" if 
source and host countries enter into bilateral or multilateral in-
vestment agreements.61 As such, it is more of a suggestion than a 
legally-binding commitment. Finally, under Article 12.2, members 
agree that if they do enter into such bilateral or multilateral agree-
ments, they would provide reasonable opportunities for invest-
ment on non-discriminatory terms.62 
In short, considering the Havana Charter's mostly hortatory, 
and even at that, sparse provisions on FDI, it would be a stretch to 
conclude that the failure to ratify the Havana Charter had an im-
mediate or lasting negative impact on FDI flows. 
Filling the void left by the failure to approve the Havana Char-
ter, and with it, the ITO, was the GATT, the fountainhead of inter-
national trade law.63 Signed by twenty-three nations-twelve de-
60 Id. art. 12.1(c)(i)-(iv). 
61 Id. art. 12.1(d). 
62 Id. art. 12.2. 
63 1947 GAIT, supra note 52; GUIDE TO GAIT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 
48, at 4-7. 
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veloped and eleven developing economies - on October 30, 1947, 
and headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, GATT 1947 performed 
double duty for forty-seven years as both the premier multilateral 
trade agreement and international trade organization. GATT 1947 
is the immediate predecessor of GATT 1994 and the WTO, which 
assumed GAIT's dual roles on January 1,1995, with the successful 
completion of the Uruguay Round.64 
GAIT 1947 is virtually silent on the subject of FDI. The ques-
tion of investment was revisited in the 1955 GAIT review confer-
ence after it was obvious that the Havana Charter and the ITO 
were stillborn. That conference recommended that contracting 
parties take steps to stimulate the international flow of capital,65 
but nothing concrete ever emerged from that conference. 
2.2. WTO Rules an Investment 
After more than seven years of negotiations, the most far-
reaching and comprehensive development in world trade since 
1947 took place in 1994 with the successful completion of the Uru-
guay Round of multilateral trade negotiations (the "Round"). Pe-
ter Sutherland, the first Director-General of the World Trade Or-
ganization, described the conclusion of the Uruguay Round as If a 
defining moment in modem history."66 Although the Uruguay 
64 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]; 
EDMOND McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION 1.12-3 (1996). 
65 Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 11, at 33-34. 
66 l'HILLlPEvANS & JAMES WALSH, THE EIU GUIDE TO THE NEW GAIT 1 (1994). 
For additional reading on the Uruguay Round summarizing the significant por-
tions of the WTO Agreement, see generally URUGUAY ROUND TRADE AGREEMENTS, 
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACfION 1, H.R. Doc. 316, 103d Cong., 656-67 (1994) 
[hereinafter URUGUAY ROUND STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION]; BHALA & 
KENNEDY, supra note 3; JOHANNA W. BUURMAN & JEFFREY J. ScHOTT, THE URUGUAY 
ROUND: AN AssESSMENT (1994); JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING 
SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF THE URUGUAY ROUND (1995); JOHN KRAUS, THE GAIT 
NEGOTIATIONS: A BUSINESS GUIDE TO THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND (1994); 
ERNEST H. PREEG, TRADERS IN A BRAVE NEW WORLD: THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE 
FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM (1995); THE GAIT, THE WTO AND 
THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT: UNDERSTANDING THE FUNDAMENTAL 
CHANGES (Harvey M. Applebaum & Lyn M. Schlitt eds., 1995); THE URUGUAY 
ROUND RESULTS: A EUROPEAN LAWYERS' PERSPECfIVE Oacques Bourgeois ed., 1994); 
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996); John 
H. Jackson, The Uruguay Round and the Launch of the wrO: Significance & Chal-
lenges, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION, supra, at 5; Terence P. 
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Round results did not silence the critics of international trade, it 
did at least lower the volume. The Uruguay Round arrested the 
slide away from liberal trade and the multilateral rules designed to 
promote it by renewing the original GATT 1947 commitment to 
open markets and the elimination of government intervention that 
impedes trade flows. What is more, the Uruguay Round expanded 
the multilateral trade system's portfolio by including two new sec-
tors, trade in services and intellectual property.67 
Although the treatment of FDI in the WTO multilateral trade 
agreements is not comprehensive - no WTO agreement currently 
exists that creates a framework for the regulation of all aspects of 
FDI-two WTO multilateral trade agreements ("MTAs"), together 
with two subsidiary agreements on trade in services, integrate 
trade and FDI to varying degrees.68 
Stewart, The Uruguay Round Agreements Act: An Overview of Major Issues and Poten-
tial Trouble Spots, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE MULTILATERAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION, supra, at 
29; TERENCE P. STEWART, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY 
(1986-1992) (1996); Symposium, Negotiating the Free Trade Labyrinth, 18 WHmlER L. 
REV. 281 (1997); Symposium, Uruguay Round-GATT/WTO, 29 INT'L LAW. 335 
(1995). 
67 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
[hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter the 
TRIPS Agreement] (listing contents of" Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights"). 
68 Four other WTO agreements address investment tangentially. First, the 
TRIPS Agreement is the most comprehensive framework agreement of its kind 
within the GATT-WTO system. Intellectual property rights are often treated as a 
form of investment. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Trade Negotiations. Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125-97 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 
GATT] (containing the complete text of the Agreement ... Rights). Although the 
TRIPS Agreement does not address the issue of FDI directly, its provisions on na-
tional treatment, MFN, minimum standards of intellectual property protection, 
and domestic enforcement procedures bear directly on the legal environment in 
which FDI operates. If a foreign investor cannot place an investment in a host 
country with the assurance that its intellectual property rights (patents, trade-
marks, copyrights, etc.) will be adequately protected from infringement, that in-
vestor may very well decide not to make the investment. With the minimum pro-
tections of the TRIPS Agreement in place for patents, trademarks, copyrights, 
trade secrets, geographical designations, layout designs of integrated circuits, and 
industrial designs, coupled with effective mechanisms for the enforcement of 
those rights against piracy and infringement within the host country, FDI will be 
encouraged, especially FDI by firms that have valuable intellectual property to 
protect. The TRIPS Agreement thus serves an important role in promoting in-
vestment. See, e.g., Sauve & Wilkie, supra note 16, at 14 (discussing the TRIPS 
Agreements relationship to intellectual property issues). 
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First, the GATS is a comprehensive agreement governing all 
trade in services (with the exception of maritime and air transport 
services). Second, the 1997 Agreement on Financial Services liber-
alizes trade and investment in the financial services sector. Third, 
the 1997 Agreement on Basic Telecommunications likewise liberal-
izes trade and investment in the basic telecommunications sector. 
Fourth, the TRIMs Agreement provides a patchwork of rules pro-
hibiting WTO members from requiring both foreign and domestic 
investors, sourcing inputs locally, imposing trade-balancing re-
quirements on investors as a condition for importing goods or ob-
taining foreign exchange, restricting access to foreign exchange for 
the purchase of imports, and restricting the volume or value of ex-
ports that a company must make. 
These four agreements are analyzed in the following subsec-
tions. 
Second, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the "SCM 
Agreement") overhauled the comparatively weak Tokyo Round predecessor 
agreement with tightened and expanded disciplines on the government provision 
of domestic and export subsidies to domestic producers. The SCM Agreement not 
only authorizes importing countries to impose countervailing duties on subsi-
dized imports that cause injury, but also goes further by curbing the adverse ef-
fects of subsidies in foreign markets. Article 6 of the SCM Agreement makes ac-
tionable the provision of subsidies that cause "serious prejudice" to the interests 
of another member. Annex IV:5 of the SCM Agreement identifies government 
funds to firms in a "start-up situation" as an example of a subsidy that can give 
rise to a "serious prejudice" complaint. (A "start-up" situation is one where fi-
nancial commitments for product development or construction of facilities to 
manufacture products benefiting from the subsidy have been made, even though 
production has not begun). See URUGUAY ROUND STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
AcrION, supra note 66, at 897-941. 
Third, Article III:2 of the plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement 
provides that procuring entities will not discriminate against locally-established 
suppliers on the basis of their degree of foreign affiliation or ownership. Agree-
ment on Government Procurement, supra note 46, art. III:2. 
Fourth, any FDI-related dispute arising under GATT 1994 or a WTO MTA 
must be resolved under the provisions of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. 
See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Annex 2, 1994 GATT, supra note 68, at 1226-47 (containing the complete text 
of the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes). This vastly improved, rules-based WTO dispute settlement process 
will give investors a more certain legal climate within which to make their foreign 
investment, to the extent a WTO agreement covers the matter in dispute and the 
investor's home country chooses to espouse the investor's claim. 
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2.2.1. The GATS 
GATT 1947 was almost exclusively concerned with trade in 
goods. The Uruguay Round's banner achievements include ex-
panding the scope of the GATT-WTO system to include the ser-
vices sectors. The GATS is a very significant step in establishing an 
international framework for trade in services, including FDI.69 
The service sector has overtaken manufacturing as the most 
important part of developed countries' economies. Service indus-
tries account for sixty-one percent of GDP and over one-half of 
employment in developed countries.7o The ratio of exports of 
world merchandise trade to world services trade was close to three 
to one in 2001,71 with world trade in commercial services totaling 
$1.44 trillion in 2002 compared to $4.75 trillion in merchandise 
trade.72 
Given the substantial increase in the volume of services trade, 
liberalizing trade in services by bringing multilateral disciplines to 
bear on this sector was an important goal for developed countries 
in the Uruguay Round.73 Developing countries, on the other hand, 
were unreceptive to the proposal to add services trade to the Uru-
guay Round agenda. Under the leadership of India and Brazil, 
they opposed putting services trade on the Uruguay Round 
agenda at all.74 To the extent developed countries enjoy any com-
parative advantage in this sector, it is in the labor-intensive con-
struction industry; however, restrictive immigration and labor 
69 See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agree-
ment, supra note 67, Annex lC, 33 I.L.M. 1167-96 (1994) [hereinafter the GATS] 
(containing the complete text of the GATS). 
70 The Manufacturing Myth, ECONOMIST, Mar. 19, 1994, at 91. Jobs in the ser-
vice sector provide nearly eighty percent of U.S. employment, a figure that is ex-
pected to increase to eighty-eight percent by 2005. Id. Services trade represented 
more than one quarter of total U.S. exports in 2002. WTO ANNUAL REPORT 2002, at 
23-24 (2002). In 2002, U.S. exports of commercial services totaled almost $263 bil-
lion, representing a global trade surplus in services in 2002 of $75 billion. Id. at 24. 
71 WTO ANNUAL REPORT 2002, supra note 70, at 23-24. 
72 Id. 
73 See EVANS & WALSH, supra note 66, at 28 (arguing that developed countries 
enjoy a comparative advantage in the more capital-intensive and highly-skilled 
service industries, such as telecommunications and financial services). 
74 For background on the issues confronting the Uruguay Round negotiators 
in liberalizing trade in services detailing the conflict between developed and de-
veloping countries, see CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE GAIT NEGOTIATIONS 
AND U.S. TRADE POLICY 119-30 (1987); EVANS & WALSH, supra note 66, at 28 (noting 
the comparative advantages of developed and developing countries). 
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laws historically have prevented cross-border trade in such ser-
vices. More importantly, developed countries showed no interest 
in changing their trade-restrictive immigration laws.75 Ultimately, 
services trade was added to the Uruguay Round agenda. After re-
solving some preliminary issues (e.g., the definition and quantifica-
tion of services trade),76 the GATS was successfully concluded. 
The GATS is the first multilateral agreement covering trade 
and investment in the services sector.77 It is divided into six parts, 
consisting of twenty-nine articles and eight annexes.78 The GATS is 
modeled after the GAIT in both name and content. The bricks and 
mortar of the GATS are built on three pillars. 
First, the GATS framework agreement proscribes core princi-
ples and basic obligations governing trade in services that are ap-
plicable to all WTO members. These basic obligations include 
rules on MFN treatment, national treatment, and transparency.79 
Second, market access commitments made by WTO members 
are included in national schedules of commitments that are ap-
pended to and made an integral part of the GATS.80 The members' 
schedules of market access commitments are analogous to the 
schedule of tariff concessions that members make under GAIT Ar-
ticle 11.81 
75 See EVANS & WAlSH, supra note 66, at 28 (discussing opposition between 
developed and developing countries). 
76 See id. at 29 (defining trade in services) . 
77 For additional analyses of the GATS, see generally BHALA & KENNEDY, su-
pra note 3, at 1242-70; URUGUAY ROUND STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, su-
pra note 66, at 966; U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN 
SERVICES: EXAMINATION OF MAJOR TRADING PARTNERs' ScHEDULES OF C:JMMITMENTS, 
USITC Pub. 2940 Oan. 1996); U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, THE YEAR IN TRADE 1993: 
OPERATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 19-24, USITC Pub. 2769 (1994); 
McGOVERN, supra note 64, Part D; Bernard Hoekman, Assessing the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 
88 (Will Martin & 1. Alan Winters eds., 1996); Richard B. Self, General Agreement 
on Trade in Services, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE MULTILATERAL 
TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 523 
(Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996); Mary E. Footer, The International Regulation of Trade 
in Services Foliawing Completion of the Uruguay Round, 29 INT'L LAW. 453 (1995). 
78 GATS, supra note 69, at 1167-68. 
79 See id. arts. II, III & XVII, at 1169-70, 1180 (listing general obligations and 
disciplines for MFN treatment and national treatment). 
80 Id. art. XVI, at 1179-80. 
81 See 1947 GATT, supra note 52, art. II, at 200 (setting forth the concessions 
required of contracting members). 
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Third, the GATS' eight annexes complement the general rules 
and market access commitments. The Uruguay Round partici-
pants recognized that negotiations would have to be continued on 
certain service sectors if the Uruguay Round was ever going to be 
concluded. These specific sectors (maritime transport, telecommu-
nications, and financial services) had proven to be major stumbling 
blocks for the negotiators. Thus, appended to the GATS are sev-
eral annexes with guidelines and deadlines for future market ac-
cess negotiations on the maritime transport, financial, and basic 
telecommunication services sectors.52 Market access commitments 
were successfully negotiated in 1997 for the financial services and 
basic telecommunication sectors.53 Negotiations on maritime 
transport services were deferred and continue to be deferred.54 
Part 1 of the GATS sets out its scope of coverage and defines 
several key terms (other definitions are provided in GATS Article 
XXVIII). Under GATS Article 1:1, WTO members agree in principle 
to universal coverage of all trade in commercial services. 55 No ser-
82 See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 1244. 
83 See infra notes 152-67, 203-35, and accompanying text (detailing negotia-
tions over financial service and basic telecommunication sectors). 
84 At the center of the maritime services deadlock is the Jones Act, 46 U.S.c. 
§ 883 (1988), which preserves certain preferences for the U.S. coastal shipping in-
dustry. Although it is generally true that broad exemptions for existing national 
laws inconsistent with GAIT are not permitted, the Jones Act was temporarily 
exempted from GAIT, pursuant to the General Interpretative Note to Annex lA, 
para.3(a). See Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods, Apr. 15,1994, WTO 
Agreement, Annex lA, 33 l.L.M. 1155 (1994). Paragraph 3(a) of the General Inter-
pretative Note provides in pertinent part: 
The provisions of Part II of GAIT 1994 shall not apply to measures taken 
by a Member under specific mandatory legislation, enacted by that 
Member before it became a contracting party to GAIT 1947, that prohib-
its the use, sale or lease of foreign-built or foreign-reconstructed vessels 
in commercial applications between points in national waters or the wa-
ters of an exclusive economic zone. 
ld. at 1155. The WTO Ministerial Conference was to have reviewed this exemp-
tion by 1999 and every two years thereafter as long as the exemption remains in 
force. ld. para. 3(b), at 1155. The WTO General Council initiated the five-year re-
view of the Jones Act exemption in July 1999, and continued to consider this mat-
ter at its meetings in October and November 1999, and in February, May, and July 
2000. No conclusions could be reached during these discussions. WTO General 
Council, Minutes of Meeting Held on 7, 8, 11 and 15 December 2000, WT / GC/M/ 61 
(Feb. 7, 2001). 
85 GATS Article I:3(b) defines "services" as "any service in any sector except 
services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority." GATS, supra note 
69, at 1169. Article I:3(c) in turn defines If services supplied in the exercise of gov-
ernmental authority" as "any service which is supplied neither on a commercial 
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vice sector is excluded a priori under the framework agreement. 
The GATS Annexes do, however, exclude air transport services 
and reserve for later negotiation specific commitments on maritime 
transport. 86 
2.2.1.1. Modes of Supply. 
GATS Article 1:2 defines "trade in services" by the following 
four "modes of supply," i.e., the way in which services are deliv-
ered. 
The first mode is the cross-border supply of services II from the 
territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member."87 
For example, a securities firm in Country A sells bonds from Coun-
try A to consumers in Country B; or an architect from Country A 
sends design drawings by mail to a client in Country B. 
The second mode is consumption of services "in the territory of 
one member to the service consumer of any other Member."88 For 
example, a tour company in Country A supplies a service to Coun-
try B consumers in Country A; or a student from Country A stud-
ies abroad in Country B. 
Third, the service supplier of one member supplies services 
through a "commercial presence in the territory of any other Mem-
ber."89 For example, a bank located in Country A renders banking 
services through its branch located in Country B; or an advertising 
firm in Country A establishes an office in Country B to render ser-
vices to clients located there. 
Fourth and finally, the service supplier of one member supplies 
services "through the presence of natural persons of a Member in 
the territory of any other Member."90 For example, an architect 
from a U.S. firm performs on-site design services in Europe; or an 
accountant from Country A travels to Country B to render account-
ing services to a client in Country B. 
basis, nor in competition with one or more service suppliers [Le., government 
monopolies]." ld. 
86 GATS, supra note 69, at 1188-89 (containing the text of the Annex on Air 
Transport Services); id. at 1192 (containing the text of the Annex on Negotiations 
on Maritime Transport). 
87 ld. art. I:2(a), at 1169. 
88 ld. art. I:2(b). 
89 ld. art. I:2(c). 
90 ld. art. I:2(d). 
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The first, second, and fourth modes of supply involve the cross-
border delivery of services. The third mode of supply involves the 
sale of services through an affiliate, i.e., the delivery of services by 
a foreign-owned firm within the territory of another member 
through facilities or other commercial presence. The commercial 
presence mode of supply is especially important because it en-
hances competition for services markets that are necessarily local 
in their geographic scope and, therefore, immovable. As noted by 
the United States in a submission to the WTO Working Group on 
the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, investment under 
the commercial presence mode of supply can not only supplement 
open international trade, but it can also introduce or increase com-
petition where open trade has not yet reached.91 
The Annex on Article II Exemptions is arguably the most im-
portant of the eight annexes appended to the GATS.92 Contrary to 
the rigid, unconditional MFN obligation found in Article I of 
GATT, GATS Article II introduces some flexibility by authorizing 
MFN exemptions,93 provided that the exemption is listed in the 
91 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Invest-
ment, Communication from the United States, at 3, WT /WGTI/W /55 (Sept. 25, 1998) 
(discussing the correlation between free flows of investment and increased com-
petition). 
Economically meaningful trade in services, especially under the commercial 
presence mode of supply, requires that service suppliers and their customers be 
able to make unimpeded capital transactions across national borders. To that end, 
GATS Article XI limits the ability of WTO members to restrict international trans-
fers and payments for current transactions relating to specific market access 
commitments. GATS, supra note 69, at 1175-76. Members may restrict such pay-
ments and transfers solely in accordance with GATS Article XII on balance-of-
payments restrictions. Id. at 1176-77. 
92 See id., Annex on Article II Exemptions, at 1187 (containing the Annex on 
Article II Exemptions). 
93 GATS Article 11:1 does provide for immediate and unconditional MFN 
treatment to services and service suppliers of any other WTO member. The 
phrase "treatment no less favourable" used in GATS Article 11:1 has been inter-
preted as being synonymous with "no less favorable conditions of competition." 
WTO, Dispute Panel on European Communities, Regime Jor the Importation, Sale 
and Distribution of Bananas, para. 7.353, WT /DS27 /R/USA (May 22, 1997). There, 
the panel concluded that the EC's 30% allocation of available import licenses for 
bananas at in-quota tariff rates created less favorable conditions of competition for 
the like-service suppliers from the complaining WTO members (i.e., Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and the United States). The allocation was, there-
fore, inconsistent with GATS Article II. The panel's conclusion was affirmed by 
the Appellate Body. See WTO Appellate Body, European Communities Regime for 
the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, para. 244, WT/DS27/ AB/R (Sept. 
9,1997) (affirming the Dispute Panel's conclUSion). 
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member's Schedule of Commitments and does not extend beyond 
ten years.94 Nevertheless, despite the principle in the Annex that 
MFN exemptions should not exceed ten years,95 only nine of the 
424 listed MFN exemptions specify a duration of ten years.96 
Seventy-nine of the WTO members (counting the EU as one 
member) listed MFN exemptions in their schedules of GATS com-
mitments.97 Of the 424 exemptions, 35% are in the transport ser-
vices sector, 25% are in the communications sector (primarily in 
audiovisual services),98 13% are in the financial services sector, and 
94 See WTO, Compilation of Article II (MFN) Exemptions by Sector, Informal 
Note by the Secretariat, Job. No. 1551 (Mar. 9, 2000) (specifying the nature of the 
exemptions). The format that the WTO members use in listing their MFN exemp-
tions contains five items of information: (1) a description of the sector or sectors to 
which the exemption applies; (2) a description of the measure, indicating why it is 
inconsistent with Article II; (3) the country or countries to which the measure ap-
plies; (4) the intended duration of the exemption; and (5) the conditions creating 
the need for the exemption. See OECD, Working Party of the Trade Committee, 
Trade in Services: A Roadmap to GATS MFN Exemptions, at 4-5 n.2, 
TD/TC/WP(2001)25/FINAL (Oct. 29, 2001) [hereinafter Roadmap] (outlining the 
five types of information to be provided for each exemption). 
95 GATS, supra note 69, Annex on Article II Exemptions, para. 6, at 1187. 
96 See Trade in Services: A Roadmap to GATS MFN Exemptions, supra note 94, at 
19 {" Only 9 of the 424 exemptions are said to apply for a duration of 10 years."}. 
All unexpired exemptions were reviewed by the Council for Trade in Services in 
2000. For a summary and critique of that review, see WTO, Council for Trade in 
Services, Communication from Hong Kong, China, Japan and Korea, S/C/W /173 (Oct. 
6(2000) (discussing matters arising from the MFN Exemption Review). 
'Yl See Trade in Services: A Roadmap to GATS MFN Exemptions, supra note 94, at 
6 ("The 424 exemptions to Article II of the GATS have been listed by 79 WTO 
Members (counting the EC as one Member), a majority of the WTO member-
ship."). "[M]ost of those 79 Members have listed 5 exemptions or less, while 10 
countries listed more than 10 [exemptions]." [d. Of the Quad members (Le., Can-
ada, the EC, Japan, and the United States), only Japan did not list any GATS MFN 
exemptions. See id. at 8 (describing exemptions listed by members). 
98 See, e.g., id. at 6 (containing the EC Schedule of Commitments which pro-
vides preferences to EC-member states for audiovisual services). An example of 
an Article II exemption is the one the United States took in the 1997 basic tele-
communications negotiations. The exemption was in response to Canada's un-
willingness to eliminate its 46.7% equity cap restriction on foreign ownership of 
most basic telecom service providers. The exemption provides: 
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18% apply to all services sectors.99 Of the various conditions that 
have prompted the listing of GATS MFN exemptions, 55% relate to 
international agreements, while 37% of the exemptions identify re-
ciprocity as the reason for the exemption.100 Almost half of the ex-
emptions that are based on reciprocity have been taken in the 
transport sector,lOl Reciprocity accounts for more than 80% of the 
exemptions listed for professional services and nearly 50% for fi-
nancial services.102 For example, the United States has listed MFN 
exemptions regarding the movement of persons for countries with 
whom the United States has a friendship, commerce and naviga-
tion treaty or a bilateral investment treaty; certain differential taxa-
tion measures; and certain aspects of air, road, pipeline, and space 
transport.103 
Exemptions are subject to negotiation in subsequent trade lib-
eralizing rounds.104 Any exemption with a term greater than five 
years is subject to review by the WTO Council for Trade in Ser-
THE UNITED STATES- LIST OF ARTICLE II (MFN) EXEMPTIONS 
Sector or Description of Measure Countries Intended Con.ditions 
Subsector Indicatin~ Its Inconsis- to Which Duration Creating the 
tency wit Article II the Meas- Need for the 
ure Aoolies Exemotion 
Telecommunica- Differential treatment of All Indefinite Need to en-
tion services: countries due to applica- sure substan-
One-way satellite tion of reciprocity meas- tiall~ full 
transmission of ures or through mar et access 
DlH and DBS international agree- and national 
television ser- ments guaranteeing treatment in 
vices and of digi- market access or na- certain 
tal audio services tional treatment markets 
WTO, United States, List of Article II (MFN) Exemptions, GATSjELj90jSuppl.2 
(Apr. 11, 1997). The abbreviations "DTH" and "DBS" stand for "direct-to-home" 
and" direct broadcast satellite," respectively. 
99 See Roadmap, supra note 94, at 10 (detailing the sectoral incidence). The bal-
ance of the exemptions are in professional services (18), recreation and sports ser-
vices (5), distribution services (3), construction services (2), health services (1), and 
tourism services (1). See id. (detailing the sectoral incidence). 
100 See id. at 22-24 (listing MFN exceptions by categories and characteristics 
relating to reciprocity). 
101 Id. 
102 See id. at 24 (noting that reciprocity accounts for 83% of professional ser-
vices and 47% of financial services). 
103 WTO, United States, Final List of Article II (MFN) Exemptions, at 78-94, 
GATSj ELj 90, (1994), reprinted in U.S. Int') Trade Comm'n, U.S. Schedule of 
Commitments Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, Inv. No. 332-
354 (May 1997). 
104 GATS, supra note 69, Annex on Article II, para. 6, at 1187. 
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vices.105 However, the Council has no express authority to demand 
termination of the exemption.106 
2.2.1.2. Market Access 
If the framework agreement is the skeleton of the GATS, then 
the schedule of market access commitments is the flesh on the 
bones. The WTO members' schedules list the service sectors and 
modes of supply for which individual members have agreed to 
provide full or partial access to the service suppliers of other WTO 
members. 
In order to harmonize members' schedules, during the Uru-
guay Round, the GAIT Secretariat suggested the use of a Services 
Sectoral Classification List ("Classification List").107 The Classifica-
tion List employs 155 service industries, with four possible modes 
of supply for each industry and with each mode of supply subject 
to both market access and national treatment commitments.108 
105 [d. Annex on Article II Exemptions, para. 3, at 1187. 
106 Id. Annex on Article II Exemptions, para. 4, at 1187 (limiting the Council's 
authority). 
107 The Services Sectoral Classification List classifies services into the follow· 
ing twelve sectors (which is further divided into 155 subsectors): 
1. Business (six subsectors, including professional services) 
2. Communication (five subsectors, including telecommunication services) 
3. Construction and Related Engineering (five subsectors) 
4. Distribution (five subsectors, including wholesale, retail, and franchising) 
5. Education (five subsectors) 
6. Environment (four subsectors) 
7. Financial (three subsectors) 
8. Health and Social Services (four subsectors) 
9. Tourism and Travel (four subsectors) 
10. Recreational, Cultural, and Sporting (five subsectors) 
11. Transport (nine subsectors) 
12. Other Services Not Included Elsewhere 
The GATS classification system has been criticized by more than one source for 
lacking clarity. See, e.g., Mina Mashayekhi, GATS 2000: Progressive Liberalization, in 
UNCT AD, A POSITIVE AGENDA FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: ISSUES FOR FUTURE 
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 169,187 (2000); Mark Felsenthal, GATS Classification Called 
Unclear; Film Industry Urges Broader Application, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 585 
(Apr. 2, 1997). 
108 See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 1262·63 (describing Oassification 
list). The following table is an illustration of the format of members' schedules of 
commitments: 
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Thus, with more than 100 Round participants negotiating bilater-
ally on a request/ offer basis for market access to 1240 service 
1/ cells" on a MFN and national treatment basis, the services trade 
negotiations were, not surprisingly, protracted.109 
Some Round participants wanted to schedule market access 
commitments on the basis of a positive list approach. Unless the 
service sector or mode of supply is expressly listed in a member's 
schedule of commitments, it is not covered under the GATS. Other 
participants wanted to proceed on the basis of a negative list ap-
proach. Market access would exist for all sectors and modes of 
supply on a national treatment basis unless express reservations 
were made in the member's schedule of commitments. The spe-
cific commitments made under the GATS are a blend of these two 
approaches. Only those industries that are listed in a member's 
schedule of commitments are open to foreign service suppliers 
with respect to at least one mode of supply (i.e., a positive list ap-
proach).110 However, if a member has made a commitment, only 
the conditions, limitations, or qualifications on market access and 
national treatment listed in the schedule may be imposed (i.e., a 
negative list approach).111 Thus, all schedules must specify (1) 
terms, limitations, and conditions on market access; (2) conditions 
and qualifications on national treatment; (3) undertakings relating 
to additional commitments; (4) the time frame for implementation 
of commitments; and (5) the date of entry into force of commit-
ments.ll2 Measures that are inconsistent with both Article XVI 
(market access) and Article XVII (national treatment) are to be in-
scribed in the column relating to market access limitations, in 
[MEMBER'S NAME] -SCHEDULE OF SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS 
Modes of supply: (1) Cross-border supply; (2) Consumption abroad; (3) Com-
mercial presence; and (4) Presence of natural persons. 
Sector or Limitations on Limitations on Na- Additional 
Subsector Market Access tional Treatment Commitments 
The WTO has prepared a Guide to Reading the GATS Schedules of Specific Commit-
ments and the Lists of Article II (MFN) Exemptions, available at http://www.wto 
.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gu)de1_e.htm. This matrix equals 1240 service 
If cells" for which market access commitments were requested. 
109 BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 1256. 
110 See TRIPS, supra note 67, art. XVI:1, at 1179 (laying out both the positive 
and negative list approaches). 
111 Id. 
112 See id. art. XX:1, at 1181 (listing the specifications of the schedules). 
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which case the inscription will be considered a condition or qualifi-
cation on national treatment as well.ll3 
Developed countries made market access commitments on ap-
proximately 45% of their service sectors.114 Developing countries 
as a group made commitments on only 12%. Starting with 620 as 
the maximum number of service sectors, subsectors, and modes of 
supply on which commitments could have been made, the United 
States made 384 commitments; the EU, 392; Canada, 352; Japan, 
408; and Mexico, 252.115 For all service sectors, only 25% are 
scheduled by developed countries without conditions or qualifica-
tions.116 The comparable figure for developing countries is 7%.117 
If a member does make market access commitments, and 
unless a reservation is otherwise recorded in a member's schedule 
of commitments, then full market access and national treatment is 
required.llS A member is prohibited from maintaining or adopting 
several types of limitations or measures, unless it has otherwise so 
specified in its schedule.119 Typical kinds of numerical limitations 
that a member might inscribe in its schedule of commitments in-
clude the following: 
113 Id. art. XX:2, at 1181. 
114 Hoekman, supra note 77, at 105-07. 
115 See id. at 102 (listing numbers of commitments scheduled for individual 
GATS members). In 1995, the International Trade Commission completed a de-
tailed analysis of the specific commitments made by Canada, the EU, Japan, and 
Mexico in the areas of distribution, education, communication, health care, pro-
fessional, transportation, and travel and tourism. The Commission concluded 
that, of a possible 440 entries that each country could have made in these service 
sectors, these four trading partners entered full commitments ranging from 104 to 
214, or 24% to 49%. See General Agreement on Trade in Services: Examination of 
Major Trading Partners' Schedules of Commitments 10-4, USITC Pub. 2940, Inv. 
332-358 (Dec. 1995) [hereinafter USITC Examination of GATS]. The Commission 
undertook a parallel study in 1996 for South America. See General Agreement on 
Trade in Services: Examination of South American Trading Partners' Schedules of 
Commitments, USITC Pub. 3007, lnv. No. 332-367 (Dec. 1996). 
116 See Hoekrnan, supra note 77, at 105 (discussing "the magnitude of com-
mitments where no restrictions apply to both market access and national treat-
ment for a given sector-mode of supply"). 
117 Id. 
118 GATS, supra note 69, art. XVI:l, at 1179. 
119 [d. art. XVI:2(a)-(f), at 1179-80. 
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(1) limitations in the form of quotas or the requirement of an 
economic needs test on the number of service suppliers or opera-
tions;120 
(2) limitations in the form of quotas on the total value of service 
transactions or assets;121 
(3) measures that restrict or require specific types of a legal en-
tity or joint venture through which a service supplier may supply a 
service;l22 
(4) limitations on the total number of natural persons that may 
be employed in a particular service sector;l23 and 
(5) limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of 
a maximum percentage limit on foreign shareholding or the total 
value of individual or aggregate foreign investment.124 
2.2.1.3. Progressive Liberalization 
Appreciating that an agreement on the complete liberalization 
of trade in services would not happen overnight, Part IV of GATS 
schedules future negotiations for further liberalization of trade in 
services. It also lays down rules for negotiating schedules and for 
the subsequent modifications of those schedules. GATS Article 
XIX schedules successive rounds of negotiations beginning no later 
than 2000 and periodically thereafter. They are aimed at the pro-
gressive liberalization of trade in services. For each round, negoti-
ating guidelines and procedures are to be established, taking into 
account the autonomous trade liberalization efforts undertaken by 
members since 1995 and the special situation of least-developed 
countries.125 GATS Article XIX contemplates that the process of 
progressive liberalization may take place through bilateral, pluri-
lateral, or multilateral negotiations in each round, provided they 
120 Id. art. XVI:2(a), (c), at 1179. Examples include a license for a new restau-
rant based on an economic needs test, annually established quotas for foreign 
medical practitioners, nationality requirements for service suppliers (equivalent to 
a zero quota), and restrictions on the amount of broadcasting time available for 
foreign films. 
121 Id. art. XVI:2(b), at 1179. For example, foreign bank subsidiaries' assets 
might be capped at a fixed percentage of total domestic assets of all banks. 
122 Id. art. XVI:2(e), at 1180. Examples include a requirement that foreign 
companies establish subsidiaries, or that in a particular sector commercial pres-
ence take the form of a partnership. 
123 [d. art. XVI:2(d), at 1180. 
124 Id. art. XVI:2(f), at 1180. 
125 See id. art. XIX:3, at 1181 (describing negotiating schedules). 
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are aimed at raising the overall level of specific commitments,126 
Improved commitments on trade liberalization of most service sec-
tors have been rolled over to the so-called Doha Development 
Agenda or Round.127 
2.2.1.4. Movement a/Natural Persons 
Under the Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying 
Services Under the Agreement (" Annex"), members agree to pro-
vide temporary entry for management and specialized personnel 
during the ordinary course of providing services. "Movement of 
natural persons" refers to the temporary admission of foreign na-
tionals into the territory of another WTO Member as part of the 
business of supplying services abroad.128 The GATS does not ap-
ply to measures affecting natural persons seeking access to a mem-
ber's employment market. It also does not apply to measures re-
garding citizenship, residence, or employment on a permanent 
basis.129 
The Annex does not prevent a member from applying meas-
ures to regulate the entry of natural persons. Such measures may 
include measures to ensure the orderly movement of persons 
across borders, provided that the measures are not applied in a 
manner that nullifies or impairs the benefits accruing to any mem-
ber under the terms of a specific commitment. However, the sole 
fact that a visa is required for natural persons of certain members 
and not others is not to be regarded as nullifying or impairing 
benefits under a specific commitment.130 
As noted by India in a submission to the Working Group on the 
Relationship Between Trade and Investment, there has been a dis-
connect in the discussion about free movement of capital and any 
discussion about the free movement of labor.l3l As India points 
out: 
126 See id. art. XIX:4, at 1181 (discussing the different modes but common goal 
of progressive liberalization). 
127 See infra notes 310-30 and accompanying text. 
128 GATS, supra note 69, Annex on Article II Exemptions, para. 1, at 1187-88. 
129 Id. para. 2, at 1188. 
130 Id. para. 4 n.l, at 1188. 
131 WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Invest-
ment, Communication from India, WT/WGTI/W /39 Oune 4, 1998}. 
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Both the mobility of capital and the mobility of labour are 
accepted as delivery modes for trade and investment in 
goods and services. H capital is mobile and flows across 
countries and regions, it is a natural corollary that labour 
must also have comparable mobility. A liberal integrated 
approach is necessary to the mobility of labour as part of 
the free global flows of capital, goods and services)32 
115 
India's observation and suggestion that the movement of labor 
be taken up in the work program of the Working Group on the Re-
lationship Between Trade and Investment has been all but ignored 
by the other participants. 
2.2.1.5. Summary: The Results of the GATS Negotiations 
Most market access and national treatment commitments to 
date are essentially standstill agreements. That is, existing market 
access and national treatment limitations, if any, are maintained.133 
However, members commit not to impose additional trade restric-
tions in the future.1 34 Consequently, while the GATS lays a foun-
dation, broad trade liberalization in services did not take place in 
the Uruguay Round. With the exception of the financial services 
and telecommunication services negotiations where members 
sought genuine liberalization of those two service sectors (dis-
cussed next), the most noteworthy achievement of the first round 
of services trade negotiations was to provide an unprecedented 
amount of information on barriers to services trade maintained by 
WTO members. Thus, through the commitments that identify 
measures that are barriers to services trade, the Uruguay Round 
negotiators accomplished the twin goals of establishing bench-
marks for future services trade negotiations and making barriers to 
services trade more transparent where market access commitments 
were made. Because of the GATS positive list approach, however, 
benchmarks and transparency are non-existent if no market access 
commitment has been made for a service sector or subsector. 
132 Id. para. 3. 
133 USITC Examination of GATS, supra note 115, at 1-4. 
134 Id. 
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2.2.2. Trade in Financial Seroices 
2.2.2.1. Introduction 
Although the extent of market openings overall, including 
openings for FDI, were extremely modest in the Uruguay Round 
GATS negotiations, genuine market openings were achieved in the 
financial services and basic telecommunications sectors in post-
Round negotiations. Let us turn first to the financial services nego-
tiations. 
Realizing that a final agreement on financial services was out of 
reach by the December 1993 deadline for the Uruguay Round, par-
ticipants agreed to continue negotiations on financial services 
through June 1995 to see if adequate market access commitments in 
the areas of banking, securities, and insurance could be secured.135 
Frustrated with the reluctance of participants to make broad finan-
cial services offers during the Uruguay Round, the United States 
reacted by making conditional MFN offers as a negotiating tactic 
for prying more liberal offers from foot-draggers.136 Countries 
whose offers were deemed adequate received reciprocal offers 
from the United States. Unconditional MFN treatment was with-
held, however, from countries that the United States considered to 
be // free riders.//137 This two-tiered approach rankled many par-
ticipants as a dangerous departure from the near-sacrosanct un-
conditional MFN principle enshrined in GATT Article 1.138 
The United States announced on June 28, 1995 that it would 
maintain its exemption from the MFN obligation relating to trade 
in financial services because it regarded the offers made by the 
other participants as insufficient.139 In response, the EU arranged 
for improved offers in an effort to induce other participants not to 
135 Kenneth Freiberg, Introductory Note, World Trade Organization: Second 
Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and Related Deci-
sions, 35I.L.M. 199, 200-01 (1996) [hereinafter Second Protocol to the GATS] (dis-
cussing the extensions to the financial services negotiations). 
136 See id. at 201-02 (discussing U.S. tactics to deal with insufficient market 
access commitments by other nations). 
137 Id. 
138 See U.S.Nr'L TRADE COMM'N, THE YEAR IN TRADE 1994: OPERATION OF THE 
TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 14, USITC Pub. 2894 (1995) [hereinafter THE YEAR IN 
TRADE 1994]. 
139 See Second Protocol to the GATS, supra note 135, at 202 (discussing the 
accommodations the United States made for countries whose offers were deemed 
insufficient). 
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withdraw their financial services commitments.140 By July 1995, 
approximately thirty WTO members (counting the EU as one) 
reached an interim agreement on financial service commitments. 
They adopted a Second Protocol to the GATS, containing schedules 
of commitments that expired on December 12, 1997,141 That date 
coincided with the new date for the completion of the financial 
services follow-up negotiations that were launched in 1997. 
In order to facilitate the post-Round financial services negotia-
tions, the WTO members agreed at the end of the Uruguay Round 
to the Understanding on Commitments on Financial Services 
(IUnderstanding").142 The Understanding was intended to harmo-
nize the structure of the market access commitments agreed to by 
the members during the post-Round financial services negotia-
tions. 
First, the Understanding contains a standstill restriction that 
provides that members will only inscribe conditions, lin:ritations, 
and qualifications to their specific commitments to the extent of ex-
isting, non-conforming measures.143 (Under Part III of the GATS, in 
contrast, it is also possible for a member to inscribe future non-
conforming measures in a member's schedule of commitments.) 
Second, regarding market access commitments, members agree 
to the following eight rules:l44 
(1) Members shall list in their schedules of financial service 
commitments existing monopoly rights and shall endeavor to 
eliminate them or reduce their scope. 
(2) Notwithstanding GATS Article XIII on government pro-
curement, members agree to accord MFN and national treatment 
to non-resident financial service suppliers in the purchase or acqui-
sition of financial services by public entities. 
(3) Members shall permit the cross-border delivery and pur-
chase of insurance services relating to (a) maritime shipping, com-
mercial aviation, and space launching; (b) reinsurance; and (c) fi-
nancial information and data processing. 
140 See THE YEAR IN TRADE 1994, supra note 138, at 31 n.83. 
141 See Second Protocol to the GATS, supra note 135. For background on the 
financial services negotiations through 1997, see WTO, OPENING MARKETS IN 
FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE ROLE OF THE GATS (Special Studies 1997). 
142 GATS, supra note 69, Understanding on Commitments in Financial Ser-
vices, at 1260. 
143 See id. at 1260 (discussing limitations of standstill provisions). 
144 See id. at 1260-63 (outlining market access commitment rules). 
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(4) Members shall grant non-resident financial service suppliers 
the right to establish a commercial presence within their territory, 
including through the acquisition of existing enterprises, subject to 
terms, conditions, and procedures for authorization of the estab-
lishment of a commercial presence that are otherwise consistent 
with the GATS. 
(5) Members shall permit financial service suppliers of any 
other member established in the former's territory to offer any new 
financial service. 
(6) Members shall not take measures that prevent transfers of 
information or the processing of information that are necessary for 
the conduct of ordinary business of a financial service supplier, 
subject to the right to protect personal data and privacy and the 
confidentiality of individual records and accounts. 
(7) Members shall permit the temporary entry of personnel of a 
financial service supplier that has established a commercial pres-
ence in the territory of a member, including senior managerial per-
sonnel possessing proprietary information esselltial to the service 
supplier, specialists in the operation of the supplier, and, subject to 
the availability of qualified personnel within the member's terri-
tory, computer and telecommunications specialists, actuarial spe-
cialists, and legal specialists. 
(8) Members commit to remove or limit any significant adverse 
effects on other members' financial service suppliers of (a) non-
discriminatory measures that prevent other members' financial 
service suppliers from offering all of the financial services permit-
ted by the member; (b) non-discriminatory measures that limit the 
expansion of financial service activities into a member's entire ter-
ritory; (c) measures that apply to both banking and securities ser-
vices when the financial service supplier concentrates its activities 
in securities services; and (d) other measures that adversely affect 
the ability of financial service suppliers to operate, compete, or en-
ter a member's market. Members need not, however, discriminate 
against their own financial service suppliers in honoring this com-
mitment. 
Third, regarding national treatment, members agree to provide 
financial service suppliers of other members access to payment and 
clearing systems operated by public entities, and to official funding 
and refinancing facilities available in the ordinary course of busi-
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ness, other than the facilities of a member's lender of last resort.145 
When membership or participation in any self-regulatory body, se-
curities or futures exchange, or any other organization, is required 
by a member as a condition of supplying a particular financial ser-
vice on an equal footing with resident financial service suppliers, 
members must ensure that such entities accord national treatment 
to non-resident financial service suppliers.146 
2.2.2.2. The 1995 Interim Agreement on Financial Services 
With the Understanding on Commitments on Financial Ser-
vices in place, the Uruguay Round participants had laid the 
groundwork for multilateral negotiations leading to a rules-based 
agreement on financial services. However, despite the best efforts 
of the Uruguay Round participants to chart a course toward deeper 
and broader offers on market access for financial services that 
would culminate in a comprehensive, multilateral agreement, 
those efforts failed to produce improved commitments from cer-
tain key players, most notably the United States. The United States 
concluded that market access commitments by some Asian coun-
tries, particularly India, Korea, and Malaysia, were not adequate to 
warrant U.S. support of a comprehensive agreement.147 Accord-
ingly, the United States signed the Second Protocol and submitted 
its schedule of commitments that included an MFN exemption re-
stricting access to its financial services sector to other members' fi-
nancial services suppliers on the basis of reciprocal treatment of 
U.S. suppliers by those members.l48 
Undaunted, the other participants, behind the leadership of the 
EU, reduced their commitments to a Second Protocol to the 
145 Id. para. C1, at 1263. 
146 Id. para. C2, at 1263. 
147 See BHALA, supra note 45, at 747. 
148 See id. at 748; WTO, United States: Specific Schedule of Commitments, 
GATS/SC/90/Supp. 1, and List of Article II (MFN) Exemptions, 
GATS/EL/90/Supp. 1 (1995), reprinted in U.S. Schedule of Commitments, supra 
note 103, app. B-1; James Bedore, Financial Services: An Overview of the World Trade 
Organization's Negotiations, INDUSTRY, TRADE, & TECH. REV. 1, USITC Pub. 2942 
(Dec. 1995); Financial Services Committee Approves Accord Without U.S., 12 Int'J 
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1311 (Aug. 2, 1995); Japan, South Korea Sign On to Financial Ser-
vices Accord, 12 Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA) 1266 OuJy 26, 1995); ASEAN Members Agree 
to Maintain Offers in wro Financial Services Negotiations, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 
1175 Ouly 12, 1995). 
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GA TS,149 the implementing document of the interim financial ser-
vice agreement ("Interim Agreement") that contains their sched-
ules of commitments on financial services. The Interim Agreement 
of 1995 contains commitments from thirty-one countries covering 
90% of world trade in financial services, including some access to 
members' banking, insurance, and securities markets.t50 The 
commitments extend to all WTO members on an MFN basis. 
2.2.2.3. The 1997 Agreement on Financial Services 
Negotiations on a comprehensive financial services agreement 
resumed on April 7, 1997. Participants set December 12, 1997 as 
the deadline for reaching an agreement.151 Negotiators started 
with a clean slate, so that all members that had made commitments 
under the interim agreement started from zero. The negotiations 
were successfully completed on December 12, 1997, with the 
agreement to enter into force by March 1,1999 at the latest.152 A to-
tal of fifty-six offers (representing seventy countries, counting the 
EU member states as one) were submitted and annexed to the Fifth 
Protocol to the GATS, bringing to 102 the number of WTO mem-
149 Second Protocol to the GATS, supra note 135. The Second Protocol en-
tered into force on September 1, 1996, and expired on December 12, 1997. [d. 
WTO members involved in negotiating the Second Protocol include Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, the EC, 
Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Morocco, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Singapore, the Slovak Re-
public, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela. BHALA & 
KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 1280 n.131. 
150 See BHALA, supra note 45, at 748. A list of the WTO members making 
commitments under the 1995 Interim Agreement is available at http://www 
.wto.org/ english/ tratop_e/ serv _e/ finance_e/ finance_comrnitments_e.htm. For 
example, the Philippines opened its insurance market to foreign firms for the first 
time in fifty years. Thailand committed to issue seven extra banking licenses by 
1997. Brazil opened participation in the privatization of its banks to foreign firms. 
BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 1280. 
151 WTO Council for Trade in Services, Decision on Financial Services Negotia-
tions, S/L/39 (1997). For background on the 1995 Interim Agreement negotiations 
and the 1997 WTO financial services negotiations, see WTO, Background Note, 
The Results of the Financial Services Negotiations Under the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e 
/ serv _e/ finance_e/ finance_fiback_e.htm. 
152 WTO, Background Note, supra note 151. As a result of the negotiations, 
the United States, Columbia, and Thailand decided to withdraw their broad MFN 
exemptions based on reciprocity. Only a small number of countries submitted 
limited MFN exemptions or maintained existing broad MFN exemptions. [d. 
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bers that made financial services commitments under the GATS.153 
As measured in revenue, the agreement covers more than 95% of 
trade in banking, insurance, securities, and financial information.154 
In the insurance sector, for example, fifty-two countries repre-
senting over 90% of world insurance premiums have guaranteed 
market access through a commercial presence for all insurance 
subsectors (i.e., life, non-life, reinsurance, brokerage, and auxiliary 
services).155 Forty-five countries permit 100% ownership of insur-
ance subsidiaries or entry through branches, including the Quad 
members and Mexico; seven countries allow 100% ownership of 
subsidiaries, but no entry through branches (i.e., Brazil, Chile, In-
donesia, Jamaica, Nicaragua, South Africa, and Venezuela); and 
nine countries allow majority control of insurance subsidiaries (Le., 
Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Pakistan, the Philippines, Romania, Singa-
pore, Slovenia, and Thailand).156 
The participants in the 1997 financial services negotiations also 
made commitments in connection with the cross-border delivery of 
insurance services.157 For example, in the specialty category of ma-
rine, aviation, and transport ("MAT") insurance, twenty-seven 
countries now permit cross-border MAT insurance, including Can-
ada, the ED and Mexico.158 Thirty-five countries have made com-
mitments in the reinsurance and brokerage subsectors of cross-
153 For a summary of the improvements in the new financial services com-
mitments, see Press Release, WTO, Successful Conclusion of the WTD's Financial 
Services Negotiations (Dec. 15, 1997), available at http://www.wto.org/english 
/news_e/pres97 _e/pr86_e.htm; Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, 
Statement by Secretary Rubin and Ambassador Barshefsky Regarding the Suc-
cessful Conclusion of WTO Financial Services Negotiations (Dec. 13, 1997), avail-
able at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/1997/12/finserv.pdf; Press Release, Office 
of the U.S. Trade Representative, World Trade Organization (WTO) Financial Ser-
vices Negotiations (Dec. 13, 1997), available at http://www.ustr.gov/releases 
/1997/12/ finserv1.pdf. 
154 See Press Release, Statement by Secretary Rubin and Ambassador Barshef-
sky, supra note 153 (listing the commitments made on a country-by-country basis); 
WTO, Non-Attributable Summary of the Main Improvements ~ the New 
Financial Services Commitments (Feb. 26, 1997) (listing the commitments made on 
a country-by-country basis), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e 
/news98_e/finsum.htm. 
155 See Press Release, Office of the U.s. Trade Representative, WTO Financial 
Services Negotiations, supra note 153, at 1. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 3. 
158 Id. 
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border insurance activities.159 For example, Japan has authorized 
the cross-border delivery of reinsurance, but not brokerage ser-
vices.160 
In banking, sixty countries guarantee a right of establishment 
for banks.161 Thirty-five countries, including the Quad members, 
permit 100% ownership of subsidiaries or branches. Sixty-four 
countries have grandfathered acquired rights of foreign banks.162 
In the securities sector, forty-five countries, including the Quad 
members, guarantee a right of establishment of foreign securities 
firms.1 63 Thirty-seven of them permit 100% ownership of subsidi-
aries or branches.164 Fifty-nine countries have grandfathered the 
rights of foreign securities firms.165 Fifty countries permit foreign 
firms to provide and transfer financial data and information.166 
In sum, in marked contrast to the flaccid results of the Uruguay 
Round negotiations on services trade in general, the 1997 agree-
ment on financial services achieved significant market liberaliza-
tion for FDI in the financial services sector. The 1997 agreement 
demonstrates what is possible in sectoral, FDI negotiations. Simi-
lar results were achieved in the telecommunication services sector, 
discussed next. 
2.2.3. Telecommunications Trade 
2.2.3.1. Introduction 
Telecommunication products and services are an increasingly 
valuable and growing component of an advanced economy's 
manufacturing base. Near the start of the post-Round negotiations 
on basic telecommunications in 1995, global telecommunication 
services revenue stood at $601.9 billion, or 2.1% of global gross 
domestic product ("GDP").167 The world telecommunications 
159 [d. 
160 [d. 
161 [d. at 4. 
162 [d. at 5. 
163 [d. at 4. 
164 [d. 
165 [d. at 5. 
166 [d. at4. 
167 See WTO, Data on Telecommunications Markets Covered by the WTO 
Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications (Feb. 17,1997) ("Revenue from inter-
national service was estimated at nearly $63 billion in 1995; accounting for 10% of 
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market is clearly an economically valuable one. It also is a fast-
growing one, with average annual revenue growth rates of 4.2% 
from 1990 to 1995 in industrialized countries, and 9.7% in develop-
ing countries in that same period.l68 In 1995, the EU, Japan, and 
the United States together accounted for nearly three-quarters of 
total revenue in world telecommunications.169 
It is against this backdrop that the WTO members negotiated 
several commitments on telecommunications services trade, both 
during the Uruguay Round and after. At the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round in December 1993, approximately one-half of the 
participants scheduled specific commitments on value-added tele-
communication services.170 Negotiations on basic telecommunica-
tion services were extended through 1996 and concluded in 1997 
(discussed below). The Uruguay Round participants also reached 
agreement on access to members' telecommunication networks, 
memorialized in the GATS Annex on Telecommunications (dis-
cussed next). 
2.2.3.2. The GATS Annex on Telecommunications 
The telecommunications sector serves a dual role as both a dis-
tinct sector of economic activity and as the means of delivery for 
other economic activities. Recognizing this duality, the GATS An-
nex on Telecommunications was negotiated to ensure that in its 
total revenue."), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres97 _e 
/ data3.htm. 
Telecommunication services are commonly bifurcated into basic and value-
added services. Value-added services are sometimes referred to in the United 
States as "enhanced" services. Basic telecommunication services include voice 
telephone, telex, and telegraph. Value-added services are computer-based and 
include electronic and voice mail, online and database information retrieval, and 
data and transaction processing. See Michael Nunes, U.S. Telecommunication Ser-
vices: Industry and Trade Outlook, INDUSTRY TRADE & TECH. REV. 1 nn.2 & 3 Ouly 
2002); WTO, Coverage of Basic Telecommunications and Value-Added Services 
(defining and giving examples of basic and value-added telecommunications ser-
vices), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e 
/ telecom_coverage_e.htm. 
168 See WTO, Data on Telecommunications Markets Covered by the WTO 
Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications (Feb. 17, 1997), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres97_e/data3.htm. 
169 Id. 
170 BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 1290. 
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role as the means of delivery, access to telecommunication net-
works does not turn into a non-tariff barrier to trade.171 
The scope of the Annex is broad, but not universal. It applies 
to all measures that affect access to and the use of public telecom-
munication transport networks and services, but does not apply to 
measures affecting cable or broadcast distribution of radio or tele-
vision programming.172 Every WTO member must ensure that the 
obligations of the Annex are applied to their own suppliers of pub-
lic telecommunication transport networks and services by what-
ever means necessary.173 
Unless a member has scheduled a specific commitment that re-
quires access or use, nothing in the Annex requires a member to 
authorize a service supplier of any other member to establish, con-
struct, acquire, or otherwise supply telecommunication transport 
networks or services.174 Likewise, and undoubtedly to the relief of 
developing countries, the Annex does not require a member to ac-
quire, lease, or build a telecommunications network or supply tele-
communication services that are not offered to the public gener-
ally,175 
The heart of the Annex is paragraph 5, whose heading could 
easily serve as the subtitle of the Annex: Access to and Use of Public 
Telecommunications Transport Networks and Services. Paragraph 5(a) 
provides, in pertinent part, "[E]ach Member shall ensure that any 
service supplier of any other Member is accorded access to and use 
of public telecommunications transport networks and services on 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions, for the 
supply of a service included in its Schedule." 
171 GATS, supra note 69, Annex on Telecommunications, at 1192. For an 
analysis of the Annex on Telecommunications, see Taunya L. McLarty, Liberalized 
Telecommunications Trade in the vvrO: Implications for Universal Service Policy, 51 
FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 38-42 (1998). 
172 GATS, supra note 69, Annex on Telecommunications, para. 2(a)-(b), at 
1193. Public telecommunications transport service means a service that a member 
requires to be offered to the public generally (thus, they may be privately owned), 
and includes telegraph, telephone, telex, and data transmission. Id. para. 3(b). 
Public telecommunication transport network means the infrastructure which 
permits telecommunications between defined network termination points. Id. 
para.3(c). 
173 Id. para. 2(a) n.l. 
174 Id. para. 2(c)(i). 
175 Id. para. 2(c)(ii). 
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A footnote clarifies that the term "non-discriminatory" refers to 
MFN and national treatment, as defined in the GA TSp6 It adds 
that sector-specific usage of the term means "terms and conditions 
no less favourable than those accorded to any other user of like 
public telecommunications transport networks or service under 
like conditions." This language strongly suggests that no deroga-
tions from the MFN or national treatment obligations may be listed 
in a member's schedule of commitments regarding access to or use 
of public telecommunication networks or services. 
The specific access and use rights accorded foreign service 
suppliers include: (1) the right to purchase or lease and attach 
terminal or other equipment that is necessary to supply services; 
(2) the right to interconnect private leased or owned circuits with 
public networks or services; (3) the right to use operating protocols 
of the supplier's choice in the supply of any service; and (4) the 
right to use networks and services for the movement of informa-
tion within and across borders, subject to reasonable measures 
necessary to ensure security and confidentiality (e.g., encryption 
requirements).177 
A member may impose three general types of measures on ac-
cess and use. First, a member may impose measures necessary to 
ensure that public service suppliers are able to make their net-
works or services available to the public generallyP8 Second, a 
member may impose measures necessary to protect the technical 
integrity of networks or services.179 Third, a member may impose 
measures necessary to ensure that service suppliers are providing 
only services for which the member has scheduled a commit-
ment.ISO Provided that the conditions fall within one of the three 
types of permissible measures just described, a member may im-
pose specific conditions on access and use. These conditions in-
clude: (1) restrictions on resale or shared use; (2) requirements to 
use specified technical interfaces and protocols for inter-connection 
with such networks and services; (3) approval of terminal or other 
equipment that interfaces with the network; (4) restrictions on in-
ter-connection of private leased or owned circuits with such net-
176 Id. para. 5(a) n.2, at 1194. 
177 Id. para. 5(b)-(d). Cf GATS Art. III bis, at 1170. 
178 GATS, supra note 69, Annex on Telecommunications, para. 5(e)(i), at 1194. 
179 Id. para. 5(e)(ii). 
180 Id. para. 5(e)(iii). 
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works or services; and (5) requirements on registration and licens-
ing.181 
Developing countries are given a special dispensation that al-
lows them to protect (or "strengthen" in the words of the Annex) 
their domestic telecommunications infrastructure and service ca-
pacity through reasonable conditions on access and use, notwith-
standing the limitations imposed on members by paragraph 5.182 
Any such conditions must be specified in the developing country 
member's schedule (which no member has done). The Annex also 
encourages technical cooperation between developed and develop-
ing members.183 
Finally, recognizing the importance of international standards 
for global compatibility and inter-operability of telecommunication 
networks and services, members agree in paragraph 7 to promote 
such standards through appropriate international organizations, 
including the International Telecommunication Union and the In-
ternational Organization for Standardization.184 Members also 
agree to engage relevant Non-Governmental Organizations by 
making arrangements with them for consultation on matters aris-
ing from the implementation of the Annex.185 
In summary, what the Annex on Telecommunications repre-
sents is a national treatment commitment that sets the stage for 
equal treatment of foreign telecommunication service providers 
vis-A-vis their domestic competitors if and when market access is 
offered to the former. Such market access was secured at least in 
part during the Uruguay Round in the case of value-added tele-
communications services. 
2.2.3.3. Commitments on Value-Added Telecommunication 
Seroices 
Value-added telecommunication service suppliers create global 
networks by leasing lines from basic telecommunication carriers. 
Consumers can access value-added services, such as e-mail or 
computer databases, by connecting to a value-added telecommuni-
cation network through a personal computer. Consumers can use 
181 Id. para. 5(f). 
182 Id. para. 5(g). 
183 Id. para. 6. 
184 Id. para. 7(a). 
185 Id. para. 7(b). 
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a local telephone number provided by the supplier, a long-distance 
number, an Integrated Services Digital Network ("ISDN") connec-
tion through a local telephone network, or a local telephone com-
pany to connect to a network.186 The modes of delivery for value-
added telecommunication services are either cross-border or 
through a foreign commercial presence.187 Physical delivery occurs 
through telecommunication and computer networks that link 
communication centers throughout the world.188 As noted above, 
the Annex on Telecommunications ensures suppliers reasonable 
and nondiscriminatory access to and use of public telecommunica-
tion network carriers and services when such services or facilities 
are required to supply a service included in a member's schedule 
of commitments. 
The Uruguay Round negotiations on specific commitments on 
value-added telecommunication services were a modest success. 
Fifty-eight countries, including all of the Quad members, sched-
uled commitments on value-added telecom services. As is true 
with the vast majority of specific GATS commitments negotiated 
during the Uruguay Round, however, the value-added service 
commitments are standstill commitments that maintain the status 
quo rather than liberalize trade.189 However, because the global 
market for value-added telecom services was comparatively open 
at the start of the negotiations, the standstill commitments made in 
the Uruguay Round prevent rollbacks on existing market access. 190 
With a few exceptions, U.S. providers of value-added tele-
communication services operate freely in Canada, the EU, Japan, 
and Mexico.191 This open business environment for value-added 
telecommunication services is largely the by-product of bilateral 
and regional agreements that predate the GATS.192 Nevertheless, 
186 See USITC Examination of GATS, supra note 115, at 5-2 (describing the na-
ture of international trade in value-added telecommunication services). 
187 Id. 
188 [d. 
189 [d. at 5-3. 
190 See Richard Brown, Basic Telecommunications Service Negotiations in the 
World Trade Organization: Impetus, Offers, and Prospects, INDUSTRY, TRADE & TECH. 
REV. 1, 5-6, USITC Pub. 3017 Oan. 1997) (describing background and achievements 
of the Uruguay Round basic telecommunication services negotiations). 
191 See USITC Examination of GATS, supra note 115, at 5-4, tb1.5-1 (highlight-
ing commitments made by u.s. major trading partners). 
192 For example, the United States and Japan concluded an international 
value-added network services ("IV ANS") agreement in 1991 that provided market 
access to Japanese business markets for U.S. providers of value-added telecom-
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the GATS buttresses this already favorable climate through the 
standstill commitments scheduled by the Quad members. 
First, with regard to the cross-border delivery of value-added 
telecommunication services, market access is virtually unrestricted 
in Canada, the EU, Japan, and the United States.193 While no na-
tional treatment limitations exist in Mexico, some modest market 
access restrictions require that a permit be obtained to provide 
many types of value-added services.194 None of the Quad mem-
bers listed any MFN exemptions that apply directly to value-added 
telecommunication services.195 
Second, with regard to the delivery of value-added telecom 
services through a commercial presence, foreign service suppliers 
face far more restrictions within all Quad members. Thus, for ex-
ample, while Canada and Japan do not have any limitations that 
are specifically targeted at the value-added telecom service sector, 
cross-industry ("horizontal") restrictions on market access include 
capping equity ownership, voting rights, and representation on 
boards of directors.196 Typical cross-industry limitations on na-
tional treatment include requirements that newly established busi-
nesses be controlled by residents of the host country.197 
Value-added telecommunication service providers in the 
United States have expressed overall satisfaction with the GATS 
commitments made by Canada, the EU, Japan, and Mexico.198 
Their main criticism is the GATS' scheduling methodology.199 The 
U.S. industry complains that the GATS's positive list approach 
does not automatically accord market access or national treatment 
to new services that grow out of technological advances.2oo Be-
cause restrictions on emerging services are unbound, trading part-
munication services. See id. at 5-6. NAFTA also provides U.S. value-added ser-
vice suppliers with liberalized access to the Canadian and Mexican markets. See 
id. at 5-5. 
193 [d. app. L. 
194 See Marie C. Wold, Liberalization of the Mexican Telecommunication Sector, 
INDUSTRY, TRADE, & TECH. REV. 1, USITC Pub. 3039 (Apr. 1997) (discussing the ef-
fects of Mexico's liberation of its long-distance telecommunications sector on U.S. 
investment, trade, and employment in that industry). 
195 USITC Examination of GATS, supra note 115, at 5-3. 
196 Id. at 5-3. 
197 Id. 
198 [d. at 5-6. 
199 Id. 
200 ld. 
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ners may impose on such services whatever national treatment 
limitations or market access restrictions they choose without pay-
ing compensation to adversely affected WTO members. NAFTA's 
negative list approach in the services sector is, for that reason, a 
preferable methodological approach, because all emerging services 
are automatically entitled to market access and national treat-
ment.201 
2.2.3.4. The 1997 Agreement on Basic Telecommunication 
Services 
While several countries offered commitments on value-added 
telecommunications during the Uruguay Round, the negotiations 
on basic telecommunications were a different story.202 The reason 
for this difference is explained by the wide variations in openness 
among countries in their basic telecommunications markets. As 
noted by Bhala and Kennedy in this regard: 
For example, in contrast to the open and competitive U.S. 
telecommunications market that followed the 1984 break-
up of AT&T, the basic telecommunications market in 
Europe is dominated by public and private monopolies or 
single service providers. Because of this gulf in perspec-
tives, offers on basic telecommunications were slow to de-
velop.203 
Despite these hurdles, rather than end negotiations on this 
branch of telecommunication services trade, the participants 
agreed instead to extend negotiations on basic telecommunications 
for two years.204 After a further extension of negotiations, an 
201 See USITC Examination of GATS, supra note 115, at 5-6. 
202 See Laura B. Sherman, Introductory Note, World Trade Organization: 
Agreement on Telecommunications Services (Fourth Protocol to General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services), 36 I.L.M. 354, 355 (1997) (noting that "[b]asic tele-
communications was one of the four services sectors left unresolved by the Uru-
guay Round"). 
203 BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 1290. 
204 WTO Ministerial Conference, Decision on Negotiations on Basic Tele-
communications, para. 5, 33 I.L.M. 144, 145 (1994). 
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Agreement on Basic Telecommunications was finally concluded L" 
early 1997.205 
On February 15, 1997, sixty-nine developed and developing 
countries from fifty-five WTO members (fifty-four governments 
plus the fifteen EU member states) successfully concluded an 
agreement on basic telecommunication services that entered into 
force on January 1, 1998.206 No single document memorializes the 
participants' "agreement" per se.207 Rather, the legal document 
that provides authoritative and complete information on the com-
mitments made by each participant is the National Schedule of 
Specific Commitments annexed to the Fourth Protocol of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Services.20B The basic telecommunica-
tion services covered by the agreement are defined broadly as any 
telecommunication transport network or service.209 
205 See Sherman, supra note 202, at 356-58 (discussing Basic Telecommunica-
tions negotiations). 
206 [d. at 357 n.23; WTO Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, 
Report of the Group on Basic Telecommunications, para. 6, S/GBT /4 (Feb. 15, 1997), 
33 I.L.M. 369, 370 (1997). 
207 See Sherman, supra note 202, at 357-58 (describing the various documents 
that form the package that is the agreement on basic telecommunications). 
208 See WTO, Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services, 
S/L/20 (Apr. 30, 1996), 36 I.L.M. 366 (1997) (agreeing to a Schedule of Specific 
Commitments). 
209 See Sherman, supra note 202, at 359 (noting that all types of basic services 
are included); Press Release, WTO, The WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommu-
nications: Informal Summary of Commitments and M.F.N. Exemptions (Mar. 6, 
1997) [hereinafter WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications Press Release] 
(noting that "[u]nder a very broad and essentially open-ended definition em-
ployed for the negotiations, basic telecommunications were considered any tele-
communications transport networks or services"), available at http://www 
.wto.org/english/news_e/pres97_e/bt summ3.htm. The WTO has identified the 
following services as being within the scope of the basic telecommunications ser-
vices negotiations: voice telephone services, packet-switched data transmission 
services, circuit-switched data transmission services, telex services, telegraph ser-
vices, facsimile services, private leased circuit services, mobile telephone services, 
mobile data services, paging, personal communications services, satellite-based 
mobile services, fixed satellite services, and teleconferencing. WTO Negotiations 
on Basic Telecommunications Press Release, supra. Circuit-switching is the tech-
nical description of older technology for the switching process that dedicates to 
two or more users the exclusive use of the circuit until the connection is termi-
nated. Packet-switching is newer technology that is used almost exclusively for 
data exchange. Unlike circuit-switched data, packet-switched data are transmit-
ted in multiple "packets" through available circuits and reassembled at the termi-
nation point. See generally From Circuits to Packets, ECONOMIST, Sept. 13, 1997, at 
25-27 (discussing telecommunications). 
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The market access openings achieved in the negotiations are 
impressive. The agreement covers 95% of world revenue in tele-
communication services (before the agreement, only 17% of the top 
twenty telecommunication markets were open to foreign service 
providers}.210 With the agreement, close to 100% of those markets 
are now open.2l1 
The fifty-five national schedules of specific commitments have 
three elements: market access, investment, and pro-competitive 
regulatory principles. A sample of the market access commitments 
shows that sixty-one countries, representing 99% of WTO mem-
bers' total basic telecommunication services revenue, commit to the 
competitive supply (i.e., two or more suppliers are permitted) of 
international voice telephone services and other international ser-
vices either immediately on January 1, 1998 or, in the case of 
twenty-four countries, on a phased-in timetable.212 Forty-one 
schedules list commitments on local service; thirty-eight list 
commitments on domestic long-distance service; and forty-two list 
commitments on international service.213 Market access commit-
ments on other basic telecommunication services include forty-
nine schedules with commitments on data transmission service, 
forty-six on cellular/mobile telephone service, forty-one on leased 
circuit service, and thirty-six on fixed satellite service.214 Nine 
countries listed MFN exemptions (Argentina, Antigua and Bar-
210 See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement of 
Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, Basic Telecom Negotiations (Feb. 15, 1997) 
[hereinafter USTR Basic Telecom Negotiations Press Release] (summarizing the 
commitments for each of the fifty-five participants), available at WTO Negotiations 
on Basic Telecommunications Press Release, supra note 209 (including text sum-
marizing the commitments for each of the fifty-five participants on a member-by-
member basis). 
211 See USTR Basic Telecom Negotiations Press Release, supra note 210, at 1; 
WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications Press Release, supra note 209. 
212 See USTR Basic Telecom Negotiations Press Release, supra note 210, at 1. 
213 WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications Press Release, supra 
note 207. The following countries deferred full market access to international 
telephone services: Spain, until December 1, 1998; Peru, until 1999; Argentina, Ire-
land, Portugal, Singapore, and Venezuela, until 2000; Bolivia and the Czech Re-
public, until 2001; Greece, Poland, Romania, and the Slovak Republic, until 2003; 
Hungary, Mauritius, until 2004; Bulgaria, Indonesia, until 2005; Grenada, Senegal, 
Thailand, and Turkey, until 2006; Brunei, until 2010; Antigua and Barbuda, until 
2012; and Jamaica, until 2013. See USTR Basic Telecom Negotiations Press Re-
lease, supra note 210, at 9. 
214 WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications Press Release, supra 
note 209, para. 4. 
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buda, Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and 
the United States).215 
On foreign direct investment, most schedules of commitments 
(fifty-six countries covering 97% of WTO members' total basic tele-
communication services revenue) permit delivery through some 
form of a commercial presence.216 Foreign service suppliers thus 
have the right to acquire, establish, or own all or part of a foreign-
based telecommunications company. Focusing on the major trad-
ing partners of the United States (the EU, Japan, Canada, and Mex-
ico), the EU, for example, in its schedule of commitments, agreed 
to full market access and national treatment with respect to the de-
livery of the following services through a commercial presence: 
voice telephone, packet-switched data transmission, circuit-
switched data transmission, telex, telegraph, facsimile, leased cir-
cuit, and mobile and personal communication systems.217 With re-
spect to these same services, however, Japan limits foreign capital 
participation in its two largest carriers, Nippon Telegraph and 
Telephone and Kokusai Denshin Denwa, to a maximum of 20%.218 
Canada likewise restricts the delivery through a commercial pres-
ence of basic telecommunication services by limiting foreign capi-
tal participation in most basic telecommunication service compa-
nies based in Canada to 20% direct ownership and 46.7% combined 
215 [d. 
216 See USTR Basic Telecom Negotiations Press Release, supra note 210, at 7. 
217 [d. at 4; WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications Press Release, 
supra note 209, para. 29 ("The EC offer commits to complete liberalization of basic 
telecom services (facilities-based and resale) across the EC for all market segments 
(local, long distance, and international). The offer also covers, for example, satel-
lite networks and services and all mobile and personal communications services 
and systems."); WTO, European Communities and Their Member States, Schedule 
of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/31/SuppI.3 (1997). Some EU member states 
have deferred the implementation of the commercial presence commitment until 
2000 (Ireland and Portugal) and 2003 (Greece). See USTR Basic Telecom Negotia-
tions Press Release, supra note 210, at 7. 
218 WTO, Japan, Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/46/SuppI.2 
(1997); WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications Press Release, supra note 
209, para. 41. 
[d. 
In April 1996, agreed to remove long-standing foreign equity limits on 
Type I carriers and radio-based services, leaving only two companies, 
KDD and NIT, with foreign equity limits (at 20%). Aside from these 
company-specific restrictions, open market access is committed in all 
market segments for basic telecommunications services (facilities-based 
and resale). 
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direct and indirect ownership.219 Mexico also inscribed market ac-
cess limitations with regard to delivery through a commercial 
presence for all telecommunications service suppliers. Direct for-
eign participation in such companies is capped at 49%.220 An ex-
ception exists, however, for cellular services, where Mexico allows 
100% foreign ownership.221 
2.2.3.5. The Regulatory Framework for Basic Telecommunica-
tions Services 
The basic telecommunications industry historically has been 
dominated by monopoly service suppliers. Against this historical 
backdrop, the WTO Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunica-
tions recognized that in order for the market access commitments 
to be fully realized and for new market entrants to be able to com-
pete effectively in this monopolistic business climate, it was essen-
tial that the participants reach agreement on a set of principles 
governing the regulatory framework for basic telecommunications 
services.222 To that end, the Negotiating Group developed a so-
called Reference Paper on competition principles generally relating 
to anti-competitive behavior, interconnection, universal service, 
transparency ill licensing, independence of regulators, and alloca-
tion of resources.223 More specifically, the Reference Paper ad-
dresses the following issues: 
(1) Safeguards against certain anti-competitive practices by 
monopolies are to be put in place, such as cross-subsidization or 
219 WTO, Canada, Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/16/SuppI.3 
(1997); WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications Press Release, supra note 
209, para. 20 ("Limits foreign equity in all facilities-based suppliers to 20% direct 
and 46.7% combined direct and indirect foreign ownership."). 
220 WTO, Mexico, Lista de compromisos espedficos [Schedule of Specific Com-
mitments], GATS/SC/56/Suppl.2 (1997); WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecom-
munications Press Release, supra note 209, para. 45 ("raising the foreign equity 
limitation to 49% for all telecommunications service suppliers"). 
221 See WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications Press Release, supra 
note 209, para. 45 ("For cellular telephony, allows more than 49% foreign invest-
ment subject to prior authorization."); Wold, supra note 194, at 6 (" Although Mex-
ico generally limited foreign investment in telecommunications services providers 
to 49%, Mexico's commitment to the WTO permits 100% ownership of firms pro-
viding cellular services."). 
222 See Sherman, supra note 202, at 357 (explaining the results of the Negotiat-
ing Group on Basic Telecommunications). 
223 See id.; Reference Paper, 36 I.L.M. 367 (1997). The source for the Reference 
Paper is the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.c. §§ 251-61 (2000). See 
USTR Basic Telecom Negotiations Press Release, supra note 210, at 5. 
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using information obtained from competitors with anti-
competitive results.224 
(2) Interconnection is to be cost-based and timely, on non-
discriminatory terms, rates, and quality.225 
(3) Universal service requirements (i.e., requirements that 
mandate basic telecommunication service for every citizen at af-
fordable prices) are to be transparent and non-discriminatory.226 
(4) Licensing criteria must be transparent and publicly avail-
able. The reasons for the denial of a license are to be made avail-
able to the applicant upon request.227 
(5) Regulators must be independent from suppliers of basic 
telecommunication services.228 
(6) Rules for the allocation of scarce resources, such as radio 
spectrum frequencies, are to be. transparent and non-
discriminatory.229 
Sixty-five of the sixty-nine participating governments, covering 
93 % of WTO members' total basic telecommunication services 
revenue, inscribed commitments on regulatory principles in their 
national schedules.230 Of these, fifty-seven committed to the Refer-
ence Paper by inscribing it in whole or in part in their schedule of 
commitments, including the Quad members and Mexico.231 Bang-
ladesh, Brazil, Mauritius, Morocco, Turkey, and Venezuela de-
ferred the date of entry into force of the regulatory principles. Bo-
livia, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and the Philippines adopted them 
in part.232 
Of all the service sectors for which GATS commitments have 
been made, the scope of the commitments made on basic telecom-
munications services is the most ambitious to date. It opens the 
world's three largest telecommunication markets-the EU, Japan, 
and the United States-to international competition. As of mid-
8. 
224 Reference Paper, supra note 223, para. 1.2, at 367. 
22S [d. para. 2.2, at 368. 
226 [d. para. 3, at 368. 
227 [d. para. 4, at 369. 
228 Id. para. 5, at 369. 
229 [d. para. 6. 
230 See USTR Basic Telecom Negotiations Press Release, supra note 210, at 5, 
231 [d. at 8; WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications Press Release, 
supra note 209, para. 6 ("Fifty-seven committed to the Reference Paper in whole or 
with few modifications."). 
232 [d. 
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2002, eighty-nine countries had made commitments on at least one 
telecommunication subsector.233 Additional market openings are 
being sought in the follow-on GATS negotiations that were initi-
ated in 2000.234 
2.2.4. The TRIMs Agreement 
Working to bolster the FDI commitment made under the GATS 
and the 1997 Agreements on Financial Services or Basic Telecom-
munications is the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Meas-
ures (the "TRIMs Agreement") concluded during the Uruguay 
Round.235 The TRIMs Agreement represents a very modest at-
tempt to reinforce GAIT rules respecting national treatment and 
the prohibition on import quotas, but falls short of being a com-
prehensive set of rules regulating international investment.236 The 
TRIMs Agreement builds on GAIT Article III, which requires 
members to provide national treatment to imported products, and 
GATT Article XI, which prohibits members from imposing quanti-
tative restrictions on the importation or exportation of goods. Al-
though GATT Article III:4, 5, and 7 do apply to certain aspects of 
investment laws, the GATT panel dispute involving the Canadian 
Foreign Investment Review Act spotlighted the need for Article III 
233 See Nunes, supra note 167, at 8-9. 
234 See, e.g., id. at 9 ("In general, the negotiating proposals seek to encourage 
full commitments on telecommunications services, eliminate restrictions on mar-
ket access and national treatment."); WTO Council for Trade in Services, Special 
Session, Communication from Canada, Initial Negotiating Proposal on Telecommunica-
tion Services, Initial Negotiating Proposal on Telecommunications Services, para. 6, 
S/CSS/W /53 (Mar. 14, 2001) (urging "those Members that have not made com-
mitments in the area of basic telecommunications and value-added telecommuni-
cations, or that have made limited commitments or commitments with long 
phase-in periods, to make commitments and to accelerate liberalization"); WTO 
Council for Trade in Services, Special Session, Communication from the European 
Communities and Their Member States, GATS 2000: Telecommunications, para. 12, 
S/CSS/W /35 (Dec. 22, 2000) (proposing that all WTO members "[C]ommit for 
Modes 1, 2 and 3 all sub-sectors and all modes without restrictions (i.e., schedules 
should read none for market access and national treatment), and include as addi-
tional commitments the whole reference paper on BT [Basic Telecommunica-
tions]"). 
235 See Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, reprinted in 
URUGUAY ROUND TRADE AGREEMENfS, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 1, 
H.R. Doc. 316, 103d Cong., 1448 (1994) [hereinafter TRIMs Agreement]. 
236 For background on the TRIMs Agreement, see Mashayekhi, supra note 19, 
at 237-39 (noting the divergent positions of the United States and Japan, on the 
one hand, which sought broad restrictions on the use of negative TRIMs, and the 
EU, on the other hand, which had a less ambitious list of prohibited TRIMs). 
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repair through the adoption of specific and unambiguous rules on 
certain trade-distorting investment measures, in particular local 
content requirements.237 
What is a trade-related investment measure or "TRIM?" A 
TRIM is any measure imposed by a government (usually, but not 
exclusively, a developing country) on a foreign investor (often, but 
not always, a multinational enterprise) as a condition for investing 
in the host country. TRIMs can be positive or negative. Examples 
of positive TRIMs (investment incentives) include financial incen-
tives, such as tax holidays or subsidies, to invest within the host 
country generally or within certain economically depressed re-
gions of the host country specifically.238 Examples of negative 
TRIMs (performance requirements) include local equity require-
ments, licensing requirements, profit remittance restrictions, for-
eign exchange restrictions, transfer-of-technology requirements, 
domestic sales requirements, trade-balancing requirements, local-
content requirements, export requirements, and import-
substitution requirements.239 
The TRIMs Agreement deals exclusively with negative TRIMs 
and addresses only a handful of the most egregious trade-related 
investment measures. The Agreement has three main features. 
First, it identifies certain types of investment measures that are in-
consistent with GAIT. Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement stipu-
lates that "no Member shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent 
with the provisions of Article III or Article XI of GAIT 1994."240 
Article 2.2 refers to the illustrative list of TRIMs that are inconsis-
tent with Articles III:4 and XI:1 of GAIT 1994.241 The TRIMs An-
nex provides that measures must be mandatory, that is, enforce-
able under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or 
237 See GATT Dispute Panel Report on Canada, Canada-Administration of the 
Foreign Investment Review Act, Feb. 7, 1984, GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 140 
(1980) (holding that undertakings between investors and the Canadian govern-
ment regarding domestic content were incompatible with GATT Article III). 
238 See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996, supra note 10, at 180 (listing "[m]ain 
types of incentive measures offered to foreign investors"). 
239 Id. at 179. For an inventory of performance requirements, see WTO 
Committee on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Joint Study by the WTO and 
UNCTAD Secretariats, Trade-Related Investment Measures and Other Performance Re-
quirements, G/C/W /307 (Oct. I, 2001). The World Bank also takes a dim view of 
performance requirements. See World Bank, Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign 
Direct Investment, 31I.L.M. 1379 (1992). 
240 TRIMs Agreement, supra note 235, art. 2.1, at 1448. 
241 See id. art. 2.2, at 1448. 
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compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage.242 
Next, these mandatory measures are prohibited if they require the 
purchase or use of domestic products (Le., local content require-
ments); limit the purchase or use of imported products to an 
amount related to the volume or value of local products that are 
exported (Le., trade-balancing requirements); or tie access to for-
eign exchange to an investor's foreign exchange earnings (Le., for-
eign exchange balancing restrictions).243 The prohibited measures 
listed in the Illustrative Annex to the TRIMs Agreement under-
score the close link between foreign investinent and international 
trade. The prohibitions of the TRIMs Agreement apply equally to 
measures imposed on domestic firms, not just on foreign invest-
ments, and cover both new and existing investments.244 
242 Id. Annex, at 1452. 
243 Id. For a study of the impact on international investment and trade flows 
of local content requirements, export performance requirements, and trade bal-
ancing requirements, see WTO Council for Trade in Goods, Joint Study by the 
WTO and UNCTAD Secretariats, Trade-Related Investment Measures and Other Per-
formance Requirements 21-26, G/C/W /307 / Add.1 (Feb. 8,2002). 
244 See McGOVERN, supra note 64, at 8.24-1 (noting that the TRIMs Agreement 
"is not limited to measures in regard to foreign investment. Measures that are 
aimed at encouraging local manufacturing capability are investment measures") 
(footnote omitted). See also WTO Dispute Panel on Indonesia, Certain Measures 
Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT /DS54/R Ouly 2, 1998). In 1993, Indonesia 
established a car program (modified and expanded in 1996) that was deSigned to 
foster and promote a local automobile industry. The car program provided for 
local content requirements linked to certain tax benefits for completed cars incor-
porating a certain percentage value of domestic products, and to customs duty 
benefits for imported parts and components used in cars incorporating a certain 
percentage value of domestic products. The United States, Japan, and the EU 
complained that the car program violated Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement and 
GATT Article III:4. (Despite the transition period that developing countries have 
under the TRIMs Agreement, the complaint was nevertheless filed against Indo-
nesia because the measures at issue were introduced after the effective date of the 
TRIMs Agreement.). The WTO panel agreed, finding that tax and tariff benefits 
made contingent upon meeting local content requirements under the car program 
constitute" advantages" within the meaning of the Illustrative List to Article 2 of 
the TRIMs Agreem~nt, and thus violate Article 2.1 of the Agreement. See id. para. 
14.91. See also WTO Dispute Panel on India, Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of 
Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, 
WT/DS90/R (Dec. 21, 2001) (holding that an obligation to use a certain portion of 
local parts and components in the manufacture of cars violates Article III:4), appeal 
withdrawn by India, WTO Appellate Body on India, Measures Affecting the Auto-
motive Sector, para. 14.91, WT/DSl46/ AB/R (Mar. 19, 2002). 
A similar TRIMs dispute between the United States and the Philippines was 
eventually resolved through a mutually agreed solution. See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. 
to Refrain from Pursuing TRIMs Panel on Philippine Cars While Nations Seek Deal, 17 
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 46, at 1777 (Nov. 23, 2000). At issue was the Philip-
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Second, the Agreement requires that all inconsistent TRIMs be 
notified and eliminated in two years in the case of developed coun-
tries, five years in the case of developing countries, and seven 
years in the case of least-developed countries.245 A time extension 
is possible under Article 5.3 if a developing country or least-
developed country member" demonstrates particular difficulties in 
implementing the provisions of this Agreement."246 In order not to 
disadvantage established enterprises that are subject to a TRIM 
relative to new inves~ents that are exempt from it, under Article 
5.5, members may apply the same TRIM to new investments dur-
ing the transition period, where the existing and new investment 
produce like products.247 
Third, in a small victory for developing-country members, the 
Council for Trade in Goods was to review the operation of the 
TRIMs Agreement by the end of 1999. As part of the Council's re-
view, the Council was to "consider whether the Agreement should 
be complemented with provisions on investment policy and com-
petition policy."248 The TRIMs Agreement's built-in agenda thus 
dovetails into the work of the two Working Groups established in 
the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference meeting to examine the 
issues of trade and foreign investment and trade and competition 
policy.249 
The TRIMs Agreement does not address key FDI issues, such 
as the right of establishment, repatriation of profits, or technology 
transfer. The TRIMs Agreement does, however, mark the first suc-
pine government's Motor Vehlcle Development Program that allowed manufac-
turers based in the Philippines to import parts and finished vehicles at preferen-
tial duty rates, provided the manufacturers met local content requirements and 
earned foreign exchange needed to buy imported parts by exportiPg completed 
vehlcles. 
245 See TRIMs Agreement, supra note 235, art. 5, at 1449. 
246 In 2000, eight developing countries (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Malay-
sia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Romania) sought an extension of the 
five-year period within which to eliminate all prohibited TRIMs. In 2001, they 
were granted a waiver of the obligation to comply with the TRIMs Agreement's 
transition period until December 31, 2001, with a possible second extension until 
December 31, 2003. See, e.g., WTO, Extension of the Transition Period for the Elimina-
tion of Trade-Related Investment Measures Notified under Article 5.1 of the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Argentina, G/L/460 (Aug. 7, 2001). See also 
Ravi Kanth, wro Approves Extending Deadline for TRIMS Compliance for Eight 
Members, 18 Int'! Trade Rep. (BNA) 1255 (Aug. 9, 2001). 
247 See TRIMs Agreement, supra note 235, art. 5.5, at 1449. 
248 Id. art. 9, at 1451. 
249 See infra notes 257-74 and accompanying text. 
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cessful attempt made within the GAIT-WTO system to facilitate 
foreign investment by eliminating non-tariff barriers to trade in 
goods associated with foreign investment. The Agreement is de-
signed to ensure that governments do not apply measures to for-
eign investment that create restrictions on trade in goods. It gives 
investors the assurance that they may freely buy, sell, import, and 
export goods that are produced in countries outside the country in 
which their investment is located. At the same time, however, the 
TRIMs Agreement may have been a solution in search of a prob-
lem. It is reported, for example, that only 6% of all overseas affili-
ates of u.s. companies are affected by TRIMs.250 It is also reported 
that most TRIMs have little effect on managers' behavior because 
they would have made most of the same decisions with or without 
local investment measures to influence or guide their decision-
making.251 
Moreover, the practices that the TRIMs Agreement does ad-
dress could have been dealt with under existing GAIT rules. The 
negative TRIMs listed in the Illustrative Annex all violate GATT 
Articles III and XI with or without a TRIMs Agreement stating that 
they do.252 The TRIMs Agreement is, in effect, a codification of 
GAIT jurisprudence-a restatement of existing GAIT rules.253 
The absence of a strong dispute settlement mechanism under 
GAIT 1947 probably explains why more TRIMs were not chal-
lenged under GAIT 1947.254 
Finally, two areas where a TRIMs Agreement is silent are re-
strictive business practices and positive TRIMs. As part of the 
WTO's built-in agenda, Article 9 of the TRIMs Agreement calls for 
a five-year review of the Agreement (Le., in 1999) to consider 
whether it should be complemented with provisions on investment 
and competition policy.255 Two WTO Working Groups were estab-
lished in 1997 to examine the relationship between trade and in-
250 See EVANS & WALSH, supra note 66, at 32. 
251 Id. 
252 See McGOVERN, supra note 64, at 8.24-1 (" [I]t is difficult to think of circum-
stances in which liability could arise under [GAIT Articles III or XI] but not under 
[the TRIMs Agreement]."). 
253 See Mashayekhi, supra note 19, at 239 (lilt prohibits those measures which 
are prohibited by GAIT Article[s] III."). 
254 The U.S. complaint against Canada's Foreign Investment Review Act is a 
notable exception. See GAIT Dispute Panel on Canada, Canada - Administration of 
the Foreign Investment Review Act, supra note 237. 
255 See TRIMs Agreement, supra note 235, art. 9, at 1449. 
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vestment and between trade and competition policy over a two-
year period.256 A brief review of the work of the Working Group 
on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment follows. 
3. THE WTO WORK PROGRAM ON THE TRADE-INVESTMENT 
RELATIONSHIP 
As the foregoing discussion has attempted to demonstrate, ex-
isting WTO rules and agreements do address investment issues 
more than just incidentally. In an attempt to build on the founda-
tion that had been laid both in the Uruguay Round and in post-
Uruguay Round negotiations, the Ministerial Declaration issued at 
the conclusion of the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference called 
for the establishment of two Working Groups, one on trade and 
investment and the other on trade and competition policy. The 
Declaration provides: 
Having regard to the existing WTO provisions on matters 
related to investment and competition policy and the built-
in agenda in these areas, including the TRIMs Agreement, 
and on the understanding that the work undertaken shall 
not prejudge whether negotiations will be initiated in the 
future, we also agree to: 
- establish a working group to examine the relationship be-
tween trade and investment; and 
- establish a working group to study issues raised by Mem-
bers relating to the interaction between trade and competi-
tion policy, including anti-competitive practices, in order to 
identify any areas that may merit further consideration in 
the WTO framework.257 
The Singapore Ministerial Declaration expresses some ambiva-
lence about the direction of the Working Group on the Relation-
ship Between Trade and Investment ("WGTI"), stating that the 
Working Group's mandate does not prejudge whether or not fu-
ture negotiations on a WTO investment agreement will be 
256 See infra notes 258-60 and accompanying text. 
'157 Singapore Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 13 December 1996, para. 
20, WT jMIN(96)jDEC (Dec. 18, 1996). 
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launched, and that any future negotiations will take place only af-
ter an explicit consensus decision by WTO members regarding 
such negotiations.258 
The substantive work performed by the WeTI has included (1) 
studying the relationship between trade and investment for devel-
opment and economic growth; (2) studying the economic relation-
ship between trade and investment; and (3) conducting a stocktak-
ing and examining the implications of existing international 
instruments and activities regarding trade and investment.259 
Many of the contributions to the WeT! note that the linkages 
between trade and foreign investment are several and assert that 
the effects of investment for host country and investor country 
alike are beneficial. In this respect, the views of the OECD, the 
WTO, and UNCTAD on the benefits of FDI in facilitating economic 
growth, technological innovation, and competitiveness have con-
verged. For example, the OECD noted the beneficial effects of FDI 
in the following 1998 communication to the WeT!: 
Direct investment by MNEs [multinational enterprises] has 
the potential rapidly to restructure industries at a regional 
or global level and to transform host economies into prodi-
gious exporters of manufactured goods or services to the 
world market. In so doing, FDI can serve to integrate na-
258 [d. The Singapore Ministerial Declaration also directs the Working Group 
to cooperate with UNCTAD to ensure that the development dimension of the 
Working Group's terms of reference is taken into account. Id. For a summary of 
UNCT AD's work on a possible multilateral framework on investment, see WORLD 
INVESTMENT REPORT 1998, supra note 10, at 73. 
259 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Report (1997) to the General Council, WT/WGTI/1/Rev.1 (Dec. 9, 1997) 
(reporting topics discussed during various 1997 meetings); WTO Working Group 
on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Report (1998) of the Working 
Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment to the General Council, 
WT /WGTI/2 (Dec. 8, 1998) (discussing substantive work done by the group in 
1998); WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, 
Report (1999) of the Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment 
to the General Council, WT /WGTI/3 (Oct. 22, 1999) (discussing substantive work 
done by the group in 1999); WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between 
Trade and Investment, Report (2000) of the Working Group on the Relationship Be-
tween Trade and Investment to the General Council, WT /WGTI/ 4 (Nov. 27, 2000) 
(discussing substantive work done by the group in 2000); WTO Working Group 
on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Report (2001) of the Working 
Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment to the General Council, 
WT/WGTI/5 (Oct. 22,2001) (discussing substantive work done by the group in 
2001). 
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tional markets into the world economy far more effectively 
than could have been achieved by traditional trade flows 
alone. As with private sector investment more generally, 
the benefits from FDI are enhanced in an environment 
characterized by an open trade and investment regime, an 
active competition policy, macroeconomic stability and pri-
vatization and deregulation. In this environment, FDI can 
play a key role in improving the capacity of the host coun-
try to respond to the opportunities offered by global eco-
nomic integration, a goal increasingly recognized as one of 
the key aims of any development strategy.260 
The WTO Secretariat echoed the OEeD's conclusions and of-
fered some of its own insights on the importance of FDI: 
Despite the difficulties associated with the measurement of 
the efficiency-enhancing effects induced by FDI, let alone 
with the assessment of the specific channels by which a 
transfer of technology affects local productivity, the empiri-
cal literature offers some important conclusions. First, there 
appears to be a wide consensus that FDI is an important, 
perhaps even the most important, channel through which 
advanced technology is transferred to developing coun-
tries. Second, there also seems to be a consensus that FDI 
leads to higher productivity in locally-owned firms, par-
ticularly in the manufacturing sector. Third, there is evi-
dence that the amount of technology transferred through 
FDI is influenced by various host industry and host country 
characteristics. More competitive conditions, higher levels 
of local investment in fixed capital and education, and less 
260 WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Invest-
ment, Communication from the GECD, Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Devel-
opment 4-5 WT/WGTI/W /26 (Mar. 23, 1998). See also OECO, Open Markets Mat-
ter: The Benefits of Trade and Investment Liberalisation (policy Brief, Oct. 1999) 
(discussing the benefits of trade and investment liberalization). For similar views 
on the positive relationship between trade and investment, see WTO Working 
Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Communication from 
Japan, WT /WGTI/W /11 (Nov. 3, 1997). 
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restrictive conditions imposed on affiliates appear to in-
crease the extent of technology transfers.261 
143 
Foreign direct investment thus plays an important role as an 
engine of world growth and increased globalization. According to 
UNCTAO, "global integration seems to have proceeded faster 
through FOI than through trade."262 
Benefits accrue to both the host country and home country 
from foreign direct investment. For investor countries the benefits 
of FOI include facilitation of international trade, product speciali-
zation, and the stimulation of innovation.263 The effects of out-
bound FOI on home country trade can be positively related. In the 
case of the United States, for example, U.S. exports tend to be posi-
tively associated with U.S. direct investment abroad. The explana-
261 Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 11, at 19 (footnotes omit-
ted). UNCTAD added in its 1997 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT that a liberal FDI 
regime must be complemented and supported by rules on competition: 
[FDI] continues to be a driving force of the globalization process that 
characterizes the modem world economy. The current boom in FDI 
flows, which has been accompanied by increasing flows of foreign port-
folio equity investments, underscores the increasingly important role 
played by transnational corporations (TNCs) in both developed and de-
veloping countries. This role has been facilitated by the liberalization of 
FDI policies that has taken place in many countries in recent years, as 
part of an overall movement toward more open and market-friendly 
policies. However, reaping the benefits of FDJ liberalization requires not 
only that barriers to FDJ are reduced and standards of treatment estab-
lished-the focus of most FDI liberalization to date-but also that com-
petition in markets is maintained. .. 
UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1997: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, 
MARKET STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION POLICY xv (1997) [hereinafter WORLD 
INVESTMENT REPORT 1997]. See also WTO Working Group on the Relationship Be-
tween Trade and Investment, Note by the Secretariat, The Effects of Foreign Direct In-
vestment on Development: Technology and Other Know-How Transfers and Spillovers, 
WT/WGTI/W /65 (Nov. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Note by the Secretariat] (noting the 
beneficial effects of technology transfers); WTO Working Group on the Relation-
ship Between Trade and Investment, Communication from Korea, Foreign Direct In-
vestment and Transfers of Technology, WT /WGTI/W /11 (May 30, 2000) (noting the 
beneficial effects of technology transfers); WTO Working Group on the Relation-
ship Between Trade and Investment, Communication from Japan, Investment Rules 
for Developing Policies, WT /WGTI/W /104 Oune 12, 2001) (noting the beneficial 
effects of technology transfers). 
262 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998, supra note 10, at 7. 
263 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Relationship Between Investment and Competition Policy, Communication 
from the United States, at 3, WT/WGTI/W /55 (Sept. 25, 1998). 
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tion for this relationship is that during the 1990s nearly 30% of U.s. 
exports were exports of u.s. parent firms to their foreign affili-
ates.264 Thus, if affiliate activity increases, and the ratio of affiliate 
sales to parents' exports to affiliates remains constant, U.s. exports 
will increase as well. 
Several empirical studies have been conducted to determine 
whether the trade relationship between an MNE and its foreign af-
filiates is complementary, that is, are U.s. exports from the parent 
firm used as intermediate goods in the affiliate's production, or 
whether the trade relationship is one of substitution, that is, do af-
filiate sales in third-country markets displace U.s. exports that 
would have otherwise gone to those markets? One would expect 
exports of the parent firm to third-country markets to be reduced if 
those markets are now served by the foreign affiliate. In the ag-
gregate, whether FDI leads to rises or declines in U.S. exports de-
pends on whether the complementarity effects outweigh the sub-
stitution effect. Studies generally have found complementarity 
between trade and FDI.265 All studies that have examined the im-
pact of outbound FDI on the export trade of the home country 
agree that at most the net effect is not very pronounced.266 First, 
local production in the host country displaces exports of finished 
goods from the home country, but at the same time creates de-
mand for intermediate products used by the foreign affiliate. Sec-
ond, local production of one product line may generate demand 
for the other product lines of the parent company. Third, local af-
filiates often engage in the marketing of the parent's entire product 
line, thereby improving the competitive position of the foreign in-
vestor vis-a-vis local firms and exporters from other countries.267 
The economic benefits of FDI for host countries include the ef-
ficient use of host-country resources, technology transfer to the 
host country (including organizational and managerial skills), posi-
tive employment effects Gob creation) in the host country, and im-
264 Examination of U.S. Inbound and Outbound Direct Investment 2-6,5-5, 
USITC Pub. 3383 Oan. 2001) (discussing effect of U.S. direct investment abroad on 
U.S. imports). 
265 See id. at 2-7 (examining the effects of inbound and outbound u.s. direct 
investment); Note by the Secretariat, supra note 261, at 17 (using statistical testing 
of spillovers to understand the impact of FDI). 
266 Note by the Secretariat, supra note 261, at 17. 
267 See id. (noting changes in the market shares of foreign and local firms). 
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proved productivity of local firms.268 Studies that have examined 
the effects of inbound FOI and the export trade of the host country 
show that inbound FOI contributes positively to the export per-
formance of developing countries. It does so directly through the 
export activities of MNEs and indirectly by reducing the costs of 
domestic firms to begin or expand exporting.269 
Two types of investment policies that can affect trade are in-
vestment incentives and performance requirements. Investment 
incentives typically do not play a fundamental role in the invest-
ment decision, unlike factors such as infrastructure, market size, 
production costs, and the skill-level of the local workforce. Never-
theless, all other things being equal, investment incentives do ap-
pear to influence foreign investors in their investment decision.27o 
Countries that maintain high trade barriers and those that 
maintain low trade barriers both attract FOI, but of different types. 
FOI to countries with a protected market tend to be stand-alone 
production units that serve the domestic market. Countries with an 
open trade policy attract vertical FOI. The WTO Secretariat con-
cludes that on average, countries with an open trade regime attract 
more FOI than protectionist countries.271 Countries with a more 
outward-oriented approach to trade experience a Significant posi-
tive effect on GOP growth from FOI inflows, whereas inward-
oriented countries experience no GOP growth from FOI infloWS.272 
268 See Open Markets Matter, supra note 260, at 29 (stating that "well func-
tioning systems of innovation and technology diffusion are proving essential to 
... job creation," among other things). 
269 See id. (discussing the export activities of small and medium sized enter-
prises). 
270 See id. at 25 (discussing the importance of trade and investment, and its 
impact on the world economy). 
271 See Note by the Secretariat, supra note 261, at 4 (detailing the preference 
for FDI in technologically developed industries). 
272 [d. The parallel working group established at the Singapore Ministerial 
Conference, the Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competi-
tion Policy, also has reported that open policies toward FDI and properly func-
tioning competition polices are mutually supportive. Liberal investment rules 
make markets contestable, thereby challenging domestic oligopolies and reducing 
the likelihood of cartels and monopolies. At the same time, effective competition 
polices can ensure against possible abuses of market power by foreign investors. 
Thus, for example, with open investment rules in place, an exporter unable to 
penetrate a foreign market because incumbent wholesalers and retailers, owned 
or controlled by local producers of competing goods, will not handle the ex-
porter's goods could establish a new distribution channel or purchase an existing 
one, thereby eliminating the local distribution bottleneck. A liberal investment 
policy, in short, can simultaneously promote competition and trade in the host-
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In sum, a few general principles emerge from the work of the 
WGTI on the trade-investment relationship. First, a policy of open 
investment appears to undergird a liberal trade policy by encour-
aging the movement of capital to markets where competition is 
then either introduced or increased, and resources can then be 
used more efficiently and transformed into goods and services for 
local and worldwide distribution. Second, an open investment 
climate-while not the sole determinant of whether an investment 
will be made, but clearly an essential one-greatly increases the 
chances for new market entrants, and with them, increased compe-
tition.273 
country market, and perhaps in the global market as well. See WTO Working 
Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy, Report (1999) of 
the Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy to the Gen-
eral Council 24, WT /WGTCP /3 (Oct. 11, 1999); WTO Working Group on the Inter-
action Between Trade and Competition Policy, Communication from the United 
States, Relationship Between Investment and Competition Policy, at 4, 
WT /WGTCP /W /102 (Sept. 25, 1998) (addressing the relationship between in-
vestment and competition policy). 
273 The factors that determine whether a firm (predominantly a multinational 
enterprise or "MNE") will make a foreign direct investment can be summarized 
using what is known as the "OLI" theory, i.e., that factors of (O)wnership, 
(L)ocation, and (I)nternalization. See John H. Dunning, Trade, Location of Economic 
Activity and the MNE: A Search for an Eclectic Approach, in THE INTERNATIONAL 
ALLOCATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: PROCEEDINGS OF A NOBEL SYMPOSIUM HELD AT 
STOCKHOLM 395-418 (B. Ohlin et al. eds., 1977) (discussing the impact of FDI un-
dertaken by MNEs); UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2000: CRoss-BORDER 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS AND DEVELOPMENT 141-42 (2000) [hereinafter WORLD 
INVESTMENT REPORT 2000]. Regarding the first factor, ownership, the firm may 
own intangible assets (e.g., intellectual property, management know-how, mar-
keting networks) that can be profitably exploited on a comparatively large scale. 
Under the second factor, location, firms that produce goods can minimize produc-
tion costs by dividing production among countries rather than producing in and 
exporting from the horne country exclusively. The third factor, internalization, 
focuses on whether the profits to be earned by exploiting the assets within the 
company are greater than licensing the use of those assets to a foreign firm. In the 
view of MNEs, technological advantages are what gives them an edge over do-
mestic competitors, followed by marketing and managerial assets. See GILLES Y. 
BERTIN & SALLY WYATT, MULTINATIONALS AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY: THE CONTROL 
OF THE WORLD'S TECHNOLCX:;Y 25-29 (1988) (discussing the impact of technology on 
the world economy). Thus, if an MNE licensed its intellectual property, it would 
be revealing details of an important asset to the licensee. By entering into a licens-
ing agreement an MNE would lose the control that outright equity ownership of a 
foreign affiliate would provide. Such an agreement would also give the licensee 
valuable information that could make it a future competitor of the MNE in coun-
tries where enforcement of intellectual property rights is weak. The licensee also 
might not possess the skills necessary to work the technology that is transferred 
under the licensing agreement. For these reasons, an MNE might conclude that 
there is greater profit potential in making an FDI rather than licensing to a foreign 
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Thus, an open and hospitable climate for foreign investment 
can increase the general welfare of both the host and home coun-
try, can promote economic efficiency, can stimulate competition 
among firms nationally and transnationally, and can ultimately 
benefit consumers both in the host country and abroad in the form 
of lower prices for goods and services. Third, an open investment 
climate not only increases competition in markets for goods and 
services that are tradable across borders, but it also makes markets 
more competitive for services that are local and immovable. 
Fourth, a liberal investment climate can also mitigate or eliminate 
local distribution bottlenecks that might prevent competition, es-
pecially in situations where local manufacturers own local distribu-
tion networks.274 
Despite the force of the economic arguments for FDI as an en-
gine of growth and development, is a WTO agreement on invest-
ment a solution in search of a problem? Is internalization-relying 
on national laws and bilateral and regional agreements to promote 
FDI inflows-preferable to globalization that looks to a multilateral 
agreement as the legal vehicle for facilitating FDI? As explained in 
the next Section, an internalization response to FDI is superior to a 
globalization approach. 
4. A WTO AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT: A SOLUTION IN SEARCH 
OF A PROBLEM? 
A WTO agreement on investment is a solution in search of a 
problem for the following reasons. First, FDI flows are steadily in-
creasing, even in the absence of a multilateral investment agree-
firm. See Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 11, at 9-10. In addition, 
the market for the MNE's other products might be favorable in the host country 
and a potential licensee or local distributor might not have the skills to effectively 
market them. The benefits of keeping the assets in-house, however, must exceed 
the costs of managing a larger, geographically dispersed organization located in 
different legal and cultural settings. For more on the internalization factor, see 
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST 
IMPLICATIONS: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION (1975); WTO 
Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Note by the 
Secretariat, The Relationship Between Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, at 3, 
WT /WGTI/W /7 (Sept. 18, 1997). 
For a survey of the reasons why firms engage in foreign direct investment, 
and the perceived benefits and costs of FOI, see Trade and Foreign Direct Invest-
ment, supra note 11, at 8,15-17. 
274 See WTO Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competi-
tion Policy, Report to the General Council; at 40, WT /WGTCP /2 (Dec. 8, 1998). 
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ment.275 Second, the' threat to national sovereignty that a WTO 
agreement on investment represents to developing countries is a 
genuine concern.276 Third, the development concerns of develop-
ing countries and their capacity (or incapacity) to absorb yet an-
other WTO agreement cannot be ignored.277 Fourth, it is safe to 
predict that many exceptions and reservations will be made to any 
WTO agreement on investment, effectively hollowing it OUt.278 
Fifth, an incremental, sectoral approach, i.e., a GATS approach, is a 
tested and proven approach at the WTO for successfully negotiat-
ing market liberalization for foreign investment.279 Sixth, the most 
pressing issue facing the WTO membership in the context of FDI is 
not a lack of market access for foreign capital.280 The immediate 
problems are TRIMs, both positive and negative, that potentially 
distort investment patterns. Seventh and finally, it is far from clear 
that the current network of bilateral and regional investment 
agreements provides an unstable and unpredictable legal envi-
ronment for FDI.281 
Each of these seven points is discussed below. 
4.1. FDI Flows Are Increasing Annually, Not Decreasing 
First of all, it is far from clear that there is a need for an interna-
tional investment agreement if one takes into consideration the 
views of the international investment community. Private inves-
tors as a group have not complained about a lack of access to for-
eign markets for their capital because of restrictive foreign invest-
ment laws. Because the demand for foreign capital outstrips the 
supply, it is a seller's market for investment capital, thus creating 
incentives for countries to liberalize their markets autonomously 
for foreign investment without being prodded to do so by a multi-
lateral agreement.282 This is especially true for developing coun-
275 See infra notes 282-97 and accompanying text. 
276 See infra notes 298-309 and accompanying text. 
277 See infra notes 310-31 and accompanying text. 
278 See infra notes 332-39 and accompanying text. 
279 See infra note 340 and accompanying text. 
280 See infra notes 341-70 and accompanying text. 
281 See infra notes 371-86 and accompanying text. 
282 WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Invest-
ment, Communication from India, at 2, WT /WGTI/W /74 (Apr. 13, 1999). 
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tries: with decreased flows of foreign aid, there is a heightened ur-
gency to attract FDI as a substitute.283 
Even if investors are prevented from moving capital to a sector 
of a foreign country that is closed to them because of national laws 
prohibiting foreign investment, is the right answer to throw a mul-
tilateral agreement on investment at the problem? Has the absence 
of such an agreement stifled foreign capital flows to host countries? 
The statistics indicate that, on the contrary, the flow of foreign 
capital to overseas destinations has been rapid and has only 
slowed in the face of a global recession. As the following table 
shows, FDI has steadily increased year over year to developed-
country host countries. Importantly from a development perspec-
tive, developing countries generally have received a steadily in-
creasing amount of FDI annually as well, although as a percentage 
of worldwide FDI inflows, developing countries' share has de-
creased in recent years.284 
283 See Mashayekhi, supra note 19, at 236 ("[W]ith the reduction of official aid, 
countries' need for private investment has increased."). 
284 The dramatic percentage decline in 1998 is attributable to the Asian finan-
cial crisis. See UNCT AD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1999: FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT xx (1999). As a percentage of 
gross domestic product, FDI inflows represented 7.6% of GDP in developed coun-
tries in 1996. The comparable figure for developing countries was 15.6%, double 
that of developed countries. See WORLD INVESlMENT REPORT 1998, supra note 10, at 
399-400 annex tbl. B.6. 
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Table 1: FDI Inflows Based on UNCTAD & World Investment Report 
1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 (in billions) 
FOI Inflows to FOI Inflows to Developing Coun-
Developed Developing tries' Percentage 
Countries Countries Share of Total FOI 
Inflows 
1992 $120.3 $51.1 30 
1993 $138.9 $72.5 34 
1994 $141.5 $95.6 40 
1995 $211.5 $105.5 33 
1996 $195.4 $129.8 40 
1997 $233.1 $148.9 39 
1998 $460 $166 27 
1999 $636 $208 21 
2000 $1,053 $247 19 
2001285 $510 $225 31 
(est.) 
UNCTAO reports that in the case of the forty-nine least-
developed countries ("LOCs"), as a group FOI increased from an 
annual average of $0.6 billion during 1986-1990 to an annual aver-
age of $3.6 billion during the latter half of the 1990s.286 In 1999, FOI 
flows to LOCs reached more than $5 billion.287 For the period 1986-
1999 as a whole, the average annual growth rate of FOI to LOCs 
has been 20%.288 This growth rate was broad-based: twenty-seven 
285 See Daniel Pruzin, U.N. Agency Cites Sharp Drop in Global Foreign Invest-
ment Jor 2001,18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1512 (Sept. 27, 2001) (projecting figures 
with respect to the fall in FDI). 
286 See UNCTAD, FDI IN LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AT A GLANCE 1 (2001) 
[hereinafter FDI IN LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES] ("FDI flows to the 49 LDCs as a 
group increased from an annual average of $0.6 billion during 1986-1990 to an an-
nual average of $3.6 billion during the latter half of the 1990s."). 
287 See id. ("In 1999, FDI flows increased further, to reach more than $5 bil-
lion). 
288 See id. (" [T]his represents an average annual growth rate of 20 per cent, 
compared to 22 per cent for developing countries as a group."). Investment flows 
to LDCs are still directed mainly to a few countries. In the period 1986-1990, five 
countries accounted for 77% of FDI inflows. However, in the period 1996-1999, 
that percentage had declined to 50%. Id. at 7. 
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LDCs experienced an average annual growth rate of more than 
20% and another eight LDCs of between 10% and 20%.289 
Of course, despite these impressive statistics, there is no control 
group to test the counterfactual of what the global economy would 
look like with a multilateral agreement on investment in place. 
Had a multilateral agreement on investment been in place, query 
whether certain foreign investments that were not made would 
have been made. UNCTAD concedes that it is difficult to predict 
how much difference a multilateral framework agreement on in-
vestment would make in terms of the quantity, quality, and pat-
terns of actual FDI flows.29o What cannot be disputed as a matter 
of statistical fact is that in the absence of a multilateral agreement 
on investment, the growth of FDI has been impressive. The stock 
of FDI increased fourfold between 1992 and 1997, being valued in 
1997 at $3.5 trillion.291 In 1997, FDI flows increased 19% over 1996 
figures, to a record-breaking level of $400 billion.292 In 1999, FDI 
grew by 25% to $827 billion, up from $660 billion in 1998,293 with 
developing countries receiving $200 billion of the total.294 By com-
parison, the total inflow of foreign direct investment worldwide in 
1995 was $315 billion, with $203 billion of that figure going to de-
veloped countries.295 The inflow of FDI into developing countries 
increased eleven-fold from $13 billion in 1981 to nearly $149 billion 
in 1997.296 
289 See id. at 1-2 (charting LDC growth rates). More than 90% of FDl is 
through greenfield investment rather than through cross-border M&A activity. 
Id. at 7. 
290 See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998, supra note 10, at 130. 
291 See id. at xvii (discussing FDI trends). 
292 See id. (discussing FDl trends). 
293 See Financial Indicators: Cross-Border Investments, ECONOMIST, Feb. 12, 2000, 
at 105 (providing FDI figures) [hereinafter Financial Indicators]. 
294 See Daniel Pruzin, UN Agency Says FDI Jumped by 25 Percent in '99 to $827 
Billion, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 234 (Feb. 10, 2000) (discussing FDI growth); Fi-
nancial Indicators, supra note 293, at 105; Business This Week, ECONOMIST, Feb. 5, 
2000, at 5 (discussing cross-border mergers and acquisitions). 
295 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996, supra note 10, at 227. FDl in developed 
countries increased from $37 billion in 1981 to $109 billion in 1993. Patrick Low & 
Arvind Subramanian, TRIMs in the Uruguay Round: An Unfinished Business?, in 
THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, supra note 93, at 413-14. 
296 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998, supra note 10, at 16. In 1996, two-thirds 
of FDI in developing countries went to Asia, whose FDI inflows rose 25% from 
1995 to $81 billion. See Emerging Market Indicators, ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 1997, at 116. 
The growth of multinational enterprises has contributed to the tremendous in-
crease in the volume of foreign direct investment. The PDI spurt was fueled in the 
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The view among many developing countries is that growth in 
FDI is considered to be beneficial because it enhances economic 
growth, productivity, and competitiveness.297 Couple this view 
with the reality that the demand for foreign capital exceeds its 
supply, and it is easy to understand why, for those countries eager 
to attract foreign capital, it is incumbent upon them to create and 
foster a domestic legal environment that is hospitable to foreign 
investment, with or without the legal compulsion of a WTO in-
vestment agreement. 
4.2. Sovereignty Concerns 
What of the national sovereignty concerns expressed by devel-
oping countries insofar as their ability to regulate the activities of 
foreign investors? Because FDI often involves issues of significant 
control over a domestic firm, it raises sovereignty issues for many 
host countries. As noted above in connection with the discussion 
of the Havana Charter, Article 12 recognized the sovereignty of 
host nations to regulate foreign investment.298 While it is argued-
mostly by developing countries - that MNEs are able to engage in 
restrictive business practices in host countries that lead to monop-
oly profits, lower economic efficiency within the host country, and 
new barriers to entry by potential competitors, the WTO Secretariat 
has made the alternative argument that the entry of an MNE 
"might have the effect of breaking up a comfortable domestic oli-
gopolistic market structure and stimulating competition and effi-
ciency. . .. The empirical evidence, however, points strongly to 
pro-competitive effects."299 Nevertheless, in instances where 
last half of the decade of the 1990s by cross-border mergers and acquisitions ($797 
billion), rather than greenfield investment in new plants and factories. See WORLD 
INVESTMENT REPORT 1998, supra note 10, at 16. 
2'17 See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1997, supra note 261; WORLD INVESTMENT 
REPORT 1996, supra note 10; Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 11. 
An extensive bibliography on trade and investment can be found in Trade and 
Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 11, at 46-53. 
298 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text. 
299 Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 11, at 16 (citing in sup-
port RICHARD E. CAVES, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
(1982), and EDWARD M. GRAHAM, GWBAL CORPORATIONS AND NATIONAL 
GoVERNMENTS (1996)). The United Nations prepared a non-binding Draft Code of 
Conduct on Transnational Corporations that dealt in part with restrictive business 
practices of MNEs. For the similarities and differences between the Draft Code 
and the DECO Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises, see WTD Working Group 
on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Communication from 
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MNEs do engage in restrictive business practices in the host coun-
try, how are developing countries that lack the human and techni-
cal capacity to combat such practices?300 For developing countries 
and for countries with economies in transition, enacting and im-
plementing competition legislation can be a formidable task.30l 
The many hurdles facing developing countries in implementing a 
competition law regime include developing a skilled staff and se-
curing the financial resources needed to administer and implement 
competition legislation. Small developing countries face a scarcity 
of skilled human resources, making it difficult for them to partici-
pate in international meetings and negotiating fora in which they 
must be present simultaneously. Developing a culture of competi-
tion also presents a challenge for businesses with little or no 
knowledge of competition law and its impact.302 They must be 
educated.303 
UNCTAD, The Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations 
and the DECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Similarities and Differences, 
WT/WGTI/W/52 (Aug. 21, 1998). 
300 Besides the problem of MNEs dominating local markets, what about sub-
sidiaries of MNEs that purchase inputs from their parent, rather than source in-
puts locally, as well as parent-imposed restrictions on a subsidiary's export mar-
kets as a way of segmenting world markets? In a related vein, what of MNE 
activity that can have adverse effects on development, for example, where a coun-
try has the potential to develop indigenous resources through local talent but is 
preempted from doing so by an MNE? In addition, developing countries are far 
less able to combat export cartels than are developed countries. 
301 See OECO, COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN THE BALTIC COUNTRIES (1999); 
William E. Kovacic, Designing and Implementing Competition and Consumer Protec-
tion Reforms in Transitional Economies: Perspectives from Mongolia, Nepal, Ukraine, 
and Zimbabwe, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1197 (1995); William E. Kovacic, Getting Started: 
Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in Transition Economies, 23 BROOK. J. 
INT'L L. 403 (1997) (discussing processes, procedures, and policies at issue when 
creating new competition institutions in transition economies). 
302 See, e.g., WTO Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and 
Competition Policy, Communication from Trinidad and Tobago, Developing and Im-
plementing a Competition Regime: Challenges Faced by Small Open Economies, 
WT /WGTCP /W /143 (Aug. 2, 2000). 
303 Developing countries may stand to gain from a WTO agreement that 
prohibits such cartel activity and that takes developing-country interests into ac-
count when cross-border mergers are reviewed. Thus, the need may exist from a 
developing country perspective for an international competition policy agreement 
with a binding dispute settlement mechanism. As far as what would be in the 
best interests of developing countries, Bernard Hoekman has advocated a compe-
tition policy agreement that (1) bans horizontal restraints on price fixing and mar-
ket sharing, including export cartels; (2) replaces antidumping duty laws with 
competition laws; and (3) provides for binding WTO dispute settlement. See Ber-
nard Hoekman, Competition Policy and the Global Trading System: A Develop-
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Of the more than eighty countries that have enacted some form 
of competition law, nearly forty of these are developing countries 
and countries with economies in transition.304 UNCTAD has con-
cluded that 1/ there would be substantial benefits to be obtained 
from strengthening the application of competition law and policy 
in developing and least developed countries and countries in tran-
sition in terms of greater production, allocative and dynamic effi-
ciency, welfare and growth."305 Those developing countries that 
do have competition laws in place typically are unable to apply 
them extraterritorially.306 In addition, having a competition law on 
the books and having an effective national enforcement mechanism 
in place are not the same thing. Developing countries that have 
enacted competition legislation may lack the resources and exper-
tise to implement an effective legal regime, although a lack of ca-
pacity to pursue investigations and to bring enforcement actions is 
not universally the case.307 Nevertheless, competition law en-
forcement actions are expensive whenever they are brought. 
Moreover, broadly drafted legislation, coupled with agency discre-
tion, creates an environment of legal uncertainty for businesses. 
One defensive (and cheap) response has been to protect local firms 
ing-Country Perspective 16 (World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 1735 (1997»; 
Ignacio de Leon, An Alternative Approach to Policies for the Promotion of Competition 
in Developing Countries, 6 Sw.J. L. & TRADE AM. 85 (1999). 
304 See Conference on Trade and Competition Policies, Exploring the Ways For-
ward, Summary, 1 OECD J. COMPETITION L. & POL'y 7, 8 (1999) (noting that "the 
majority of developing countries have enacted competition laws in the last five 
years"). There is an ongoing, but quiet, debate over whether traditional competi-
tion laws are appropriate for developing countries and economies in transition. 
See, e.g., Craig W. Conrath & Barry T. Freeman, A Response to "The Effectiveness of 
Proposed Antitrust Programs for Developing Countries," 19 N.C. J. INTL L. & COM. 
REG. 233 (1994); A.E. Rodriguez & Mark D. Williams, The Effectiveness of Proposed 
Antitrust Programs for Developing Countries, 19 N.C. J. INTL L. & COM. REG. 209 
(1994) (responding to the former and acknowledging the "fierce debate" over 
whether it is a good or bad idea for economies in transition to market economies 
to adopt antitrust laws). 
305 UNCTAD, Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, Empirical Evidence of the 
Benefits from Applying Competition Law and Policy Principles to Economic Development 
in Order to Attain Greater Efficiency in International Trade and Development 2, 
TD/B/COM.2/EM/10/Rev.l (May 25,1998). 
306 See Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 NYU. L. 
REV. 1501, 1537 (1998) (discussing antitrust efforts of developing countries). 
307 For a review of competition law enforcement activities of several Latin 
American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Panama, Peru, and Venezuela), see Organization of American States, Report on 
Developments and Enforcement of Competition Policy and Laws in the Western Hemi-
sphere, FTAA.ngcp/inf/04/Cor.1 (Oct. 25, 1999). 
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and infant industries by restricting access of foreign investors and 
foreign traders to their markets. The downside is the impoverish-
ment of the protected economy, damage to international competi-
tion, and an overall decline in aggregate world wealth. 
Alternatively, one of the cheapest and most effective pro-
competitive devices available to any government is to adopt a lib-
eral trade policy that will bring competitive pressure to bear on lo-
cal monopolies in the form of imports. Equally important in the 
promotion of competition in national markets is the encourage-
ment of foreign direct investment. The overall focus for develop-
ing countries, then, should be on a competition policy that pro-
motes competition in local markets, rather than competition law 
that seeks to punish anti-competitive conduct. In short, competi-
tion in local markets can be promoted If on the cheaplf through lib-
eral trade and foreign investment policies at the nationallevel.308 
UNCTAD has warned, however, that If[t]rade and foreign invest-
ment liberalization, while increasing international competition in 
many sectors, may enhance the incentive for firms to resort to RBPs 
to maintain their marker position ... "309 Therefore, it may be too 
facile to conclude that developing countries need only be con-
cerned with competition policy and not also with competition law 
enforcement. The countries most vulnerable to restrictive business 
practices are also the countries least capable of combating them, 
namely, developing countries. 
4.3. Development Concerns 
At the WTO's fourth Ministerial Conference held in Doha, 
Qatar in November 2001, the trade ministers of the WTO members 
devoted much of their attention to the capacity of developing 
countries to implement existing WTO commitments.310 Following 
the debacle in 1999 at the third Ministerial Conference in Seattle, 
developing countries, especially the LDCs, were determined not to 
308 See id. at 13, para. 37. 
309 UNCTAD, Revised Study by the UNCTAD Secretariat, Review of All As-
pects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of 
Restrictive Business Practices, The role of competition policy in economic reforms in de-
veloping and other countries, at 7, TD/RBP/CONF.4/2 (May 26, 1995). See WTO 
Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy, Report 
to the General Council 14, WT/WGTCP/2 (Dec. 8, 1998) (pointing out that trade 
liberalization alone would not sufficiently guarantee competition in all circum-
stances). 
310 See infra notes 317-25 and accompanying text. 
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be marginalized at the next biennial meeting of the Ministerial 
Conference. 
Two pivotal meetings occurred in 2001 that put the spotlight at 
the Doha Ministerial Conference on the economic plight of LDCs. 
The first meeting was the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Least Developed Countries held in Belgium in May 2001. Out of 
the Conference came a document entitled Draft Programme of Action 
for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2001-2010, calling for 
coherent action by the United Nations, the WTO, the World Bank, 
and the IMF to integrate LDCs into the global economy.311 The sec-
ond meeting was the LDC trade ministers' meeting held in Zanzi-
bar, Tanzania in July 2001. In the Zanzibar Declaration the LDCs 
agreed to take steps to reverse the process of their exclusion and 
marginalization in world trade.312 The trade ministers identified 
no fewer than nine items that they requested the Doha Ministerial 
Conference to agree to, including full implementation of the com-
mitments undertaken at the Third United Nations Conference on 
the Least Developed Countries and full implementation of the In-
tegrated Framework.313 Attached to the Zanzibar Declaration was 
an annex entitled LDCs Development Agenda at the Fourth Ministerial 
Conference, Negotiating Objectives and Proposals of the Least Developed 
Countries.314 The LDCs' agenda listed no fewer than twenty-one 
agenda items for Doha, including implementation issues in the ar-
eas of agriculture, services trade, subsidies, technical assistance 
with food and product standards, textiles and clothing, TRIMs, 
TRIPS, customs valuation, antidumping and countervailing duties, 
and safeguards.315 
Speaking on behalf of a broader range of developing countries, 
the Group of 77, together with China, issued a separate declaration 
in October 2001 calling on the Ministerial Conference to, inter alia, 
make the special and differential treatment provisions of the WTO 
multilateral trade agreements "legally binding... operational-
311 See UNCTAD, Third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed 
Countries, Draft Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 
2001-2010 para. 65, A/CONF.191/L.18 (2001) (stating that "[c]oherent actions ... 
remain an essential element of overall policy reform). 
312 See Meeting of the Ministers Responsible for Trade of the Least Devel-
oped Countries, Zanzibar Declaration, circulated by the WTO, WT/L/409 (Aug. 6, 
2001) (discussing the marginalization of LDCs in the multilateral trading system). 
313 See id. 
314 See id. 
315 See id. 
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ized ... and enforceable so that these do not remain merely 'best 
endeavour clauses."'316 The Declaration also called for increased 
technical assistance in order to bring developing countries' laws 
into compliance with WTO obligations. 
Around 100 implementation issues were raised prior to the 
Doha Ministerial Conference, either in the LDC Zanzibar Declara-
tion, in the Draft Programme issued at the Third U.N. Conference 
on LDCs, or in the Group of 77 Declaration. At the Doha Ministe-
rial Conference the trade ministers launched a "work program" 
that includes on its agenda many of these implementation-related 
issues and concerns.317 Although the trade ministers carefully 
avoided the use of the politically-charged phrase, "multilateral 
trade negotiation round," -perhaps out of a concern that it would 
conjure up images of the seemingly interminable eight-year Uru-
guay Round-the "work program" is informally known as the 
"Development Round." The Ministerial Declaration issued at the 
conclusion of the Doha session provides: 
We attach the utmost importance to the implementation-
related issues and concerns raised by Members and are de-
termined to find appropriate solutions to them. . .. [W]e 
further adopt the Decision on Implementation-Related Is-
sues and Concerns in document WT/MIN(01)/17 to ad-
dress a number of implementation problems faced by 
Members. We agree that negotiations on outstanding im-
plementation issues shall be an integral part of the Work 
Programme we are establishing .... 318 
316 Group of 77, Declaration of the Group of 77 and China on the Fourth 
WTO Ministerial Conference at Doha, Qatar, para. 7, circulated by the wro, 
WTjLj424 (Oct. 24, 2001). 
317 WTO Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, 9-14 November 2001, Minis-
terial Declaration adopted on 14 November 2001, para. 12, 
WTjMIN(01)jDECjW jl (Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Doha Ministerial Declara-
tion]. 
318 Id. para. 12. The Declaration adds that where a specific negotiating man-
date is established in the Declaration, the relevant implementation issues are to be 
addressed under that mandate. See id. para. 12(a). Otherwise, the other out-
standing implementation issues are to be addressed as a matter of priority by the 
relevant WTO bodies, which shall report to the Trade Negotiations Committee by 
the end of 2002 for appropriate action. See id. para. 12(b). 
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With regard to the specific concerns of LDCs, the Ministerial 
Declaration acknowledged the concerns expressed by LDCs in the 
Zanzibar Declaration.319 The Declaration also endorsed the Inte-
grated Framework and reaffirmed that the special and differential 
(S&D) treatment provisions are an integral part of the WTO 
Agreements.32o The Declaration states that It all special and differ-
ential treatment provisions shall be reviewed with a view to 
strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and 
operational. In this connection, we endorse the work programme 
on special and differential treatment set out in the Decision on Im-
plementation-Related Issues and Concerns."321 The Decision on 
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns referred to in para-
graph 12 of the Ministerial Declaration identifies more than forty 
implementation issues and proposed action by the WTO mem-
bers.322 Most of the forty-plus items were settled at or before the 
Doha Conference. 
The majority of the remaining items are the subject of negotia-
tions that are to be concluded not later than January 1, 2005, with a 
stocktaking of the progress of the negotiations to take place in Sep-
tember 2003 at the fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mex-
ico.323 As was the case with the Uruguay Round agreements, all 
agreements reached during the Doha Development Round are to 
be treated as a single undertaking, that is, a package deal with no 
opt-outS.324 This single undertaking would include, of course, an 
agreement on investment. 
319 See id. para. 43. (recognizing that lithe integration of the LDCs into the 
multilateral trading system requires meaningful market access, support for the 
diversification of their product and export base, and trade-related technical assis-
tance and capacity building"). 
320 See id. 
321 Id. para. 44. It was agreed in early 2002 that the review of all S&D treat-
ment provisions will be carried out by the Committee on Trade and Development 
with a view to making them more precise, effective, and operational. See WTO, 
Committee on Trade and Development, Report to the General Council 1, TN/CTD/3 
Ouly 26, 2002). 
322 See WTO Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Decision on Implementa-
tion-Related Issues and Concerns, WT /MIN(Ol)/W /10 (Nov. 14, 2001) (listing the 
decisions reached by the ministerial conference). 
323 See Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 317, para. 45 (detailing the 
negotiations to take place). 
324 See id. para. 47 (" With the exception of the improvements and clarifica-
tions of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, the conduct, conclusion, and entry 
into force of the outcome of the negotiations shall be treated as part of a single 
undertaking."). 
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Several items were identified at the Doha Ministerial Confer-
ence that are to be the subject of future trade negotiations, includ-
ing agriculture, implementation issues, services, and market access 
for non-agricultural products.325 Also on the agenda is a possible 
WTO agreement on investment. Paragraphs 20 and 22 of the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration state: 
Recognizing the case for a multilateral framework to secure 
transparent, stable and predictable conditions for long-term 
cross-border investment, particularly foreign direct invest-
ment, that will contribute to the expansion of trade ... , we 
agree that negotiations will take place after the Fifth Session 
of the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision to be 
taken, by explicit consensus, at that Session on modalities of 
negotiations. 
In the period until the Fifth Session, further work ii1 the 
Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment will focus on the clarification of: scope and defi-
nition; transparency; non-discrimination; modalities for 
pre-establishment commitments based on a GATS-type, 
positive list approach; development provisions; exceptions 
and balance-of-payments safeguards; consultation and the 
settlement of disputes between Members. Any framework 
should reflect in a balanced manner the interests of home 
and host countries, and take due account of the develop-
ment policies and objectives of host governments as well as 
their right to regulate in the public interest. The special de-
velopment, trade and financial needs of developing and 
least-developed countries should be taken into account as 
an integral part of any framework, which should enable 
Members to undertake obligations and commitments com-
mensurate with their individual needs and circumstances. 
Due regard should be paid to other relevant WTO provi-
325 See id. paras. 13-19 (detailing the work program agenda set forth in the 
Declaration). 
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sions. Account should be taken, as appropriate, of existing 
bilateral and regional arrangements on investment.326 
If S&D treatment is to have any meaning, what will such treat-
ment look like in the context of a WTO investment agreement? 
Will developing countries be permitted to enter into reservations 
and be granted exemptions under an investment agreement that in 
effect codifies the status quo regarding FDI? In the face of a clear 
recognition by the international trade community at the Doha Min-
isterial Conference that developing countries confront serious 
problems in implementing the agreements reached during the 
Uruguay Round, are developing countries once again to be asked 
to assume even more legal obligations as the price for continued 
WTO membership? What seems to have emerged form the Doha 
Ministerial Conference is that agenda items in any future multilat-
eral trade negotiation round will be agreed to on a consensus basis 
and not dictated by the Quad members to developing countries. It 
seems quite predictable that in any WTO agreement on investment, 
developing countries will be accorded a great deal of flexibility in 
its implementation, especially in the areas of national treatment, 
performance requirements, and reservations excluding certain sen-
sitive sectors from foreign investment.327 The reason why it seems 
quite predictable is the backdrop of some ninety-seven provisions 
in the WTO MTAs on S&D treatment for developing countries,328 
326 See id. paras. 20, 22. 
327 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Communication from UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements: Con-
cepts Allowing for a Certain Flexibility in the Interest of Promoting Growth and Devel-
opment, WT /WGTI/W /77 (May 25, 1999) (setting forth concepts designed to 
afford developing countries great flexibility within international investment 
agreements). 
328 See WTO Committee on Trade and Development, Concerns Regarding 
Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions, 
Note by the Secretariat para. 4, WT / COMID /W /66 (Feb. 16, 2000). The majority 
of WTO MT As contain one or more clauses providing special and differential 
(S&D) treatment of developing countries. In total, there are ninety-seven S&D 
treatment provisions in the WTO agreements. The S&D treatment provisions can 
be divided into six categories: (1) provisions aimed at increasing trade opportuni-
ties; (2) provisions that require WTO members to safeguard the interests of devel-
oping-country members; (3) flexibility of commitments; (4) transitional time peri-
ods; (5) technical assistance; and (6) provisions relating to measures to assist least-
developed country members. Id. See also WTO Committee on Trade and Devel-
opment, Implementation of WTO Provisions in Favour of Developing Country 
Members, Note by the Secretariat, WT/COMID/W/35 (Feb. 9, 1998) (providing 
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and the MFN exemptions listed under the GATSon the grounds of 
culture, environment, and social objectives,329 coupled with the 
commitment in the Doha Ministerial Declaration that the S&D 
treatment provisions are an integral part of the WTO Agreements. 
The Declaration states: 
[AJIl special and differential treatment provisions shall be 
reviewed with a view to strengthening them and making 
them more precise, effective and operational. In this con-
nection, we endorse the work programme on special and 
differential treatment set out in the Decision on Implemen-
tation-Related Issues and Concerns.330 
comprehensive information on actions taken pursuant to WTO provisions in fa-
vour of developing countries). 
The MTAs covering trade in goods with S&D treatment clauses include: (1) 
the Agreement on Agriculture; (2) the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the Antidumping Agree-
ment); (3) the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures; (4) the 
Agreement on Safeguards; (5) the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures; (6) the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade; (7) the 
TRIMs Agreement; (8) the Agreement on Implementation of Article vn of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the Valuation Agreement); (9) and the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 431. 
In addition to the WTO MT As covering trade in goods, three other WTO 
MTAs-the GATS, the TRIPS Agreement, and the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes-contain special provisions for 
the benefit of developing and least-developed countries. Id. 
329 WTO members listed a number of GATS MFN exemptions on the 
grounds of cultural objectives (seventy exemptions), environment and conserva-
tion (twenty exemptions), industrial policy (forty-nine exemptions), and social ob-
jectives (fourteen exemptions). See Trade in Services: A Roadmap to GATS MFN Ex-
emptions, supra note 94, paras. 64-77 (detailing the breakdown of the exemptions). 
330 Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 317, para. 44. The Declaration 
also provides the following with regard to an agreement on investment and de-
veloping countries: 
We recognize the needs of developing and least-developed countries for 
enhanced support for technical assistance and capacity building in this 
area, including policy analysis and development so that they may better 
evaluate the implications of closer multilateral cooperation for their de-
velopment policies and objectives, and human and institutional devel-
opment. To this end, we shall work in cooperation with other relevant 
intergovernmental organisations, including UNCTAD, and through ap-
propriate regional and bilateral channels, to provide strengthened and 
adequately resourced assistance to respond to these needs. 
Id. para. 21. 
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If this kind of flexibility for developing countries is included in 
a WTO investment agreement, the main argument in support of 
such an agreement-predictability and stability-would be seri-
ously undercut.331 BITs are, therefore, an attractive alternative in 
cases where flexibility is needed because they allow national poli-
cies to be given effect by subordinating the admission of invest-
ment to the host country's domestic laws. 
4.4. Exceptions and Reservations Will Hollow Out a wro Agreement 
on Investment 
It is not hard to predict that if negotiators proceed on the basis 
of either a positive list approach (as directed in the Doha Ministe-
rial Declaration) or a negative list approach (market access is gen-
erally granted in the schedules of commitments, subject to specific 
exceptions or reservations), then WTO members will either refuse 
to make market access commitments or will enter reservations to 
an investment agreement on the grounds of, for example, national 
security (e.g., the Exon-Florio Amendment or the Helms-Burton 
Act332), or the protection of cultural industries (e.g., the EU's 
sweeping MFN exemption for audio-visual services under 
GATS333). Besides the reservations that developed countries might 
make, they would likely be joined by developing countries in the 
case of reservations to ensure continued state ownership and con-
trol over natural resources and transportation industries.334 Under 
NAFTA, which uses the negative list approach, the parties have 
listed reservations in Annexes that literally run for hundreds of 
pages.335 Query whether these same country-specific reservations 
will become part of a WTO agreement on investment. Employing 
a negative list approach, the draft MAl had some 600 pages of res-
ervations and that was for only a few of the OEeD countries.336 On 
331 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. 
332 See supra notes 32 & 40. 
333 USITC Examination of GATS, supra note 115, at 5-17. 
334 See, e.g., NAFTA, annex III, Schedule of Mexico, reprinted in NAFTA 
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION ArnON, supra note 26, at 1679-83 (reserving to the 
state the right to perform exclusively activities in the energy and transportation 
sectors). 
335 See NAFTA, annexes I-II, reprinted in NAFTA STATEMENT OF 
ADMINISTRATION ArnON, supra note 26, at 1486-1678. 
336 See MAl NEGOTIATING TEXT, supra note 28, art. IX (country-specific excep-
tions). See generally Don Wallace, Jr. & David B. Bailey, The Inevitability of National 
Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment with Increasingly Few and Narrow Exceptions, 
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the other hand, if a positive list approach is used, what will be the 
quality and quantity of offers and commitments? 
If negotiations on an agreement on investment do proceed at 
the WTO, the GATS positive list approach based on sector-by-
sector negotiations would allow WTO members to retain control 
over the type of FDI they wish to attract. As noted by the EU, the 
positive list approach "has the merit of incorporating enough flexi-
bility to allow a gradual and progressive liberalisation of FDI, fully 
compatible with any development strategy adopted by WTO 
members."337 A positive list approach would automatically ex-
clude new sectors that arise as a result of technological innovation. 
Although a negative list approach to a comprehensive investment 
agreement has advantages for investment liberalization-not the 
least of which is that WTO members are required to list with speci-
ficity exempted sectors or industries-the experience to date with a 
negative list approach is that it spawns so many exemptions as to 
render administration of any agreement problematic.338 In the end, 
both approaches enable countries to preserve discriminatory 
measures and exclude from foreign investment certain sectors of 
the economy as deemed necessary to further national development 
policy.339 What is left could be nothing more than a mere shell of 
an agreement. 
4.5. An Incremental, Sectoral Approach Is Tested and Proven 
What lessons can be learned from the pace of liberalization ef-
forts achieved to date under existing WTO multilateral agreements 
that address key dimensions of FDI, most importantly the GATS 
(and the two subsidiary agreements on financial services and basic 
telecommunications) and the TRIMs Agreement? Admittedly, nei-
ther the GATS nor the TRIMs Agreement treats the subject of FDI 
31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 615 (1998) (discussing relevant norms regarding FDI with a 
focus on the MAl). 
337 WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Invest-
ment, Communication from the European Community and Its Member States, Concept 
Paper on Modalities of Pre-Establishment, para. 20, WT/WGTI/W /121 Oune 27, 
2002). 
338 See Sauve & Wilkie, supra note 16, at 11 (discussing the feasibility of the 
negative list approach). 
339 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Communication from Canada, Development Provisions, para. 9, 
WT /WGTI/W 1131 Ouly 3, 2002) (stating the benefits of both positive- and nega-
tive-list approaches). 
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in a comprehensive fashion. Most obviously, of course, the GATS 
does not address the subject of FDI by manufacturers of goods. 
But as explained above,34o among the four modes of supply cov-
ered by GATS, GATS provides, inter alia, for the supply of services 
by the service suppliers of one WTO member through a commer-
cial presence in another WTO member, i.e., through an FDI. And, 
as noted, the TRIMs Agreement fails to address altogether certain 
national measures that could have distortive effects on global FDI 
inflows, namely, positive TRIMs or investment incentives. 
On the other hand, the 1997 Agreements on Financial Services 
and Basic Telecommunications represent genuine market liberali-
zation within these two major service sectors, including the right to 
establish a commercial presence. These two agreements are exam-
ples of what can be achieved using a sectoral approach that is 
based on reciprocity. Perhaps an incremental, sectoral approach to 
investment is preferable to a sweeping agreement on investment 
whose consequences might not be easy to predict. Progressive lib-
eralization of services trade is part of the WTO's built-in agenda 
and the subject of ongoing negotiations at the WTO. Negotiations 
on an investment agreement should be postponed to await the out-
come of the follow-on services negotiations. 
4.6. Dealing with Positive and Negative TRIMs 
The most pressing issue facing the WTO membership in the 
context of FDI is not a lack of market access for foreign capital. The 
immediate problem is the one of TRIMs, both positive and nega-
tive, that potentially distort investment patterns. The TRIMs 
Agreement prohibits, inter alia, the most egregious internal and 
border measures that force investors to source inputs locally. De-
spite the benefits of FDI and the tremendous growth worldwide in 
FDI, host-country barriers still exist in the form of performance re-
quirements.341 The most common restrictions include measures re-
lating to admission and establishment (e.g., investment notifica-
340 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
341 The use of performance requirements in the motor vehicle sector is not 
uncommon, although many of these measures are being repealed or phased out. 
See WTO Council for Trade in Goods, Trade-Related Investment Measures and 
Other Performance Requirements, Joint Study by the World Trade Organization 
and UNCTAD Secretariats, Addendum 2-6, G/C/W /307 / Add.1 (Feb. 8, 2002) 
(describing performance requirements used in various countries' motor vehicle 
industries). 
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tion, approval, or authorization requirements that are sometimes 
contingent upon satisfying criteria that are highly subjective and, 
therefore, subject to political manipulation); measures relating to 
ownership and control (e.g., limitations on the nationality or resi-
dency of senior managers or members of the board of directors, lo-
cal equity requirements, and restrictions on the acquisition of real 
estate); and measures relating to operations (e.g., currency ex-
change controls and employment requirements).342 As a group, 
these measures are negative TRIMs. While the TRIMs Agreement 
prohibits performance requirements tied to the purchase of local 
versus foreign-source goods, as well as measures that tie the 
amount of foreign exchange and imported inputs to the value of 
exports, many other performance requirements, such as technology 
transfer requirements, mandatory use of local business partners, or 
foreign exchange controls that prevent the free repatriation of prof-
its, are not the subject of the TRIMs Agreement. Such performance 
requirements are likely to deter, not attract, FDI and its associated 
technology, perhaps preventing increased competition in local 
markets.343 However, given the competitive environment for FDI, 
342 For a list of examples of investment measures relating to admission and 
establishment, ownership and control, and operations, see WORLD INVESTMENT 
REPORT 1996, supra note 10, at 176-79 (discussing investment measures affecting 
the entry and operations of foreign investors). In the results of a survey released 
in 2000, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce and Industry Canada reported an 
inventory of more than 110 specific restrictions on investment. See Canadian 
Chamber of Commerce, supra note 14. The Report summarized that 38% of the 
barriers resulted in the investment being canceled, 43% resulted in the terms of 
the investment being altered, and 25% of the restrictions involved discretionary 
decision-making on the part of the host government. The Report is summarized 
in a submission by Canada to the WGTI. See WTO Working Group on the Rela-
tionship Between Trade and Investment, Communication from Canada, 
WT/WGTI/W /97 (Mar. 9, 2001) (presenting results obtained in a report on for-
eign investment barriers). 
343 As noted in a u.s. submission to the WTO Working Group on Trade and 
Investment: 
Sometimes these investment screening regimes have even been given a 
competition policy rationale, one based on concern that efficient new 
market entrants could harm existing local competitors and perhaps 
achieve a local monopoly. In our view, these concerns are largely mis-
placed, especially if foreign entry is by way of II greenfield" investment 
rather than through acquisition of a local competitor. On the conceptual 
level, competition policies that attempt to protect (established) competi-
tors, rather than consumers, are inherently suspect; after all, competition 
laws should protect competition, not competitors. While other rationales 
are sometimes asserted for maintaining such protective policies, competi-
tion rarely is enhanced by them. 
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it can be anticipated that countries motivated to attract FDI will 
eliminate these disincentives to foreign investment out of pure self-
interest. If that doesn't occur, foreign capital will probably have lit-
tle difficulty in finding an alternative host country where such dis-
incentives do not exist. At the same time, negative TRIMs may be 
negotiable, so even if in theory they would have an impact on FDI 
flows, an investor may be able to negotiate around them. One 
study found that in 83% of the projects covered by negative TRIMs, 
investors claimed that the TRIM merely made them do what they 
would have done in any event.344 That same study found that 63% 
of respondents were compensated for the imposition of the 
TRIM.345 
With regard to possible improvements of the TRIMs Agree-
ment to make it less distortive of FDI flows, consideration should 
be given to amending the TRIMs Agreement by incorporating the 
NAFTA provisions on negative TRIMs, especially those dealing 
with technology transfer and membership on corporate boards.346 
The list of proscribed practices in NAFTA Article 1106 includes ex-
port performance requirements, domestic content requirements, 
trade balancing, product mandating (i.e., giving a preference to lo-
cal sources of supply), and technology transfer requirements.347 
Under Article 1106, a NAFTA party may not, as a condition for the 
establishment or operation of an investment, impose any of the fol-
lowing seven restrictions on a firm:348 
• limit its sales in the domestic market by conditioning 
such sales on exports or foreign exchange earnings; 
• buy or use components from a local supplier or accord a 
preference to domestic goods or services; 
• achieve a minimum level of fI domestic content"; 
WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Com-
munication from the United States 5, WT /WGTI/W /55 (Sept. 25, 1998). 
344 See EVANS & WAlSH, supra note 66, at 33. 
345 See id. 
346 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Communication from the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, 
Kinmen and Matsu, Development Provisions, at 2, WT/WGTI/W /126 Ouly 1, 2002) 
(noting that requiring foreign investors to transfer technology to domestic firms or 
to the government might have the counterproductive effect of deterring FDI). 
347 The NAFTA proscription on technology transfer is not included in the 
Illustrative List of the TRIMs Agreement. See TRIMs Agreement, supra note 235, 
Annex, at 1452. 
348 See NAFTA art. 1106.1, supra note 26, at 1101~02 (listing seven perform-
ance requirements no party may enforce). 
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• limit its imports to a certain percentage of exports or 
foreign exchange inflows associated with the invest-
ment; 
• transfer technology to any domestic entity, except to 
remedy an alleged violation of competition [Le., anti-
trust1law; 
• export a specified level of goods or services; or 
• supply designated regional or world markets solely 
from its local production. 
The obligation to refrain from such practices extends to the in-
vestments by investors of both a NAFTA party and by non-parties 
alike.349 NAFTA Chapter Eleven also forbids the NAFTA parties 
from requiring that senior managers be of any particular national-
ity. However, the NAFTA parties may require that the majority of 
the members of a board of directors be of a specific nationality, 
provided that such a requirement does not materially impair the 
ability of the investor to exercise control over its investment.350 
Turning to the issue of investment incentives, as a preliminary 
matter investment incentives come in several forms: (1) financial 
incentives (funds paid directly to the investor in the form of grants 
and subsidized loans); (2) fiscal incentives (tax holidays or exemp-
tions from import duties on capital goods); and (3) indirect incen-
tives, such as subsidized services or market privileges (e.g., the 
provision of infrastructure at less-than-market prices, preferential 
treatment in obtaining government procurement contracts, or a 
monopoly position in the market).351 Regarding the issue of in-
349 See id. (extending the reach of the article to investors of a party or of a 
non-party in its territory). 
350 See id. art. 1107, supra note 26, at 1103. Query whether developing coun-
tries would have any interest in expanding the TRIMs Agreement to cover more 
negative TRIMs, in the absence of some type of compensatory adjustment in the 
areas of, for example, the use of antidumping duties by developed countries or 
greater market access for goods of export interest to developing countries, such as 
textiles, clothing, and agricultural products. See Sauve & Wilkie, supra note 16, at 
14 (discussing investment policy issues at the WTO). 
351 See Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 11, at 21-24 (classify-
ing investment incentives into three categories). For a list of the main types of in-
vestment incentives, see WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996, supra note 10, at 180. 
For an inventory of common incentives, see WTO Working Group on the Rela-
tionship Between Trade and Investment, Note by the Secretariat, The Impact of In-
vestment Incentives and Performance Requirements on International Trade, at 6, 
WT/WGTI/W /56 (Sept. 30, 1998). 
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vestment incentives,352 arguments have been advanced that in-
vestment incentives distort FDI inflows, but here the evidence of 
such distortions is not clear.353 Just as the prohibition on the use of 
export subsidies and import-substitution subsidies on other than 
agricultural products was agreed to in the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures ("SCM Agreement"), it is argued 
that the same disciplines need to be imposed on the use of invest-
ment incentives and for the same reason: The use of such incen-
tives has the potential for distorting the market for capital, just as 
the use of export and import substitution subsidies distort global 
patterns for trade in goods.354 Investment incentives may have 
more of an impact on FDI flows than negative TRIMs (although the 
precise impact of incentives on FDI and trade flows remains the 
subject of conjecture).355 
The counter-argument has been made that if governments 
compete for FDI through investment incentives, this helps insure 
that FDI goes to those places where it is most highly valued,356 
352 Despite NAFfA's restrictions on performance requirements, the NAFTA 
parties remain free to use positive TRIMs that condition the receipt of government 
subsidies (e.g., a tax holiday in exchange for building a facility in an econornically-
depressed region of the country) on where facilities are located, on training or 
employing workers, on the construction or expansion of particular facilities, or on 
conducting research and development. See NAFfA art. 1106.4, reprinted in 
NAFfA STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcrION, supra note 26, at 1102. 
353 See Hoekman & Saggi, supra note 8, at 12. As observed by Hoekman and 
Saggi: 
[T]he empirical evidence regarding the efficacy of financial incentives to 
attract FDI is ambiguous. . .. If one accepts the notion that there is a 
solid economic case for promoting inwardFDI via incentives because of 
positive externalities [generated by MNEs], countries may find them-
selves in a bidding war for attracting FDI . . .. If this is an important 
possibility, there is a potential case for international cooperation to ban 
or discipline the use of fiscal incentives. 
Id. at 11. 
354 See Patrick Low & Arvind Subramanian, TRIMs in the Uruguay Round: An 
Unfinished Business?, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 413, 
414 (Will Martin & L. Alan Winters eds., 1995) (arguing that as with subsidies in 
trade in goods, investment incentives tend to distort the allocation of FDI). 
355 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Communication from ASEAN 1, WT /WGTI/W / 41 Ouly 3, 1998) (ad-
dressing recent debate regarding the efficiency of investment incentives). 
356 "Subsidy freedom" has been advocated in cases where incentives are ef-
fective in attracting FDI. See Eric W. Bond & Larry Samuelson, Tax Holidays as 
Signals, 76 AMER. ECON. REV. 820-26 (1986) (examining the potential role of tax 
holidays as a signal). 
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Moreover, the advocates of an SCM Agreement approach forget 
how difficult it was to conclude that Agreement, given the impor-
tance of subsidies to governments' development policies. The sig-
nificant carve-out of agricultural subsidies from industrial subsi-
dies must also not be forgotten, the former being covered in the 
WTO Agreement on Agriculture and with far fewer disciplines 
than is the case under the SCM Agreement. 
Developing countries are at a clear disadvantage vis-a-vis de-
veloped countries in any investment incentive competition where 
an incentives package is determinative in the investment location 
decision. The spread of investment incentives can distort invest-
ment patterns in favor of developed countries that have deeper 
pockets. This assumes, of course, that developing countries and 
developed countries are in fact in competition for the same FDI. It 
seems more likely that developing countries compete inter se for 
FDI.357 
In defense of incentives it has been suggested that they draw 
foreign investment where they help correct market failures, e.g., 
weak infrastructure, such as roads and telecommunication net-
works. When used for this reason, incentives can be considered a 
country risk premium, providing a partial counterweight to the 
lack of adequate infrastructure.358 Investment incentives also have 
357 UNCT AD adds that: 
Experience suggests that incentives do not rank high among the deter-
minants of FDI, although their impact on FDI locational choices is some-
times apparent at the margin. . .. In many instances, therefore, incen-
tives can be a waste of resources - something most countries can ill-
afford - and, when they are successful, can be distortional. 
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996, supra note 10, at 181. For example, if a country 
offers $200 million in incentives to attract a FDI project that brings $150 million in 
total benefits, the host country is net $50 million worse off with the FDI than 
without it. On the other hand, judicious use of incentives as part of a carefully 
thought-out macroeconomic strategy could have wealth-creation effects that more 
than offset the costs associated with providing the incentives. 
358 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Communication from Singapore, WT /WGTI/W /99, at 2-3 (Mar. 13, 2001); 
WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Com-
munication from Korea 1, WT /WGTI/W /62 (Oct. 28, 1998); WTO Working Group 
on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Communication from ASEAN 
2, WT /WGTI/W /41 Ouly 3, 1998) (addressing the risk premium function as a key 
role of incentives). But see WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between 
Trade and Investment, Note by the Secretariat, The Impact of Investment Incentives 
and Performance Requirements on International Trade 7, WT /WGTI/W /56 (Sept. 30, 
1998) ("If investors request a 'risk premium' to compensate for the risk associated 
with macroeconomic instability, runaway inflation and exchange rate fluctua-
HeinOnline -- 24 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 170 2003
170 U. Pa. ]. Int'l Ecan. L. [24:1 
been defended on the ground that they serve as a directional tool 
or carrot to regulate the type and nature of FDI a country re-
ceives.359 For example, incentives that are granted sequentially can 
protect against unscrupulous investors who promise to modernize, 
diversify, or add production capacity but who later renege on their 
commitment.360 Finally, investment incentives have been defended 
on the ground that they attract the kind of investment that leads to 
long-term competitiveness because along with capital comes tech-
nology transfer, managerial know-how, and ready-made access to 
overseas markets.361 
Although all host countries might mutually benefit if they vol-
untarily foreswore the use of investment incentives, individual 
"cheaters" would gain from continuing to offer incentives regard-
less of what other countries do. Because of this "prisoners' di-
lemma," as economists call it, host countries harm themselves by . 
pursuing their narrow self-interests and providing incentives. 
When all countries offer incentives, the incentives may simply can-
cel each other out, and investments will essentially be made in the 
same way as if no country was offering incentives in the first place. 
As the WTO Secretariat has explained: 
tions, the most sensible policy response would be to address these underlying 
problems ... rather than to compensate investors for the poor investment cli-
mate."); WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Invest-· 
ment, Communication from Mexico 3, WT /WGTI/W /64 (Nov. 19, 1998) ("To attract 
FDI it is preferable to remedy, and not to compensate for, structural or economic 
imperfections [through fiscal incentives]."); Pham Van Thuyet, Vietnam's Legal 
Framework for Foreign Investment, 33 INT'L LAW. 75, 77 (1999) ("[W]hat investors 
need most is reasonably good infrastructure. . .. Tax incentives alone are not suf-
ficient to lure investors ... . ff). 
359 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Communication from ASEAN 2, WT /WGTI/W /41 Ouly 3, 1998) (discuss-
ing the role of incentives as a directional tool); WTO Working Group on the Rela-
tionship Between Trade and Investment, Communication from Singapore 2-3, 
WT /WGTI/W /99 (Mar. 13, 2001) (addressing incentives as a directional tool); 
WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Com-
munication from Korea 1, WT /WGTI/W /62 (Oct. 28, 1998) (discussing incentives 
provided to FDI that accompany technology). 
360 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Communication from ASEAN 3, WT/WGTI/W /41 Ouly 3,1998) (stating 
that "[i]ncentives may help curtail 'fly-by-night' investors."). 
361 See id. But see WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade 
and Investment, Communication from Korea 8, WT /WGTI/W /62 (Oct. 28, 1998) 
(noting that tax incentives have generally failed to achieve their desired effects). 
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[H]ost country pursuit of the perceived first best solution-
attracting investment from other countries - destroys the 
possibility of achieving a second best solution in which no 
country offers incentives, and countries therefore end up in 
a third best solution with incentives being paid out, but 
with few, if any, effects on investment allocation.362 
171 
An amended TRIMs Agreement that imposes disciplines and 
limitations on the use of investment incentives would permit WTO 
members to break out of the "prisoners' dilemma," which could be 
especially important for developing countries that cannot expect to 
outspend developed countries in any investment incentive compe-
tition.363 The question is whether such an amendment would 
362 Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 11, at 21 n.83. Accord 
WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Com-
munication from Korea 3, WT jWGTIjW j 62 (Oct. 28, 1998) (arguing that incentives 
could unnecessarily increase the cost to society of producing goods and services). 
But see Hoekman & Saggi, supra note 8, at 12 ("[I]f financial incentives are ineffec-
tive [in attracting FDI], there is no rationale for seeking multilateral disciplines 
prohibiting fiscal incentives as it is in each countries [sic] self-interest not to offer 
them."). 
363 The question has been raised why it is that developed countries-
champions in word, if not in deed, of market mechanisms-also use investment 
incentives if they are in fact as distortive of the market for capital as has been ar-
gued. See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Invest-
ment, Report (1999) of the Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment to the General Council 10, WT jWGTlj3 (Oct. 22, 1999) (asking why 
developed countries used incentives when they "took the view that market forces 
should determine the allocation of resources"). In the Uruguay Round the EU 
opposed restrictions on investment incentives, arguing that they are part of do-
mestic industrial policy and, therefore, could not be covered in a WTO agreement 
without infringing upon national sovereignty. See EVANS & WALSH, supra note 66, 
at 34. Modest attempts to corral investment incentives have been taken in the 
OECD Decision on Incentives and Disincentives (part of the 1976 OECD Declara-
tion on Multinational Enterprises), in the Caribbean Common Market agreement 
on the harmonization of fiscal incentives, and in the EU as part of its competition 
rules. See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996, supra note 10, at 181. The non-binding 
OECO Decision on International Investment Incentives and Disincentives stresses 
the need to strengthen international cooperation in this area by urging member 
countries to give due weight to the interests of other member countries affected by 
investment incentives or disincentives. The Decision encourages countries to 
make investment incentive measures as transparent as possible so that their scale 
and purpose can be easily determined. The Decision was revised in 1984 and 
again in 1991 to provide for consultations and review procedures to make coop-
eration between adhering countries more effective. See OECO, Decision on Inter-
national Investment Incentives and Disincentives, Second Revised Decision of the 
Council, DAFFEjIME(2000)02 (May 1984). The impact of these regional and 
plurilateral efforts have been limited. See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996, supra 
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achieve the desired result. In the case where two developing coun-
tries would have competed against each other by offering location 
incentives, an agreement to refrain from the use of investment in-
centives would be in effect a collusive agreement among develop-
ing countries. Of course, only one country can be the recipient of 
the FDI, but the hope must be that in the long run everything evens 
out. Yet no lawyer or economist can make such a promise and de-
liver on it.364 
Despite the arguments against using investment incentives, 
/I [a ]rguments on the pros and cons of investment incentives have 
never been conclusive and are unlikely ever to be SO."365 Many de-
veloping countries still dangle new ones to attract FDI.366 For 
them, investment incentives remain an important policy instru-
ment in the pursuit of development strategies,367 Moreover, be-
cause developing countries are net importers of FDI, they have no 
reason to negotiate an agreement that focuses on investment incen-
tives unless the negotiations are expanded to include other issues 
of interest to them.368 
Certain investment incentive programs will present knotty is-
sues for negotiation. For example, the draft MAl specified that 
government subsidies or advantages offered for training or em-
ploying certain workers or for constructing and expanding facili-
ties would not have been barred.369 Whether legislation that gives 
note 10, at 181 (observing that "incentives do not rank high among the determi-
nants of FDI"). 
364 See Markusen, supra note 8, at 53 (attempting to create a model with fixed 
and open policies and procedures for regulating investment). 
365 WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Invest-
ment, Communication from Singapore 3, WT/WGTI/W /99 (Mar. 13,2001). See also 
Hoekman & Saggi, supra note 8, at 2 (concluding that regardless of whether in-
vestment incentives work or not, "there is no clear case for international coopera-
tion that restricts the ability of governments to pursue national policies"). 
366 See, e.g., Philippines Passes Law Giving Breaks to Attract Investment by Multi-
nationals, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2043 (Dec. 16, 1999) (describing how multina-
tional firms setting regional headquarters in the Philippines are not subject to in-
come tax or value-added tax); Glen Perkinson, Indonesia Preparing Tax Breaks to 
Attract More Foreign Investors, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1400 (Aug. 25, 1999) (de-
scribing Indonesian tax incentives). 
367 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Report (1998) of the Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and 
Investment to the General Council 22, WT/WGTI/2 (Dec. 8, 1998). 
368 See Hoekman & Saggi, supra note 8, at 2 (observing that no clear case for 
international cooperation in restricting incentives exists). 
369 See MAl NEGOTIATING TEXT, supra note 28, at 22 n.29. 
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special preferences for socially or economically disadvantaged mi-
nority groups, e.g., preferences to minority-owned small busi-
nesses in bidding on government contracts, should be excluded 
from or included on the list of prohibited investment incentives 
presents another thorny issue. On the other hand, prohibiting in-
centives would have the salutary benefit of preventing disputes 
over MFN treatment. For example, what if an investor from Coun-
try A was offered certain incentives for making an investment in 
Country C, but an investor with the same kind of investment from 
Country B was not made the same offer? The discretionary ad-
m.inlstration of incentive programs, which can be an important 
element in a country's development plans, might have to be elimi-
nated or severely curtailed if MFN treatment issues are to be 
avoided. Against this backdrop of strong differences of opinion 
over the value of investment incentives, perhaps the appropriate 
response is to strengthen the capacity of governments to effectively 
administer incentive programs rather than prohibit their use.370 
Considering the near impossibility of controlling local tax regimes 
through a multilateral agreement on investment, any prohibitions 
on investment incentives could be circumvented. 
In sum, given the diversity of opinion on the pros and cons of 
investment incentives, negotiations on disciplining the use of in-
vestment incentives should be postponed indefinitely.371 
4.7. Is the Current Legal Regime for FDI Unstable and Unpredictable? 
One of the most frequently touted benefits of a multilateral 
agreement on investment is that it would introduce predictability 
and stability to a presumably unpredictable and unstable world 
regarding FDl,372 Unfortunately, this view either ignores or under-
370 It has been suggested that the SCM Agreement, which distinguishes be-
tween prohibited and permitted subsidies, be used as a model for classifying and 
regulating investment incentives. See WTO Working Group on the Relationship 
Between Trade and Investment, Report (1999) of the Working Group on the Relation-
ship Between Trade and Investment to the General Council 11, WT jWGTIj3 (Oct. 22, 
1999) (discussing the dispute over the definitions used in the SCM Agreement). 
371 In the words of the WTO Secretariat, "As competition for FDI intensifies, 
potential host governments find it increasingly difficult to offer less favourable 
conditions for foreign investment than those offered by competing nations." 
Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 11, at 21. But see Sauve & Wilkie, 
supra note 16, at 14 (citing authors who acknowledge the complexity of the issue 
and the reluctance of key players to address it). 
372 See, e.g., Drabek, supra note 6, at 4-5 (noting foreign investors' need for 
transparent and predictable rules). 
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estimates the role played by the network of bilateral and regional 
agreements on foreign direct investment. The part played by BITs 
and regional agreements on investment in quickening the pace of 
FDI flows, not to mention autonomous measures taken at the na-
tional level to improve the climate for foreign investment, should 
not be overlooked or minimized. The huge number of parallel le-
gal regimes at the bilateral and regional level, as well as national 
laws designed to encourage inflows of foreign capital, evidence the 
perception, if not the reality, that BITs and regional investment 
agreements facilitate the cross-border movement of foreign capi-
ta1.373 UNCTAD reports that the network of bilateral investment 
treaties has quintupled during the 1990s, reaching 1941 by the end 
of 2000, compared to some 400 at the beginning of 1990,374 liThe 
373 See UNCTAD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS: A COMPENDIUM, 
vols. I-III (1996), vols. IV-V (2000), vol. VI (2001), vols. VII-IX (2002) (collecting bi-
lateral and regional instruments on foreign direct investment); WTO Working 
Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Bilateral, Regional, 
Plurilateral and Multilateral Agreements, Note by the Secretariat, WT /WGTI/W /22 
ijan. 26, 1998); UNCTAD, TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: AN 
OVERVIEW 94-103 (1999) [hereinafter TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
AGREEMENTS] (listing 105 of the main bilateral, regional, and multilateral instru-
ments dealing with FDI from 1948 to 1999); ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, 
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE: A COMPENDIUM (1999) (not-
ing that sweeping economic reforms have led to a substantial liberalization in the 
investment regimes of most countries in the hemisphere); Trade and Foreign Di-
rect Investment, supra note 9, at 27-28 (listing sixteen regional investment agree-
ments). 
374 UNCT AD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2001: PROMOTING LINKAGES 6 (2001) 
[hereinafter WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2001]. UNCT AD notes that as of 1999, out 
of some 1700 BITs, less than 10% involve OECD countries; that is, most BITs are 
concluded between a developed country and a developing country or between 
two developing countries. See LESSONS FROM THE MAl, supra note 21, at 22 n.8. 
One BIT was concluded on average every 2.5 days in 1997. See WORLD 
INVESTMENT REPORT 1998, supra note 10, at xix. The number of double taxation 
treaties also increased, numbering 1982 at the end of 1999. See WORLD INVESTMENT 
REPORT 2000, supra note 273, at xv. As of August 2002, the United States had con-
cluded forty-five BITs with the following countries (unless otherwise indicated by 
an asterisk, the year indicates when the BIT entered into force; an asterisk indi-
cates the year the BIT was signed): Albania (1998); Argentina (1994); Armenia 
(1996); Azerbaijan (1997*); Bahrain (1999); Bangladesh (1989); Belarus (1994*); Bo-
livia (1998*); Bulgaria (1994); Cameroon (1989); Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(1989); Republic of the Congo (1994); Croatia (1996*); Czech Republic (1992); Ec-
uador (1997); Egypt (1992); EI Salvador (1999*); Estonia (1997); Georgia (1997); 
Grenada (1989); Haiti (1983*); Honduras (1995*); Jamaica (1997); Jordan (1997*); 
Kazakhstan (1994); Kyrgyzstan (1994); Latvia (1996); Lithuania (1998*); Moldova 
(1994); Mongolia (1997); Morocco (1991); Mozambique (1998*); Nicaragua (1995*); 
Panama (1991); Poland (1994); Romania (1994); Russia (1992*); Senegal (1990); Slo-
vakia (1992); Sri Lanka (1993); Trinidad & Tobago (1996); Tunisia (1993); Turkey 
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common thread that runs through the proliferation of both types of 
treaties," UNCTAD concludes, "is that they reflect the growing 
role of FDI in the world economy and the desire of countries to fa-
cilitate it."375 As of January 1, 2000, the forty-nine LDCs had con-
(1990); Ukraine (1996); and Uzbekistan (1994*). A current list of U.S. BITs and a 
sample BIT are available at http://www.state.gov/www/issues/economic 
/7treaty.html. The forty-five countries with which the United States has con-
cluded BITs account for approximately 5% of total U.S. FDI. See U.S. INT'L TRADE 
COMM'N, THE YEAR IN TRADE 1994: OPERATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 
68 (1995). 
37S WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998, supra note 10, at xix. A sample of re-
gional activities focused on investment are the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FT AA) negotiations, U.S. outreach to Latin America, APEC initiatives, and the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area. 
At the Second Summit of the Americas held in Santiago, Chile, in April 1998, 
the thirty-four heads of state participating in the FT AA negotiations 'accepted the 
recommendations made by their trade ministers in San Jose and officially 
launched negotiations on a Free Trade Area of the Americas. See Second Summit 
of the Americas, Santiago Declaration, Apr. 19, 1998, available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/ftaa/santiago/sadop_e.htm. The heads of state also 
issued a Plan of Action, a body of concrete initiatives intended to promote the 
overall development of FT AA countries. See Second Summit of the Americas, 
Plan of Action, Apr. 19, 1998, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/ftaa/santiago 
/sapoa_e1.stm. The Santiago Declaration reiterates the negotiators' commitment 
to complete FT AA negotiations by 2005. The Declaration also states that the 
FTAA will be balanced, comprehensive, WTO-consistent, and will constitute a 
single undertaking (i.e., it will be an all-or-nothing, package deal). An agreement 
on investment is among the list of agenda items. 
On October 30, 1998, the United States and the five-member Andean Pact or 
Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela) signed an agree-
ment establishing a U.S.-Andean Community Trade and Investment Council. The 
Council will address key trade and investments issues, including the FTAA nego-
tiations, protection of intellectual property rights, and trade issues under the An-
dean Trade Preference Act. 
On October 8, 1998, ASEAN finance ministers agreed to adopt a framework 
agreement on an ASEAN Investment Area. Under the Investment Area, ASEAN 
investors are to receive national treatment by 2010 (2013 for Vietnam and 2015 for 
Laos and Burma), which will be extended to all investors by 2020. Each ASEAN 
member is to submit a list of excepted industries by mid-1999. See Jason 
Gutierrez, ASEAN Finance Ministers Approve Investment Pact, 'Surveillance' Mecha-
nism, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1716 (Oct. 14, 1998). In September 2001, the 
ASEAN members agreed to move up the deadlines for eliminating certain excep-
tions in the framework investment agreement from 2020 to 2010. See Rafael D. 
Frankel, Deadlines for ASEAN Investment Area Moved Up in Bid to Draw Foreign In-
vestment, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1476 (Sept. 20, 2001). 
The twenty-one-member Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum has three 
permanent Committees. In 1993, a Committee on Trade and Investment was cre-
ated to assume the duties of the working group assigned to that task. The work 
program of the Committee includes reviewing the results of the Uruguay Round 
and its implications for the region, pursuing efforts to simplify and harmonize 
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cluded a total of 224 BITs, about half (120) with developed coun-
tries.376 . 
As noted by India in a submission to the WGTI, bilateral in-
vestment treaties "provide a predictable climate for foreign in-
vestments."377 At the same time, even in the absence of a BIT, FDI 
may still flow into a host country, drawing into question the rele-
vance on a WTO agreement on investment.378 Because the decision 
to make an FDI is multifaceted, there may be no reason to believe 
that multilateral investment rules would lead to increased FDI 
flows.379 In short, neither the presence of a multilateral agreement 
on investment nor the absence of a BIT may be a determining fac-
tor in FDI inflows. 
customs procedures in the region, and examining the investment environment 
within APEC. See Joint Statement of APEC Ministers, Declaration on an APEC 
Trade and Investment Framework, Annex 1 (Nov. 20, 1993). The APEC Non-
Binding Investment Principles were adopted in 1994. They deal, inter alia, with 
transparency, non-discrimination among investor nations, national treatment, in-
vestment incentives, performance requirements, expropriation and compensation, 
repatriation and convertibility, dispute settlement, temporary entry of personnel, 
and avoidance of double taxation. The Investment Principles also encourage 
members to minimize the use of performance requirements that distort or limit 
the expansion of trade and investment. See WTO Working Group on the Relation-
ship Between Trade and Investment, Communication from APEC, WT /WGTI/W /9 
(Oct. 6, 1997) (outlining APEC's approach to investment); Trade and Foreign Di-
rect Investment, supra note 11, at 30-31; WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996, supra 
note 10, at 140-42. The APEC Investment Principles are available at 
http://www.apecsec.org.sg. 
376 FDI IN LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, supra note 286, at 14 (noting 120 BITs 
conducted between LDCs and developed countries) . 
377 WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Invest-
ment, Communication from India 3, WT /WGTI/W /74 (Apr. 13, 1999). India added 
that "studies have also pointed out that transnational corporations may not even 
be aware of the existence of such treaties-the determinants of their FDI decision 
lie elsewhere." Id. See also WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between 
Trade and Investment, Communication from India 3, WT /WGTI/W /72 (Apr. 13, 
1999) (,,[E]ven bilateral investment agreements have little effect on FDI flows."). 
378 For example, in the absence of a BIT between Chile and Peru, Chilean in-
vestors still invested $1 billion in Peru between 1993 and 1996. Likewise, in the 
absence of a BIT between the United States and Peru, the total stock of U.S. in-
vestment in Peru in 1997 was $1.46 billion. See WTO Working Group on the Rela-
tionship Between Trade and Investment, Communication from Peru, Bilateral Trea-
ties for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment: The Case of Peru 3, 
WT/WGTI/W/47 Ouly 8, 1998). 
379 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Report (2001) of the Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and 
Investment to the General Council 3-4, WT /WGTI/5/Rev.1 (Oct. 22, 2001). 
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While the arguments put forward by the advocates of a multi-
lateral investment agreement could easily leave one with the im-
pression that national barriers to foreign capital are high, deep, and 
wide, and that the international legal environment for capital is 
unstable and unpredictable, the fact is that since the 1980s the 
worldwide trend in national legislation regulating FDI has been to 
adopt laws that attract foreign investors by creating a favorable in-
vestment climate.380 UNCTAD reports that II [i1n recent years, there 
has been a sea-change in the attitudes of developing country gov-
ernments towards FDI and [transnational corporation] activi-
ties."381 Out of 599 changes in FDI legal regimes between 1991 and 
1996,95% went in the direction of more liberal investment rules.382 
UNCTAD found that in 1997 at least 151 changes in FDI regulatory 
regimes were made by seventy-six countries, 89% of which were in 
the direction of creating a more favorable environment for FDI.383 
In 1998 the trend was the same: of 145 regulatory changes relating 
to FDI by sixty countries, 94 % were in the direction of creating a 
more favorable climate for FDI.384 Similarly, in 2000 there were 150 
regulatory changes affecting FDI, of which 147 were more favor-
able to FDI.385 UNCTAD also reports that at the national level 
most of the forty-nine LDCs have legislation in place that liberal-
izes restrictions on FDI, provides for national treatment of FDI, al-
lows profit repatriation, and protects against expropriation.386 
380 See TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 373, at 
30 (indicating that the overwhelming majority of national regulatory changes af-
fecting FDI that have been introduced between 1991 and 1998 have been favorable 
to FOI); FREE TRADE OF THE AMERICAS WORKING GROUP ON INVESTMENT, FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT REGIMES IN THE AMERICAS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1999) (noting the 
favorable legal climate for foreign investment within the hemisphere). For a list of 
143 countries that have enacted special FDI legal regimes at the national level, see 
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998, supra note 10, at 56 tbl. 111.1. 
381 Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Note 
by the UNCTAD Secretariat, Transnational Corporations, Foreign Direct Investment 
and Development 5, WT/WGTI/W 181 Add.1 (Sept. 26, 1997). 
382 ld. 
383 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998, supra note 10, at xix. 
384 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1999, supra note 284, at xviii. 
385 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2001, supra note 374, at 6. 
386 See FDI IN LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, supra note 286, at 13. UNCT AD 
adds that an important area of reform involves limiting requirements on local eq-
uity participation, thereby expanding the amount of foreign ownership and con-
trol of an investment. Id. 
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Finally, regarding the alleged transaction costs that are im-
posed upon MNEs in becoming familiar with a multitude of BITs 
and national investment laws, Hoekman and Saggi observe: 
[I]t seems that the major proportion of the transactions [sic] 
costs associated with FDI is likely to arise from differences 
in language, culture, politics, and the general business cli-
mate of a host country. Familiarizing oneself with the in-
vestment laws of a country seems trivial in contrast to those 
more daunting challenges that exist regardless of whether 
the country is a signatory to a multilateral or a bilateral in-
vestment agreement. 387 
In short, in order to answer in the affirmative the question 
whether a globalization response to regulating FDI is preferable to 
the internalization response, a stronger case for globalization needs 
to be made. 
5. A WTO AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT: BUILDING A CONSENSUS 
Why should WTO members negotiate an agreement on in-
vestment, besides the fact that powerful WTO members, most no-
tably the EU, favor such an agreement? Assuming that the eco-
nomically weaker WTO members do not submit to the will of the 
stronger members, several conditions must be met before negotiat-
ing and successfully concluding a multilateral FDI agreement un-
der WTO auspices. 
A first condition is a consensus among policy-makers and gov-
ernments as to the value of having an open investment climate. 
Moving the key players to the point where they perceive it to be in 
their national interest to have international rules on investment is 
the critical first step. Despite different political and economic phi-
losophies among WTO members as to the proper role of govern-
ment in the national economy and in controlling the flow of foreign 
capital, a consensus is building in favor of FDI generally. Still, 
many countries-especially, but not exclusively, developing coun-
tries - constantly wrestle with the question of whether the energy, 
telecommunications, transportation, and natural resources sectors 
should be government-owned, privatized but owned solely by na-
387 Hoekman & Saggi, supra note 8, at 16-17. 
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tionals, or privatized and open to foreign ownership. Issues of na-
tional sovereignty, in both developed and developing countries, 
cannot be underestimated. Developing countries ask what advan-
tages flow from a multilateral agreement on investment when their 
development objectives are best achieved through autonomous lib-
eralization in conjunction with BITs. A multilateral agreement on 
investment would only tie the hands of developing countries with 
regard to performance requirements, such as technology transfer, 
and the use of investment incentives.388 
Closely related to the national sovereignty hurdle blocking a 
multilateral investment agreement are powerful, and too often un-
derestimated, sentiments of nationalism and national pride that 
prevent a consensus from building on a multilateral investment 
agreement. This sentiment runs especially strong when the topic is 
protecting cultural industries from being overwhelmed or acquired 
by foreign investors. These deep feelings of national pride threaten 
any multilateral investment agreement. 
WTO members have to believe that it is in their economic self-
interest to conclude a multilateral agreement on investment. Such 
a consensus unquestionably developed in the case of international 
trade in goods and services, as evidenced by the broad-based 
membership in the WTO. But even then many countries' commit-
ment to the goal of free trade has been less than unflagging over 
the past fifty-five years, and the consensus, as shaky as it is, took 
more than 200 years to build from the time Adam Smith first wrote 
on the economic benefits of liberal trade. 
A second condition is a consensus on the best forum for negoti-
ating multilateral rules on investment. Many good arguments can 
be made for placing such negotiations in the WTO. The WTO 
could very well prove to be a hospitable forum for negotiating an 
FDI agreement, as suggested by some scholars,389 because of the 
opportunities for using bargaining chips and making trade-offs 
among and between trade sectors. The WTO counts among its 145 
members all the world's developed countries and the major devel-
oping countries, including Brazil, India, and China. Considering 
388 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Report (2000) of the Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and 
Investment to the General Council 10, WT jWGTIj 4 (Nov. 27, 2000). 
389 See, e.g., Ernest-Ulrich Petersmann, International Competition Rules for Gov-
ernments and Jor Private Business: A "Trade Law Approach" Jor Linking Trade and 
Competition Rules in the WID, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 545, at 560-61 (1996). 
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the diverse and broad WTO membership that includes developed, 
developing, and emerging economies, a strong argument can be 
made that the WTO is the proper forum for concluding a multilat-
eral investment agreement, not only because of its broad-based 
membership, but because of the close link between trade and liber-
alized investment rules.39o 
Historically, the WTO's predecessor, the GA TI, had as its rai-
son d'€tre for the elimination of government barriers to interna-
tional trade in goods. With the establishment of the WTO in 1995, 
that portfolio has been expanded to cover trade in services and the 
protection of intellectual property. In fulfilling its primary man-
date, that is, completing the unfinished business of eliminating the 
many government-supported barriers to market access to foreign 
goods and services, it might be appropriate to add to the Organiza-
tion's portfolio an agreement to eliminate government barriers to 
FDI. However, negotiating rules on investment is far outside the 
WTO's portfolio of trade in goods and services. The liberalization 
of capital flows touches upon far more sensitive issues than does 
liberalization of markets for goods and services. If the OEeD ne-
gotiations on the stillborn MAl are any clue, WTO negotiations on 
an investment agreement would be so politically charged that they 
would undoubtedly become a lightening rod to which well-
organized environmental and labor NGOs would be attracted. Ig-
noring civil society and still reaching an agreement proved impos-
sible in the MAl negotiations. This suggests that perhaps NGOs 
should somehow be co-opted by including them in the negotia-
tions in order to lend legitimacy to them.391 Though perhaps 
sound as a theoretical matter, as a practical matter, such a strategy 
seems doomed from the start. 
Looking down the road, should the WTO members success-
fully conclude an agreement on investment, query whether the 
WTO is robust enough to resolve satisfactorily all investment dis-
putes between host-country members and home-country members 
on behalf of their investors. Query whether such disputes should 
even be justiciable at the WTO.392 Assuming that a credible dispute 
390 See EDWARD GRAHAM, GLOBAL CORPORATIONS AND NATIONAL 
GoVERNMENTS (1996) (arguing in favor of a multilateral investment agreement 
concluded under WTO auspices). 
391 See Sauve & Wilkie, supra note 16, at 9. 
392 The task of resolving investor-host country investment disputes would 
probably have to be delegated to other international institutions, such as the In-
ternational Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. As Sauve and 
HeinOnline -- 24 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 181 2003
2003] A WTO AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT 181 
settlement process exists or can be fashioned to resolve trade-
investment disputes, will the losers have the political will to abide 
by adverse dispute settlement decisions? 
A third condition is a consensus that a comprehensive, global 
approach to addressing foreign direct investment under WTO aus-
pices is preferable to the incremental approach we now see in exist-
ing WTO agreements, coupled with the parallel network of bilat-
eral and regional investment agreements. The provisions in WTO 
agreements that deal with investment, such as the TRIMs Agree-
ment that shields foreign investors from buy-local laws, thereby 
ensuring that both foreign and domestic investors are permitted to 
purchase materials from the lowest-cost source, regardless of its 
domestic or foreign origin, and the GATS that provides for a com-
mercial presence mode of service delivery, do not address the sub-
ject of FDI in a comprehensive fashion. Nevertheless, they repre-
sent a promising beginning. Likewise, while it is true that the two 
sectoral agreements on basic telecommunications and financial 
services negotiated in 1997 do not deal with investment in a com-
prehensive or systematic way either, these two agreements do rep-
resent genuine market openings to foreign capital and investors in 
the two sectors covered in the respective agreements. Given the 
diversity of opinion on the need for and wisdom of a WTO invest-
ment agreement, it might make more sense at this time to let the 
renewed negotiations on services trade serve as a telltale for the 
prospects of a comprehensive WTO framework agreement on in-
vestment, rather than launch headlong into negotiations on a com-
prehensive, multilateral approach to investment negotiations at the 
WTO. It arguably would be wiser to move ahead with these fol-
low-on negotiations and build on the achievements of the Uruguay 
Round before tackling a comprehensive investment agreement. As 
evidenced by the reservations to investment contained in NAFT A, 
the majority of which are in services industries, coupled with the 
lack of genuine market liberalization commitments made in the 
Uruguay Round in trade in services,393 the real liberalization to FDI 
that needs to occur is in the services area.394 
Wilkie point out, if private investors were given standing to bring complaints be-
fore the WTO, it would be difficult to find a principled basis for denying standing 
to labor and environmental NGOs. See id. at 13. 
393 For suggestions on how the follow-on GAlS negotiations should proceed 
in order to yield greater market liberalization, see id. at 16-20 (recommending, in-
ter alia, clarifying the definition of "commercial presence," strengthening the 
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A place to start would be to eliminate the 424 MFN exemptions 
that WTO members have listed under the GATS Annex to Article 
II. In addition, as the OECD notes in its study of the GATS MFN 
exemptions, about half of the 424 MFN exemptions were taken in 
sectors that provided limited, if any, market liberalization. Audio-
visual services and maritime, air, and road transport services, for 
example, account for 51 % of the MFN exemptions, but the aggre-
gate level of market access commitments is relatively low in com-
parison with financial services.395 At some future date the GATS 
could serve as a model for the progressive but incrementalliberali-
zation of foreign investment in the manufacturing sector.3% One 
can never be sure about such things, but it would seem that ser-
vices negotiations, including progressive liberalization in the 
commercial presence mode of supply, will attract less attention 
from environmental groups, given that services industries are less 
polluting than traditional smokestack manufacturing industries or 
other primary industries, such as oil and mineral extraction.397 
6. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Whether the WTO can succeed in concluding a multilateral 
agreement on investment is subject to doubt. Several WTO mem-
bers (e.g., the EU) have supported such a framework agreement, 
while others (e.g., the United States) have expressed misgivings 
and shown reluctance to move forward on meaningful negotia-
tions.398 Considering the diverse and broad WTO membership that 
includes developed, developing, and emerging economies, a strong 
argument can be made that the WTO is the proper forum for con-
cluding a multilateral investment agreement, not only because of 
its broad-based membership, but because of the close link between 
GATS investment protection provisions, and refining the terminology used in the 
GATS schedules of commitments). 
394 See Alan M. Rudman & Michael Gastrin, NAFTA' s Treatment of Foreign 
Investment, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NAFTA 47-79 (Alan M. Rudman ed., 
1994)95 Trade in Services: A Roadmap to GATS MFN Exemptions, supra note 94, at 15. 
396 See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Communication from Mexico 6-7, WT /WGTI/W /132 Ouly 8, 2002); 
Hoekman & Saggi, supra note 8, at 2; Sauve & Wilkie, supra note 16, at 15 (claiming 
that few major barriers to FDI remain in the manufacturing and primary goods 
industries). 
397 See Sauve & Wilkie, supra note 16, at 9. 
398 See Lawrence }. Speer, wro Trade Agenda Left Unresolved at Conclusion of 
OEeD Ministerial, 16 Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA) 914 Oune 2, 1999). 
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trade and liberalized investment rules. On the other hand, it is 
misguided to treat developing countries as a monolithic, homoge-
neous group. Lumping them together and forcing them to bend to 
the terms of a WTO agreement on investment runs counter to the 
commitment of special and differential treatment for developing 
countries found in virtually every WTO agreement, as well as to 
the letter, if not the spirit, of the Doha Ministerial Declaration and 
the Development Round agenda. On the other hand, treating de-
veloping countries as individual countries with country-specific 
needs becomes virtually impossible under a multilateral agree-
ment. Bilateral investment agreements offer the flexibility that is 
not possible under a multilateral framework. BITs can be tailored 
to fit country-specific needs in a way that is not possible under a 
multilateral framework. 399 
Policy makers and government officials can stick their heads in 
the sand and ignore the OECD MAl fiasco, but it would be foolish 
to ignore its lessons. The first lesson is that if a small club of de-
veloped countries could not reach a binding agreement on a sub-
ject such as foreign investment, where most of the OECD members 
have a relatively open investment climate, then what chance is 
there of reaching agreement on foreign investment rules under 
WTO auspices among 145 economically, politically, and culturally 
diverse nations? The second lesson is an extrapolation of the first: 
Again, if a small club of developed countries could not reach a 
binding agreement on a subject such as foreign investment, where 
their foreign investment laws are not dramatically far apart, then 
what chance is there of those same countries, when joined with 
some 100 other countries in the WTO, of reaching agreement on 
common investment rules, a subject that touches the sensitive 
nerve of national sovereignty? The more countries that are in-
volved in the investment negotiations, the more it is advisable to 
take an incremental approach at the multilateralleve1.4°O 
The economic arguments for an open investment climate may 
be strong, but those arguments do not necessarily lead inexorably 
to the conclusion that a multilateral agreement on investment is the 
399 But see WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment, Communication from Canada, Development Provisions para. 14, 
WT /WGTI/W /131 Ouly 3, 2002) (suggesting that developing countries can be ac-
commodated under a multilateral investment agreement through phase-in and 
grace periods that would allow them to build the capacity necessary to comply 
with the agreement). 
400 See LESSONS FROM THE MAl, supra note 21, at 27. 
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only correct legal response. While economists make a persuasive 
argument for the benefits of open markets on the cross-border flow 
of capital, the ·devil is in reaching agreement on multilateral rules 
and institutions for achieving these economic goals. Forcing the 
bitter pill of international regulation of investment down the 
throats of countries which are not prepared or willing to accept 
such rules is a formula for disaster. International agreements must 
be perceived by the parties as being in their best interests. Devel-
oped countries may try to bully less-powerful developing coun-
tries into entering into such agreements as the price of continued 
WTO membership, but adherence to the commitments made in 
such agreements will be begrudging and cheating at the margins 
widespread. 
Depending upon the precise content of a WTO investment 
agreement, the potential payoffs of such an agreement would in-
clude greater security, stability, predictability, and transparency, 
thus creating a favorable legal climate for investors. On the other 
hand, the impact of a WTO investment agreement could be negli-
gible, given the not inconsiderable liberalization that has already 
taken place worldwide, especially in developing countries and 
countries in transition. Like BITs, a multilateral agreement on in-
vestment is not an end in itself; rather, a multilateral agreement is a 
means to facilitating investment by allowing economic factors to 
determine whether and where an investment is made. Moreover, a 
WTO agreement on investment is really beside the point if a poten-
tial host country does not have the fundamentals firmly in place: 
political stability, desirable geographic location, adequate infra-
structure, human capacity, functioning legal institutions and en-
forceable contract rights, intellectual property protection, and open 
trade policies.401 
Would such an agreement reduce international frictions in the 
area of transnational mergers and acquisitions, an increasingly 
popular mode of entry into a foreign markets? International M&A 
activity is a global concern because it can reduce the competitive-
ness or contestability of a market. Such activity is of special con-
cern to the national authorities of the acquired firm because it 
represents a diminution of national sovereignty and control over 
domestic enterprises. The growth in FDI underscores the impor-
tance to some of concluding a WTO competition policy agreement 
401 See Hoekrnan & Saggi, supra note 8, at 21. 
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that takes into account these transborder concerns. In 1997, for ex-
ample, worldwide cross-border M&A activity totaled $342 billion. 
That figure nearly tripled in 2000 to $1.1 trillion,'nearly 50% greater 
than in 1999.402 
The debacle at the WTO's Seattle Ministerial Conference in De-
cember 1999 was in part fueled by myths and misinformation 
about the WTO, free trade, and globalization. It is true that accel-
erated trade liberalization worldwide has led to the increased 
globalization of business and the interdependence of national 
economies. But many environmental and workers' rights groups 
view the world as a zero sum game: to the extent the WTO suc-
ceeds at promoting globalization, then to the same extent the envi-
ronment and labor rights suffer in direct proportion. Environ-
mental doomsayers proclaim that we are on the brink of a global 
environmental collapse, thanks in no small part to free trade. It is 
difficult not to be a bit skeptical when labor unions decry the labor 
rights record of developing countries. One cannot help but won-
der whether they silently fear global economic interdependence 
and wish sub rosa for autarchy. In the words of former presidential 
economic adviser Murray Weidenbaum: 
If the full policy agenda of the anti-global activists were 
adopted, the long-run effect would be for the United States 
and other industrialized nations to lose the benefits of the 
specialization of labor, and suffer severe declines in stan-
dards of living. Ironically, the economic costs would soon 
be translated into environmental costs. Wealthier countries 
can afford to devote more resources to achieving a cleaner 
environment, and they do so. Poorer countries do far less 
to clean up the environment.403 
Nevertheless, from the integration of national economies it 
does not inexorably follow that negotiating a multilateral legal re-
gime regulating foreign investment, let alone a multilateral agree-
ment under WTO auspices, is necessarily the right approach. Mul-
402 See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2001, supra note 374, at 10. See generally 
KEVIN KENNEDY, COMPETITION LAW AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION; THE 
LIMITSOFMULTILATERALISM (2001). 
403 Murray Weidenbaum, Globalization Myths, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 
16,1999, at 9. 
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tilateralism is no panacea. Indeed, it has limits that policymakers 
need to recognize. The legal and political arguments against such 
an approach are formidable and convincing. Forcing the liberaliza-
tion of domestic laws on foreign direct investment may, in the end, 
be a solution in search of a problem. Although we do not live in a 
market economist's perfect investment world (i.e., a world that is 
barrier free to the flow of investment capital from whatever 
source), bilateral and regional agreements on investment, WTO 
commitments on non-discrimination and market access to goods 
and services, not to mention unilateral" disarmament" in the form 
of domestic laws that remove barriers to foreign investment, have 
made any multilateral investment agreements in large part redun-
dant. 
The WTO is in many respects a "natural" forum for negotiating 
an investment agreement. Still, there is nothing in the WTO's con-
stitution that makes a WTO agreement on FDI necessary, inexora-
ble, or preordained. Indeed, the absence of any multilateral FDI 
agreement-which was underscored in 1998 with the collapse of 
the OECD MAl-might not reflect a WTO lacuna or failure, but 
rather might be compelling evidence that a critical mass of political 
will among the world's developed countries has failed to build, 
since the end of World War II, such an agreement. It has not been 
for lack of trying that a multilateral investment agreement has not 
been concluded. On the contrary, it has been much discussed in 
other international fora, including the OECD and UNCTAD. At 
least one conclusion to be drawn from these discussions and nego-
tiations is that the world is not ready for, does not want, andj or 
does not need a multilateral agreement on investment. 
The WTO's prestige, reputation, and authority are at an all-
time low. The United States, its most powerful membe:..', has been 
ambivalent at times in its support of the WTO and its goal of pro-
moting liberal trade. The commitment of the United States to U.S. 
participation in the WTO is less than whole-hearted.404 But even 
404 Despite the U.S. Trade Representative's ringing endorsement of contin-
ued U.S. membership in the WTO in her March 2000 Report, 2000 TRADE POLlCY 
AGENDA AND THE 1999 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON 
THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, a resolution was introduced in Congress in 
2000 calling for U.S. withdrawal from the WTO pursuant to section 125 of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.c. § 3535 (mandating a five-year review 
of U.S. participation in the WTO). Gary G. Yerkey, USTR Sends Report to Congress 
Urging Continued U.S. Participation in wro, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 394 (Mar. 9, 
2000). That resolution was defeated in the House of Representatives on June 21, 
2000, by a vote of 363 to 56. Corbett B. Daly, House of Representatives Affirms 
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the most vocal government critics of the WTO have called for re-
form of the Organization, not for U.S. withdrawal from it.405 At the 
same time, intemperate and pandering remarks by former Presi-
dent Clinton at the WTO Seattle Ministerial Conference, suggesting 
that the WTO conclude an agreement on core labor standards that 
would be enforced through trade sanctions, steeled the resolve of 
developing countries not to be steamrolled by the WTO's devel-
oped-country members in the next WTO trade negotiation round. 
All of these developments are unfortunate because the WTO, 
unlike virtually every other inter-governmental organization in the 
world, sets rules that bind rich countries and poor countries alike. 
The big losers from the debacle in Seattle were developing coun-
tries. Of all the things that developing countries need - corruption-
free government and the other institutions that make capitalism 
work - open markets for foreign goods, services, and capital are 
probably the easiest to create. A liberal trade policy is a policy of 
increased competition and opportunity. Such a policy holds great 
promise not only for developed countries, but for the developing 
countries of the world as well. 
In sum, with the collapse of the OECD negotiations on a Multi-
lateral Agreement on Investment, the spotlight has shifted to the 
WTO as the forum for possibly concluding such an agreement. 
Moving the discussions on a multilateral investment agreement 
from the OECD to the WTO could simply be a case of pouring old 
wine into a new and bigger bottle. With the collapse of negotia-
American Membership in World Trade Organization, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. 975 Oune 22, 
2000). See Press Release, Office of the USTR, USTR Barshefsky Hails Overwhelm-
ing House Vote on WTO, Bipartisan Vote Rejects U.s. Withdrawal from WTO 
Oune 22, 2000). 
405 See Corbett B. Daly, Ways and Means Panel Rejects Resolution Calling for 
U.S. Withdrawal from WTO, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 923 Oune 15, 2000); Gary G. 
Yerkey, USTR Set to Issue Report Defending Continued U.S. Participation in WTO, 17 
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 341 (Mar. 2, 2000) (noting that House Minority Leader 
Richard Gephardt continues to support U.S. participation in the organization, but 
believes that dispute settlement system needs to be reformed). In August 2002, 
Congress approved and President Bush signed the Trade Act of 2002 which, inter 
alia, renews the President's trade promotion authority to negotiate multilateral 
trade agreements without subsequent amendments to such agreements by Con-
gress. See Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, §§ 2101-13,116 Stat. 933, 992-
1022 (2002). Trade promotion authority was formerly known as fast-track negoti-
ating authority. For a description of fast-track negotiating authority and proce-
dures, see Harold Kongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Policy, 18 BROOK. J. 
INT'L L. 143 (1992); Alan F. Holmer & Judith H. Bello, The Fast Track Debate: A Pre-
scription for Pragmatism, 26 INT'L LAW. 183 (1992). 
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tions on the proposed OEeD Multilateral Agreement on Invest-
ment in 1998, attention turned almost by default to the WTO as the 
sponsor of negotiations on a WTO investment agreement. The les-
son for the WTO from the MAl debacle is clear: Tread lightly. The 
MAl negotiators' expectations were unrealistically high and thus 
failed to gamer the necessary critical mass of support that was re-
quired for a multilateral investment agreement. 
Although no comprehensive WTO agreement regulating all as-
pects of FDI currently exists, the GATT-WTO system does inte-
grate trade and FDI in several important respects, most notably 
with the commercial presence mode of supply under the GATS. 
The fact that developed-country economies are today overwhelm-
ingly services-based and are net exporters of FDI strengthens the 
case, at least for developed countries, for further liberalization in 
services trade. This fact at the same time weakens the argument 
for WTO negotiations on a comprehensive, framework investment 
agreement. Even though the treatment of FDI in WTO agreements 
is fragmented and limited, there is no urgency to launching nego-
tiations on a WTO investment agreement. The WTO's raison d'etre 
to progressively liberalize trade in goods and services could be 
jeopardized if linkages are made in negotiations between invest-
ment and nontrade issues, such as labor and environment.406 
Given the many linkages between trade and nontrade areas-
labor, environment, competition policy-a Pandora's box could be 
opened if serious negotiations get underway in the WTO on an 
agreement on investment.407 
406 See Hoekman & Saggi, supra note 8, at 23. See also Symposium, The 
Boundaries of the wro, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002) (addressing the phenomenon of 
linkage between trade and other nontrade issues). 
407 See Jagdish Bhagwati, Powerful Reason for the MAl to be Dropped Even from 
the wro Agenda, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1998, at 17. 
